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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-3256?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13138525#comment-13138525
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Hadoop QA commented on MAPREDUCE-3256:
--------------------------------------

-1 overall.  Here are the results of testing the latest attachment 
  
http://issues.apache.org/jira/secure/attachment/12501322/MAPREDUCE-3256-20111028.1.txt
  against trunk revision .

    +1 @author.  The patch does not contain any @author tags.

    +1 tests included.  The patch appears to include 10 new or modified tests.

    +1 javadoc.  The javadoc tool did not generate any warning messages.

    +1 javac.  The applied patch does not increase the total number of javac 
compiler warnings.

    +1 findbugs.  The patch does not introduce any new Findbugs (version 1.3.9) 
warnings.

    +1 release audit.  The applied patch does not increase the total number of 
release audit warnings.

    -1 core tests.  The patch failed these unit tests:
                  org.apache.hadoop.yarn.server.TestContainerManagerSecurity

    +1 contrib tests.  The patch passed contrib unit tests.

Test results: 
https://builds.apache.org/job/PreCommit-MAPREDUCE-Build/1193//testReport/
Console output: 
https://builds.apache.org/job/PreCommit-MAPREDUCE-Build/1193//console

This message is automatically generated.
                
> Authorization checks needed for AM->NM protocol
> -----------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: MAPREDUCE-3256
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MAPREDUCE-3256
>             Project: Hadoop Map/Reduce
>          Issue Type: Sub-task
>          Components: applicationmaster, mrv2, nodemanager, security
>    Affects Versions: 0.23.0
>            Reporter: Vinod Kumar Vavilapalli
>            Assignee: Vinod Kumar Vavilapalli
>            Priority: Blocker
>             Fix For: 0.23.0
>
>         Attachments: MAPREDUCE-3256-20111028.1.txt
>
>
> We already authenticate requests to NM from any AM. We also need to authorize 
> the requests, otherwise a rogue AM, *but with proper tokens and thus 
> authenticated to talk to NM*, could either launch or kill a container with 
> different ContainerID. We have two options:
>  - Remove the explicit passing of the ContainerId as part of the API and 
> instead get it from the RPC layer. In this case, we will need a 
> ContainerToken for each container.
>  - Do explicit authorization checks without relying on getting ContainerID 
> from the RPC.
> One ContainerToken per container is a serious restriction. We anyways want to 
> be able to use application-ACLS to, say, stop containers owned by others. So 
> I am going to take the later route of explicit checks.

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