G'day Thaxists,
George reckons:
A few tentative observations on East Timorese developments. It is clear
that the imperialist forces that have descended on East Timor to
ostensibly protect the civilian population against the pro-independence
"militia" are a mere pretext for direct imperialist intervention to
protect and advance the class interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie.
[Yeah, but they ARE protecting the civilian population, George! If you're
going to argue against intervening in East Timor, you'd have to select a
domain (spatial and/or temporal) within which things would probably turn
out better if outside forces did not intervene. I'm not sure a bit of
outside intervention might not have been the go back in late 1975 ... but
then, I'm not sure a simple refusal of permission by the USA wouldn't have
been more than enough (a million Iraqis would still be alive if the US had
simply said 'no' to Saddam in July 1991 ... but then they'd be alive if the
US hadn't killed 'em, too). I just think we have to be context-specific
when we analyse possible interventions by primarily imperialist forces,
that's all.]
Now that the cold war period is effectively over imperialism no longer
relies in the same way on the kind of regime that has ruled over
Indonesia. Consequently it can suffer a facade of East Timorese
independence involving formal democratic structures.
[The Djakarta line on 'voluntary integration' has been no less a facade.]
Imperialism has directly intervened in East Timor in order to protect and
develop its oppressive hold over the world. East Timor will be effectively
another "invisible" colony of imperialism.
[Which is what it's been since late '75, before late '75, and was always
going to be in 2000.]
Australian capitalism is required to do Washington's work for a variety of
reasons. One of them is Beijing. If Washington was to walk into East Timor
as the main player China would become increasingly worried concerning the
former's strategic intentions. China is highly sensitive to any direct
intervention by Washington in that part of the world. Consequently direct
military intervention by the Americans would most probably lead to a
deterioration in relations between Beijing and Washington. At a time when
relations between them have already deteriorated after its intervention in
Kosova and its bombing of the Chinese embassy Washington would merely
reduce the options available.
[Yeah, this makes a bit of sense. The US is on the nose in many a polity,
I think. Mind you, by not helping an enthusiastic hand, Uncle Sam has
annoyed a lot of other people, too. It can be lonely at the top.]
Some other powers in that part of the world would experience greater
uneasiness with a relatively large scale American military intervention
too. Any direct military intervention by the US might encourage closer
co-operation between Russia and China. Already these two powers have been
drawing closer together in the face of the growing power of American
imperialism.
[Reckon a Russia/China co-operation would be pretty popular in those
countries, and is effectively there already in many ways. Reckon there are
decisive limits to this, though. Those countries' elites and their
aspirations are inextricably tied to the USA.]
In view of this the ideal player for the role of chief bourgeois
crusader is Australia. It is an "Asian" power and has been conducting
itself over the last while --before the current difficulty- within that
context rather than as a Western power within Asia.
[Well, I don't know too many Australians who think we're 'Asian', and I
don't know ANY 'Asians' who think we are.]
Jakarta, on the other hand, if forced could play the Asian card and
thereby increase bourgeois instability in that region. This could only but
upset Washington strategic plans. This is what Washington fears even
though it is a highly unlikely scenario. Jakarta can play this card by
making things difficult for Cosgrove in East Timor through its deployment
and reactivation of --its Trojan horse-- the "militia" in East Timor. By
re-activating this force it can make things so difficult for Australia as
to undermine its ability to impose and maintain imperialist stability in
East Timor.
[I guess if the military get desperate about their capacity to bend the
political process to their will - and I think they are pretty much so
already, after that sterling demo in Djakarta yesterday - they might see if
they can heat things up in East Timor, get some 'peacekeepers' to chase
militia people on to West Timorese soil, whip up a bit of nationalistic
fervour vis the 'aggressor', and go into martial law mode. I also note
that most of the TNI are still openly unfriendly to the visitors - they are
East Timorese members of the Indonesian military, and they could easily
turn belligerent if they thought a little logistic support was on offer
from the old mother country. But I'm sure Cosgrove and his bosses know all
this.]
As the situation there deteriorates --getting increasingly messy--
Canberra would be forced to pour more and more troops into the island. This
force the Australian bourgeoisie to introduce conscription.
[Which would take a braver primeminister than the one we have. Unless we
approach a war-footing - which I just can't see happening.]
This development together with the body bags returning home could
adversely impact on the Australian regime. The conditions for the
emergence of a mass anti-war protests might be created.
[That'd make a lot of lefties blush - they were demanding we send 'our
boys' in a week ago.]
There is always the remote possibility then that East Timor could lead to
growing bourgeois instability in Australia itself and the consequent
radicalisation of Australian politics.
[A slow process of polarisation is evident here - but Ozzies are slower to
move than most. I reckon it's happening a lot more quickly in eg. Germany,
right now. Do you have a view on that, Hinrich?]
Apart from all this Australia would be effectively finished as a regional
power --for some time-- capable of conducting the current kind of
intervention in that region. Obviously neither Canberra nor Washington
would be pleased with such a state of affairs. This would significantly
upset Washington's strategic plans since no longer could it hope to use
Australia to serve as its lieutenant in that region. Canberra's loss of
credibility would further destabilise the situation in that part of the
world and correspondingly strengthen China's regional status.
[All of which is tenable. But China might yet be in for some wholesale
socio-political strife, too. I'm not sure we'll long be able to think of
China as a monolith run by old men in Beijing. Fragmentation is the
inherent other of globalisation, and my guess is that today's Indonesia is
tomorrow's China.]
Furthermore Washington, under such circumstances, would be forced to
intervene militarily in East Timor thereby exposing its naked imperialist
aggressive intentions to other powers in that region thereby prompting
them to seek protection under a Russia/China umbrella. The one thing
Washington does not want is a Russian/Chinese bloc that includes other
Asian powers. To avoid this Washington might be prepared to hand back East
Timor to Indonesia.
[I don't reckon Indonesia really wants East Timor back. I tend to think
it's more a political football than the game itself. Sure, East Timor
might be worth a few quid in the long run, but the costs, especially the
early investments in the context of today, have been hideous.]
At present the main danger facing many powers in the world is the growing
power of US imperialism in the absence of an effective counterweight as
the Soviet Union had been until its demise. With the Soviet "menace" gone
it is becoming increasingly clear that the American "menace" is the new
kid in town.
[Not that new, surely?]
What is now being gropingly sought is an effective counterweight to
American expansionism --its new frontierism. The one thing that can unite
China, Russia and Europe is their fear of an increasingly powerful US.
[I reckon this has legs. But I still think bits of Europe, all of Russia,
and, as I say above, even China could be facing a greater threat before
this scenario. Just as we should not accept all this banal 'functionalist
integrationism' we get fed by the neo-liberal globalists (ie. big is
better, inevitable and more stable), we should not fall for it ourselves
(the unity you're flagging could actually turn out to be a very noisy
fragmentation).
The one thing they share in common is their growing fear of Washington.
Among Washington's aims is the conduct of a strategic policy in such a way
as to hinder and even prevent such a growing unity which might prove be
extremely threatening to the US. In the aftermath of the cold war we are
living in a period where a radical readjustment in international relations
is proceeding.
[Too true.]
However there are limits to such threats since Washington may fear the
break up of Indonesia to its own class interests.
[I've got ten bob that says Indonesia will lose quite a few bits'n'pieces
over the next decade, whatever Washington might want. More than it'll be
prepared to handle, too. And, if half the rest of the world is gonna
behave as I've been saying it might, more than it actually COULD handle.
All very structural and dialectical of me, I think. With very interesting
political potentials, too - anything from a world-wide search for a global
answer to a global crisis to the creation of hundreds of
theocratic/ethnic/nationalistic enclaves engaged in the war of all against
all. Either way, my guess is we've a decade or two of real trauma before
us - and it seems to me, lefties can do little else but try to enhance the
chances of the former possibility rather than the latter, which means
making ties now that might bind later.]
Cheers,
Rob.
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