> Burr said that > Commerce had seen the proposed registrar accreditation > agreement that included the fee and also noted that there were > not many comments about it during ICANN's comment period - > apart from long and vociferous comments from NSI. What was posted for comment is at http://www.icann.org/draftguidelines.html (8 Feb 1999) "...Under the proposal, accredited registrars would pay the variable component monthly to ICANN based on the number of initial and renewal SLD registrations they enter into the registry beginning in July 1999 (the first month of ICANN's first full fiscal year). The amount due per registration-year would be established in ICANN's annual budgeting process, in which fees and charges are established with "the goal of fully recovering the reasonable costs of the operation of [ICANN] and establishing reasonable reserves." (See ICANN Bylaws, Article XI, Section 4(b).) To provide greater certainty to prospective registrars considering entering the business, this proposal would stipulate that the variable component would not exceed US$1.00 per registration-year. Q35. Are there any practical problems presented by collection of per-registration fees at the registrar level? Q36. Is it appropriate to have both fixed and variable components of the accreditation fee? Q37. At what level should the fixed component be set? Should the level vary based on the country in which the registrar is located? Q38. Is there some measure other than registration-years on which the variable component should be based? Q39. Is it beneficial to state a cap on the rate at which the variable component is computed, to allow registrars to better assess their prospects in the business? [...]" ---------- Out of curiosity, I looked through the 100 comments received in the dedicated comments-guidelines list which was essentially dead by 4 March (Singapore) -- the redoubtable Jim Williams suggested differential rates for indivs and commercial entities, and Amadeu wrote Q35. Are there any practical problems presented by collection of per-registration fees at the registrar level? The only practical question is : why is this per-registration fee collected at the register and not the registry level?. More than practical, the problem is one of principles:**does this amount to an Internet tax?** Why should registrars pay by registration, instead of contributing to ICANN's expenses based on ICANN's needs as set in the budget? ... Q37. At what level should the fixed component be set? Should the level vary based on the country in which the registrar is located? At the level of the need for contribution that ICANN's activities might require form registrars. Differentiated fees (positive discrimination) has a strong appeal in this context., And a strong drawback: the extreme facility that net activities provide for "offshore flagging". NSI's comments were 'too long' so one must go offsite to read them at all (http:// www.netsol.com/policy/icann299/ ) there doesnt seem to be any evidence that other posters ever did that. Nevertheless, they are worth looking over in the wake of the Com Cmte hearings, as the accreditation contract is at the heart of the dispute. On question 35-39 relating to the 'variable' registration fee, the detailed response is: A fixed application fee from each company applying for accreditation seems a reasonable way to cover the costs of processing each application. A variable fee based on registration years payable by each registrar would be inefficient and unjustified by any fair allocation of fees [*]in relation to the sources of costs incurred by ICANN[*]. It would be more appropriate for each registry (including the IP registries) to bear a proportionate share of ICANN's operating costs. Q40. Are the stated grounds of termination appropriate? Can they be made more specific while still preserving their utility? ICANN has no legitimate interest in establishing direct contractual relations with registrars. Its limited role in developing accreditation criteria does not require it to enter into bilateral agreements with registrars, especially where the terms of the proposed agreement extend well beyond matters concerning the registrar's minimum credentials. ICANN can perform its proper accreditation function simply by publishing accreditation standards and enforcing them through flow- down clauses in contracts with registries. The draft agreement proposed by ICANN attempts to leverage whatever limited authority it may have as a registrar accreditation body into much broader powers over the registrar industry. ICANN thus apparently hopes to acquire such powers by withholding a registrar's accreditation if the registrar does not capitulate to the expansive terms of the "accreditation agreement." Such tactics raise concerns about the enforceability and legality of ICANN's proposed agreement. As the Department of Commerce cautioned in the White Paper: [t]he new corporation does not need any special grant of immunity from the antitrust laws so long as its policies and practices are reasonably based on, and no broader than necessary to promote the legitimate coordinating objectives of the new corporation. [emphasis added]. The White Paper did not contemplate that ICANN would wield such power. The Department of Commerce expressly stated that its policy is not to "propose a monolithic structure for Internet governance, … [but rather to] seek a stable process to address the narrow issues of management and administration of Internet names and numbers . . . ." Underscoring the limited scope of ICANN's proposed authority, the Department of Commerce indicated that the new corporation (i.e., ICANN) should operate "on principles similar to those of a standard-setting body." [...] ========== Interestingly, NSI also says (re Q5) ... ICANN must recognize that lack of consensus on uniform standards does not necessarily create a need for top down, centralized action. In the presence of disagreement, the default condition in the marketplace is that many diverse actors will continue to develop and implement policies they believe will best serve their customers and constituents. **Dissatisfaction by any constituency with present policies, whether trademark owners or noncommercial registrants, whether privacy advocates or those who favor broad distribution of all information collected in the registration process, is an inevitable and normal state.** For an open, bottom up, Internet standard setting body, the key question presented is not "what is the best policy?" but "does sufficient agreement exist on specific provisions that will be widely accepted on a voluntary basis?" Compare the testimony of Esther Dyson, 22 July: "But consensus does not always or necessarily mean unanimity, and there are certainly those in the community who disagree, for various reasons, with particular consensus positions produced by this process. Some disagreements are philosophical; some are cultural; some are economic. This is inevitable given the diversity of interests involved and the cultural, political and economic issues implicated by the matters that ICANN has dealt with. The fact of those disagreements, however, is evidence of the process itself, not of any problems with it." So in talking about the "embodiment of the Internet community as a whole [reflecting] the participation of a large and growing number of technical, business, public-interest, academic, and other segments," does one go on any longer and more vociferously than the other? ============= www.netsol.com/policy/icann299/didnt.html Questions ICANN Should Have Asked But Did Not When should ICANN enter into contracts with registries and on what terms? What should the relationship between ICANN and Regional Internet Address Registries be? What should the overall ICANN budget be? Should the DNSO approve fees to registries proposed by ICANN?
