On 2/20/20 5:51 AM, Hans-Martin Mosner via mailop wrote:
This is probably a reasonable way of dealing with the problem. TOR exit nodes are somewhat like dynamic IP addresses - you will get a lot of dictionary attacks and similar stuff, and you can just block off any non-authenticated non-http access from such IPs (maybe use fail2ban to silence them for a limited time).
This hints at the type of policy that I as alluding to. I.e. $Company Policies: · $Company filters traffic from ToR exit nodes.· Any malicious activity detected by $Company's spam trap / honey pot is reported.
Neither policy alters the other policy. The former policy just makes it such that ToR exit nodes can't hit the latter policy.
-- Grant. . . . unix || die
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
_______________________________________________ mailop mailing list mailop@mailop.org https://chilli.nosignal.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/mailop
