I’m working on the basic changes to implement my suggestion at the moment. Once that is there testing specific ports against version 3 ’the canaries’ will be trivial. more in a bit.
> On 6 Oct 2021, at 5:40 pm, Ken Cunningham <ken.cunningham.web...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > For whoever gets up the enthusiasm to take on the storm of nay-sayers: > > Although I found about 90% of the 100 or so ports I tried built without any > changes against openssl 3.0.0 (rust, cargo, qt5, qt4-mac, etc, etc), and the > rest were easy < 5 min fixes to use our openssl11 port, I noted in the > openssl 3 migration guide that the FIPS mode is disabled by default on the > openssl 3 build, and has to be expressly enabled. > > I recall that most of the (very few) build failures I saw were in fact FIPS > failures, so enabling that module might fix a bunch of them. > > Best, > > Ken > > > On Tue, Oct 5, 2021 at 12:54 PM Fred Wright <f...@fwright.net > <mailto:f...@fwright.net>> wrote: > > On Mon, 4 Oct 2021, Christopher Jones wrote: > >> On 4 Oct 2021, at 5:54 pm, Ken Cunningham <ken.cunningham.web...@gmail.com > >> <mailto:ken.cunningham.web...@gmail.com>> wrote: > >> > >> I was hoping to move this along for the overwhelming benefit of the > >> license, but TBH the push-back so far is 99.99% negative about moving > >> to openssl 3.0.0 this year, so too controversial for me to get involved > >> with. I'll sit back for six to twelve months and see what you guys work > >> out over the coming year. > > > > All the more reason to follow my suggested migration path then I would > > say, as it allows an openssl30 port to be made available, and those > > ports that wish to can use it via the new PG, but it doesn’t have to > > become the default until some later date. > > The PR thread contained (approximately) the following two statements: > > 1) Unless v3 is the default, nobody will bother to use it. > > 2) Everybody is really, *really* anxious to move to v3 for the more > permissive license. > > Clearly those two statements are in conflict. > > At Google, we had a process called "canarying". Although technically a > misnomer, it referred to the "canary in the coal mine" concept, with the > idea that rolling out new stuff with possible issues should start small, > so that problems could be found (and hopefully fixed) before they caused > large-scale breakage. > > If the OpenSSL folks were committed to maintaining backward compatibility, > then none of this nonsense would be necessary, but it's clear that they're > not. And there's no reason to assume that they won't pull the same crap > again in the future (having done so at least twice already), so having a > mechanism for multiple coexisting OpenSSL "major" versions could have > long-term value beyond the v3 transition. > > > TBH I also was quite dubious of making 3.0.0 the default any time ’soon’ > > I agree, especially if the only end benefit is the license. Remember, > OpenSSL is the poster child for why *not* to assume that that newer is > more secure. :-) > > Fred Wright
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