[lng-odp] [PATCH API-NEXT v2 17/20] linux-generic: crypto: make HMAC work across segmented packets

[Github ODP bot]

From: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsoleni...@linaro.org>

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsoleni...@linaro.org>
---
/** Email created from pull request 34 (lumag:crypto-update-main-new)
 ** https://github.com/Linaro/odp/pull/34
 ** Patch: https://github.com/Linaro/odp/pull/34.patch
 ** Base sha: 826ee894aa0ebd09d42a17e1de077c46bc5b366a
 ** Merge commit sha: 7c49c61063e2d57f049a5436cf12a3c36710bb34
 **/
 platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c 
b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c
index 25f2e231..a147f271 100644
--- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c
+++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c
@@ -118,29 +118,53 @@ null_crypto_routine(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param 
ODP_UNUSED,
 }
 
 static
+void packet_hmac(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param,
+                odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session,
+                uint8_t *hash)
+{
+       odp_packet_t pkt = param->out_pkt;
+       uint32_t offset = param->auth_range.offset;
+       uint32_t len   = param->auth_range.length;
+       HMAC_CTX ctx;
+
+       ODP_ASSERT(offset + len <= odp_packet_len(pkt));
+
+       /* Hash it */
+       HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
+       HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,
+                    session->auth.key,
+                    session->auth.key_length,
+                    session->auth.evp_md,
+                    NULL);
+
+       while (len > 0) {
+               uint32_t seglen = 0; /* GCC */
+               void *mapaddr = odp_packet_offset(pkt, offset, &seglen, NULL);
+               uint32_t maclen = len > seglen ? seglen : len;
+
+               HMAC_Update(&ctx, mapaddr, maclen);
+               offset  += maclen;
+               len     -= maclen;
+       }
+
+       HMAC_Final(&ctx, hash, NULL);
+       HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+}
+
+static
 odp_crypto_alg_err_t auth_gen(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param,
                              odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session)
 {
-       uint8_t *data  = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt);
-       uint8_t *icv   = data;
-       uint32_t len   = param->auth_range.length;
        uint8_t  hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 
-       /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to auth */
-       data += param->auth_range.offset;
-       icv  += param->hash_result_offset;
-
        /* Hash it */
-       HMAC(session->auth.evp_md,
-            session->auth.key,
-            session->auth.key_length,
-            data,
-            len,
-            hash,
-            NULL);
+       packet_hmac(param, session, hash);
 
        /* Copy to the output location */
-       memcpy(icv, hash, session->auth.bytes);
+       odp_packet_copy_from_mem(param->out_pkt,
+                                param->hash_result_offset,
+                                session->auth.bytes,
+                                hash);
 
        return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE;
 }
@@ -149,31 +173,19 @@ static
 odp_crypto_alg_err_t auth_check(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param,
                                odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session)
 {
-       uint8_t *data  = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt);
-       uint8_t *icv   = data;
-       uint32_t len   = param->auth_range.length;
        uint32_t bytes = session->auth.bytes;
        uint8_t  hash_in[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
        uint8_t  hash_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 
-       /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to auth */
-       data += param->auth_range.offset;
-       icv  += param->hash_result_offset;
-
        /* Copy current value out and clear it before authentication */
-       memset(hash_in, 0, sizeof(hash_in));
-       memcpy(hash_in, icv, bytes);
-       memset(icv, 0, bytes);
-       memset(hash_out, 0, sizeof(hash_out));
+       odp_packet_copy_to_mem(param->out_pkt, param->hash_result_offset,
+                              bytes, hash_in);
+
+       _odp_packet_set_data(param->out_pkt, param->hash_result_offset,
+                            0, bytes);
 
        /* Hash it */
-       HMAC(session->auth.evp_md,
-            session->auth.key,
-            session->auth.key_length,
-            data,
-            len,
-            hash_out,
-            NULL);
+       packet_hmac(param, session, hash_out);
 
        /* Verify match */
        if (0 != memcmp(hash_in, hash_out, bytes))