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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-1994?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12895999#action_12895999
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Vinod K V commented on MAPREDUCE-1994:
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bq. I believe you're allowed to make hard links to other files regardless of
their permissions. If it were kept in a directory with strict permissions, that
would help the issue a little bit.
I actually meant that even though an attacker can create hard-links, he/she
cannot run it because of the strict permissions. Secure permissions on this
file are really really important and are validated by the binary itself anyways.
Given that we can simply address the arv[0] spoof problem here. Is that fine?
> Linux task-controller determines its own path insecurely
> --------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: MAPREDUCE-1994
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-1994
> Project: Hadoop Map/Reduce
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: security, task-controller
> Affects Versions: 0.22.0
> Reporter: Todd Lipcon
> Assignee: Todd Lipcon
> Priority: Critical
>
> The task-controller uses argv[0] to determine its own path, and then calls
> stat() on that. Instead it should stat("/proc/self/exe") directly. This is
> important since argv[0] can be spoofed to point to another program and thus
> either fool the autodetection of HADOOP_HOME or evade various permissions
> checks.
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