Hej,
Att sammanfatta vad som händer i EU gällande Chat Control 1 och 2 är inte helt
enkelt.
Här är en uppdatering från femtejuli-stiftelsen, se även uppdateringen på
inlägget.
https://femtejuli.se/2026/03/03/parlamentsutskott-sager-nej-till-chat-control-1/
Patrick Breyer skriver också ett inlägg kopierat nedan.
Här är det senaste ändringsförslaget till Chat Control 2 som jag har haft i
mina loggor. Om någon känner till ett senare, posta gärna.
https://cdn.netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2025/07/2025-07-24_Council_Presidency_LEWP_CSA-R_Compromise-texts_11596.pdf
Den som vill läsa och sätta sig in i innehållet är förstås mer än välkommen att
dela sin sammanfattning. Många ögon behövs.
Följ gärna chatcontrol.eu och chatcontrol.se och du kan även bidra till
chatcontrol.se med länkningar till nyhetsuppdateringar till arkivet.
Ulrika
> PRESS RELEASE
>
> Bombshell in Brussels: Civil Liberties Committee Votes to Stop "Chat Control
> 1.0" – Sensational Vote Against Mass Surveillance
>
> In a historically rare turn of events, the European Parliament's Committee on
> Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)
> [voted](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-10-2026-0040_EN.html)
> Monday night against the Commission's proposal to extend the so-called "Chat
> Control 1.0" Regulation (EU) 2021/1232. This interim regulation, set to
> expire in April, allows providers of e-mail, messaging and chat services
> (such as Meta or Google) to indiscriminately scan the private chats and
> emails of millions of citizens for potentially illegal content.
>
> By a [vote of 38 to
> 28](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/303623/Vote%20results_2%20March%202026.pdf)
> (with 3 abstentions), MEPs delivered a resounding rejection of
> indiscriminate mass surveillance of private messages. The rejection was
> carried by a broad but heterogeneous coalition: Committee members from the
> EPP (Christian Democrats), Greens, The Left, the majority of the Renew group
> (Liberals), and the far-right ESN voted against the draft report while the
> Social Democrats (S&D) voted in favor, supported by the national-conservative
> ECR and the far-right PfE group.
>
> Patrick Breyer, digital freedom fighter and former Member of the European
> Parliament for the Pirate Party, comments:
>
>> "What a sensational milestone: The digital privacy of correspondence is
>> alive! There is no majority for indiscriminate mass scanning of our private
>> chats. A thousand thanks to everyone who applied pressure beforehand. The
>> final showdown follows next week at the plenary vote."
>
> The Vote Result: No Majority for Indiscriminate Chat Control
>
> The committee rejected all attempts to further legitimize the temporary
> derogation allowing for the mass, indiscriminate scanning of private chats,
> which is set to expire in April 2026. None of the political camps could
> secure a majority for their approach:
>
> - FAILED: The proposal by Rapporteur Birgit Sippel (S&D), which sought to
> drop error-prone AI text scanning and automated classification of unknown
> visuals but proposed to continue indiscriminate mass control via "hash
> scanning" (matching against databases), failed to reach a majority with a tie
> of 33:33 votes. The criticism: Scanning for already known images does not
> stop ongoing abuse nor rescue children.
> - FAILED: The Conservatives' demand to allow even less reliable AI analysis
> of never-before-seen images and chat histories also found no majority. This
> is the approach adopted by EU governments in Council.
> - FAILED: The fundamental rights-compliant proposal by the Greens and Pirates
> to restrict scans strictly to individuals connected by law enforcement to
> child sexual abuse was also not adopted.
>
> As a result, the LIBE Committee
> [recommends](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-10-2026-0040_EN.html)
> that the EU Parliament rejects the Commission proposal. It is expected,
> however, that all alternative approaches listed above will be put to a vote
> again in the plenary session next week – the outcome is completely open.
>
> Lobbying Myths Debunked
>
> Industry associations and proponents are currently trying to pressure MEPs
> with the claim that the scans are "voluntary" and "high-precision" (see [tech
> industry lobbying
> paper](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/DOT-Europe-Open-letter-on-extension-of-ePrivacy-derogation.pdf)).
> The reality is different:
>
> - Mass False Suspicion: There is no such thing as "high precision" in mass
> hash scanning. When searching for "known" material, opaque international
> databases often fail to account for European criminal law. Furthermore,
> algorithms are blind to context and lack of intent (e.g., acting out of
> outrage, misguided humor, misjudging age, or teenage sexting). The
> consequence: The German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) reports that
> almost half of all reported chats (approx. 150,000 per year) are criminally
> irrelevant. This floods authorities with false positives and ties up
> resources urgently needed to investigate producers and abuse perpetrators.
> Automated analysis of unknown visuals or the text of chat conversations is
> even less reliable.
> - Criminalization of Minors: Instead of catching predators, algorithms
> increasingly criminalize minors. In Germany, 40% of proceedings already
> target teenagers sharing "embarrassing" or sexually explicit content
> (sexting) among themselves, without any abusive intent.
> - Coercion via Backdoor: The alleged "voluntary nature" of the providers is
> effectively a standard that hardly any major US service evades. In the
> future, providers are to be explicitly obliged to implement "risk mitigation"
> measures.
>
> No "Legal Vacuum," but a Chance for Real Security
>
> The argument by proponents that letting the regulation expire would lead to a
> dangerous "legal vacuum" and leave police "blind" is misleading
> fear-mongering:
>
> - Public Web Still Scanned: Providers remain permitted to scan public posts,
> hosted files, and websites without this special regulation regarding private
> communication. User reports also remain permissible. Suspicious activity
> reports to the police will therefore continue.
> - Encryption is Coming Anyway: Indiscriminate mass surveillance is a dying
> model. Major services like Meta are increasingly shifting to end-to-end
> encryption, where these scans are technically impossible.
> - Quality over Quantity: Ending error-prone mass scans would relieve
> authorities of the flood of "junk data" and free up capacity for targeted,
> undercover investigations.
> The negotiations on the permanent Child Sexual Abuse Regulation (CSAR) are
> scheduled to conclude in Summer, thus new rules will soon be enacted.
>
> Why Mass Scans Fail and What We Need Instead
>
> Searching for a needle in the haystack of billions of private communications
> has proven ineffective. It drowns law enforcement in data garbage, while
> professional predator networks have long since moved to secure channels.
> Instead of endlessly extending the failed "Chat Control 1.0", the EU needs to
> move on to the approach already outlined by the Parliament for the permanent
> regulation (CSAR):
>
> - Security by Design: Obliging services to implement safe default settings
> (e.g., protection against contact attempts by strangers/adults) rather than
> breaking the privacy of all users.
> - Targeted Investigations: Surveillance must only occur upon reasonable
> suspicion and with a judicial order – focusing resources on actual
> perpetrators to protect children, prevent the production of new material and
> bust offender networks.
> - Removing Instead of Scanning: Proactive cleaning of the public web and
> consistent removal obligations for illegal material to stop distribution at
> the source.
>
> Politics at a Crossroads
>
> Breyer concludes:
>
>> "EU governments in the Council are almost unanimously (except CZ) demanding
>> an extension of privatised mass surveillance for two years, to pave the way
>> for the permanent authorization of Chat Control during this time. The
>> Parliament now has the historic chance to choose a new, truly effective and
>> rights-respecting approach. We need targeted, judicially ordered
>> surveillance in cases of suspicion and secure technology for everyone – not
>> a permanent state of exception that places 450 million innocent citizens
>> under general suspicion."
>
> Further Information & Documents:
>
> - [Industry Lobbying
> Paper](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/DOT-Europe-Open-letter-on-extension-of-ePrivacy-derogation.pdf)
> - [Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor
> (EDPS)](https://www.edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/press-releases/2026/extension-interim-rules-combat-child-sexual-abuse-online-must-address-shortcomings-and-prevent-indiscriminate-scanning_en)
> - [Civil Society Open
> Lette](https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/We-say-no-to-Big-Tech-mass-snooping-on-our-messages-CSO-open-letter-February-2026.pdf)
>
> Background Information:
> https://chatcontrol.eu
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
>
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>
> --
> Dr. Patrick Breyer
> Former Member of the European Parliament for the German Pirate Party
> E-Mail:
> [email protected]
> My PGP key:
> http://keys.gnupg.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x774EC7FD4E3C9B04
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