Karl Auerbach wrote:

> I am certainly glad that you have finally demolished the authority of
> the SO's.
> 
> It's good to know that the board is going to have the ability and
> responsibility to entirely ignore, review, reject, or completey rewrite
> anything that the PSO, DNSO, or ASO might decide.
> 
To the best of my knowledge, this is what happens for every Board for every
corporation.
If a group of people (appointed or elected doesn't matter) has the
responsibility to speak for a corporation, it surely has the authority to
take decisions.

In this respect, I thought that nobody had any doubt.
The matter of discussion was, in last fall, was about having the SOs as
separately incorporated or acting as part of ICANN. The latter solution has
been chosen, and I am very happy of that.

This reinforces the concept that SOs are advisory bodies, who make
recommandations to ICANN, whose Board then has to take the final decision
(and assume every responsibility, even legal).

This said, the fact that the responsibility of decision lies in ICANN's
Board does not make the SOs useless. They still have a responsibility: the
one of making good recommandations.
In fact, the Board can, if it pleases, disregard SOs recommendations, but it
is obvious that the Internet Community would expect an argumented reason for
doing that.

What I am trying to say is that the SOs still have an important role to
play.
I know that you are not convinced about this, and that, at least for the
PSO, you have been advocating even its dismissal. I disagree, because I
believe that the SOs and the Board have distinct and complementary roles,
and it will not be wise to get the whole thing out of balance.

In fact, my feeling is that your real point is not "a weak vs. strong
Board", a subject that most of us thought closed (if it ever has been an
issue), but "weak vs. strong SOs".
If we go down this path, we may end up in disrupting the authority of the
SOs (I am talking about the authority to advise or recommend, not to
decide). Moreover, if their authority is undermined, their capacity to elect
Board members could be questioned, and in the end we may end up in proposing
a Board composed only by "at-large" Directors.

Is this the *real* target of this discussion?   ;>)

Regards
Roberto

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