Nigel Woodley writes: > I understand other mailman type products offer this functionality for the > very reason that I have outlined.
What you are saying implies that an explicitly untrusted host is allowed to inject content into a secure network based on the most easily forged identification on the Internet. This seems unlikely to be true to me, and if true, I would say the security policy is broken. Are you sure you understand the actual rules for mail distribution on this network? I have to suspect that even if you got what you say you want, you still would not be able to distribute posts via a Mailman based on that host. There are better methods for identification like DKIM (though they still have technical problems w.r.t. mailing lists). Perhaps such a protocol is in use on your network and you need not munge headers at all (in fact, you can not munge DKIM-signed headers without breaking DKIM). HTH ------------------------------------------------------ Mailman-Users mailing list Mailman-Users@python.org http://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/mailman-users Mailman FAQ: http://wiki.list.org/x/AgA3 Security Policy: http://wiki.list.org/x/QIA9 Searchable Archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/mailman-users%40python.org/ Unsubscribe: http://mail.python.org/mailman/options/mailman-users/archive%40jab.org
