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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-2858?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13126793#comment-13126793
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Allen Wittenauer commented on MAPREDUCE-2858:
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bq. It authenticates the user and if the user is not the owner of AM, the 
filtering will happen.

Correct, but with two very big points:

a) The only allowed access is via the proxy (no HDFS, etc)
b) The filter drops all embedded content.  Bye-bye MR SVG graphs.

bq. Signing is pretty much useless in practice due to key management issues 
besides the hairy implementation issues (need to sign am jar along with all its 
dependencies and any stuff that gets added to distributed cache)

Actually, you'd be amazed at the enterprises that actually have effective 
signing infrastructures in place. 

But more importantly, you missed a key thing here:  you can still allow 
untrusted code to run.  You just mark it as such so that whoever can make the 
informed decision.  This is much better than a black box that gives a false 
sense of security.
                
> MRv2 WebApp Security
> --------------------
>
>                 Key: MAPREDUCE-2858
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-2858
>             Project: Hadoop Map/Reduce
>          Issue Type: Sub-task
>          Components: applicationmaster, mrv2, security
>    Affects Versions: 0.23.0
>            Reporter: Luke Lu
>            Assignee: Luke Lu
>            Priority: Blocker
>             Fix For: 0.23.0
>
>
> In MRv2, while the system servers (ResourceManager (RM), NodeManager (NM) and 
> NameNode (NN)) run as "trusted"
> system users, the application masters (AM) run as users who submit the 
> application. While this offers great flexibility
> to run multiple version of mapreduce frameworks (including their UI) on the 
> same Hadoop cluster, it has significant
> implication for the security of webapps (Please do not discuss company 
> specific vulnerabilities here).
> Requirements:
> # Secure authentication for AM (for app/job level ACLs).
> # Webapp security should be optional via site configuration.
> # Support existing pluggable single sign on mechanisms.
> # Should not require per app/user configuration for deployment.
> # Should not require special site-wide DNS configuration for deployment.
> This the top jira for webapp security. A design doc/notes of threat-modeling 
> and counter measures will be posted on the wiki.

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