September 13: John Howard proudly proclaims he has 'no regrets' over East
Timor: "If I had my time over again, I would not have handled things any
differently."
Now back to a summarising timeline as gleaned from John Lyons's article 'The
Secret Timor Dossier' (*THE BULLETIN* October 12 1999, pp 24 to 29)
October 1998: Australia has evidence that a militia has been dedicated to
intimidating pro-independence voters in the case of a vote. Oz doesn't pass
this on to the Yanks, but US official Stanley Roth foresees 'internecine
violence' anyway.
December 1998: Primeminister Howard writes the struggling President Habibie
to congratulate him and encourage him to pursue his offer to the East
Timorese of 'autonomy'. This strengthens the hand of those close to Habibie
who want rid of a one-billion-dollar lemon.
January 27: Habibie goes the extra yard, and a vote for self-determination
is on offer. The US and Portugal want peacekeepers then and there. Downer
strongly argues against it - it'd be undiplomatic to evince distrust of the
Indonesians. Even ET leaders Xanana Gusmao and Bishop Belo think it's all
going too quickly.
February 23 1999: Questioned about this, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali
Alatas not only does not parry Downer's question about the arming of the
militias, but calls this 'a legitimate arming of auxiliaries'. (see March
9)
February 25: Downer asks that, in the event of the vote for independence he
expects, Indonesia's military behave itself. US official Roth foresees the
possibility of a provocateur-led bloodbath and, ultimately, a Wiranto
presidency. Downer recommends both of 'em be sweet to Wiranto and talks
Roth out of challenging Wiranto and Prabowo. Roth recommends a peacekeeping
force and Downer declines (Peter Vaughese of the Primeminister's Department
chimes in on Downer's side - yet a few weeks later, Howard himself will
insist he was always arguing FOR such a force). The prescient Roth avers
there'll ultimately have to be one, anyway.
February 27: Downer again argues against Portugese Foreign Minister Jaime
Gama's stance that a fully fledged peace-keeping force should oversee the
vote.
March 4: DIO tells Oz government that the Indonesian military are helping
the militias and that Wiranto is turning a blind eye. Downer now suddenly
expresses reservations that the militias are being armed at all.
March 9: Downer tells journalist Laurie Oakes that Alatas has assured him
the militias are not being armed.
March 29: The UN Secretariat warns of a 'precarious' transition and some
pressing 'security issues'.
April 6: Liquica slaughter.
April 14: Oz Foreign Affairs official Neil Mules repeats Oz's
anti-peace-keeping stance to the concerned Portugese.
April 17: Slaughter in Dili. Roth says it's getting 'out of hand'.
April 19: ALL Oz's intelligence agencies have now told Howard that large
scale violence is likely. Howard rings Habibie and expresses disappointment
at ABRI performance in ET. Wants a meeting.
April 21: ABRI and some Easat Timorese people formalise peace between them.
Oz Foreign Affairs internally calls this 'unnegotiated' and 'short on
delivery', in short 'a substitute for real action by TNI'.
April 27: Bali summit. Habibie promises stability and Howard asks for an
international police presence - the UN will fix the strength of this force,
and Habibie agrees.
April 30: Downer tells Albright 2-300 cops should be about right.
April 28: Howard says on radio that 'there isn't any doubt that the
Indonesians through this process are committed to the laying down of arms'.
He said he was 'delighted' with 'em. Lyons writes that, in actual fact,
Australia now considers it has 'overwhelming evidence' that Wiranto is
directly linked to the East Timorese militias.
May 21: DSD presents the Oz government with persuasive evidence of the
Wiranto/militia link.
June 14: Downer presents this evidence to the UN.
June 16/17: Downer tells Roth that the UN don't want the vote postponed.
It'd only encourage the militias.
June 21: Oz Defence No. 2 Air Marshall Doug Riding confronts the Indonesian
military chiefs with proof of their establishment, support and coordination
of the militias (through their Kopassus regiment). Apparently makes Lt
Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono rather cross.
June 29: First militia assault on UN bases at Maliana, Liquica and
Viqueque.
July 10: Kofi Annan expresses increasing concern.
July 16: Fateful voter registration commences.
July 28-31: Downer visits Djakarta and Dili. Exerts diplomatic pressure -
and then pops off to London to watch the cricket (editor's note).
August 16-17: Oz and US officials meet and agree to not to do anything that
might upset 'a sensitive period'.
August 19: Oz Foreign Affairs recommends police and military liaison be
ready for early commitment.
August 30: 98.6% of registered voters turn out, and 78.5% of 'em vote for
independence. Foreign Affairs calls this a threatening and unstable'
situation - but it's too late, the militias are getting started in Dili by
that afternoon..
September 13 (and gawd knows how many deaths later): John Howard proudly
proclaims he has 'no regrets' over East Timor: "If I had my time over again,
I would not have handled things any differently."
Late September 1999: Downer tells Indonesian ambassador Wiryono that
Indonesia is '100 times more important than East Timor'.
Nuff said.
Cheers,
Rob.
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