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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-2858?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13128984#comment-13128984
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Luke Lu commented on MAPREDUCE-2858:
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bq. How do you purport to even find the JavaScript? I don't believe you can
write an ad-hoc parser that detects all known ways of embedding JavaScript.
This is a good point. The scanner needs to be aggressive (false positive is OK)
to cover all script cases: anything in between script/object/embed tags, any
on*|codebase|src|href attributes, while considering charset/encoding of the
response. That's why typical HTML parsers are not suitable for this task. The
scanner needs to be carefully reviewed. Fortunately, it's pretty short as it
doesn't try to do any remotely as ambitious as Caja, which ha numerous security
bugs over the years. As I mentioned, a trivial scanner that always return true
for #maybeUnsafe is acceptable.
bq. having a whitelisted set of ApplicationMaster jars is the only real way to
achieve this.
Again, whitelisting AM jars is complementary to the proxy. But it's not
sufficient for real world usage, as there'll be too many jars to review and
extremely inconvenient/counter-productive for cluster/cloud/grid usage.
bq. If we can't do a whitelist of binaries, we should always generate the
interstitial when the visitor doesn't match the submitter.
+1. I personally would recommend this even with whitelisted binaries and log
every action (visitor username, webapp username, visitor choice (proceed, view
source, strip (non-whitelisted) scripts (may break content) etc).
> MRv2 WebApp Security
> --------------------
>
> Key: MAPREDUCE-2858
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-2858
> Project: Hadoop Map/Reduce
> Issue Type: Sub-task
> Components: applicationmaster, mrv2, security
> Affects Versions: 0.23.0
> Reporter: Luke Lu
> Assignee: Luke Lu
> Priority: Blocker
> Fix For: 0.23.0
>
>
> In MRv2, while the system servers (ResourceManager (RM), NodeManager (NM) and
> NameNode (NN)) run as "trusted"
> system users, the application masters (AM) run as users who submit the
> application. While this offers great flexibility
> to run multiple version of mapreduce frameworks (including their UI) on the
> same Hadoop cluster, it has significant
> implication for the security of webapps (Please do not discuss company
> specific vulnerabilities here).
> Requirements:
> # Secure authentication for AM (for app/job level ACLs).
> # Webapp security should be optional via site configuration.
> # Support existing pluggable single sign on mechanisms.
> # Should not require per app/user configuration for deployment.
> # Should not require special site-wide DNS configuration for deployment.
> This the top jira for webapp security. A design doc/notes of threat-modeling
> and counter measures will be posted on the wiki.
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