Hegel, Marx, and, for that matter, Jay Gould (he and Dan Dennett - the American reductionist philosopher - fought over this issue) did not regard development to be incremental or continuous. The dialectic, the successive emergence of negations of previous conditions suggests that development hops and jumps rather than grows by inches. The principle of Quantity is also not a case of incremental change. You can think of it as a teapot on the burner or the apparent lull before a sudden popular rising; the conditions conducive to a boiling pot or a popular uprising cook slowly without any apparent sign of dramatic change until a critical state is reached and then, things happen very suddenly indeed. The concept of Quantity for Engels and Marx as for Hegel refers to the sudden change of state rather than to the accumulation of conditions that engenders it. The issue really is the essentialism that Marx and Engels adopted from Hegel. The significant fact of the sudden boil of the teapot and the popular uprising is the end product of the process that generates them and not the conditions. After all, a teapot on a low fire is just a teapot on a low fire and a long, hot Summer is just a long, hot, Summer; they both only become interesting when they result respectively in a pot of boiling water and an uprising of an angry community. Victor
----- Original Message ----- From: "Charles Brown" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "'Forum for the discussion of theoretical issues raised by Karl Marx andthe thinkers he inspired'" <marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu> Sent: Monday, March 07, 2005 3:47 PM Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels > > We might also speak of demergent functions. Engels , in his crude and > snobbish approach, mentions the tranformation of quantity into quality _and_ > the transformation of quality into quantity. The latter is like permanent > revolution, when quantitative shift is so continuous, it takes on the nature > of a quantitative change at a higher level of the spiral. > > Charles > > > Oudeyis victor > > I was particularly interested in your earlier discussion on emergence. > I agree strongly with Jay Gould that dialectics; Hegelian and Marxist alike, > describe what I suppose would now be called "emergent functions". I have > many reservations about Engel's representation of the dialectic and his > three so-called "laws" appear to me to be a snobbish attempt to present > "Dialectics for the Working Class". Certainly Llyod Spencer and Andrzej > Krauze's Hegel for Beginners and Andy Blunden's Getting to Know Hegel are > much more successful representations of dialectical theory. A search for > emergentism in Marxism would be better served by reinvestigating the methods > of Hegel (his Logics) and of Marx (Practice, or, better, labour practice) > for the mechanics and process whereby they derive emergent complex moments > from simpler prior conditions. I suspect that the concretisation of > abstraction through successive negation, unity of labour practice and extant > condition in the productive process, and sublation of prior syntheses in > extant dialectical moments will have more significance for understanding > emergence in human history than the hierarchy theories of Salthe, Swenson, > and O'Neil, the emergent semiotics of Hoffmeyer and so on. That is not to > say that systems, even cybernetic systems, are not relevant to the > investigation, but, we must remember that despite Engel's (sometimes > brilliant and sometimes embarrassing) adventures in the dialectics of > Nature, that Hegel and Marx theoretical interests were exclusively focussed > on human activity and human history and were only interested in Nature as a > derived function of human inteaction with material conditions. Even > Hegel's dialectics on Nature concerned the Natural Sciences and not Nature > as such (as the subject of human contemplation). > > Which bring us to the problem of Natural science and Marxism. > > Certainly the Natural sciences are a component of modern history. They > more or less emerge in late Mediaeval Europe together with the development > of powerful urban commercial and industrial institutions. From the point of > view of Marxist theory, the interesting thing about the Natural sciences is > the relation between the moment of their emergence and the concurrent > developments of European society in all its aspects. For example, the > optical and astronomical discoveries of the earliest Natural scientists were > most useful for the long-range navigation needs of Europe's commercial and > colonial enterprises while the mathematical developments in geometry, > trigonometry and the calculus were important for the development of improved > techniques for the prompt and accurate estimations of volume, mass, and > weight of goods as well as managing cannon fire. Even the origin of the > Social Sciences can be traced to this period; Machiavelli and de Seyselle's > practical analyses of government as well as the contemporary development of > double entry accounting and . But, note, that the Marxist interest in these > developments is in their practical relations to the needs growing out of the > urbanization and commercialization of human life and not as representations > of contemplated Nature. > > Mathematics and the Natural sciences can contribute to the development > of Marxist theory, but only in a form that contributes to the objectives of > the dialectical explication of historical conditions and events. After all, > in Capital, Marx exploits and develops the practices of contemporary > accounting to provide mechanical mathematical objectifications of the > relations between productive and commercial processes that are critical to > the aims of his theory. Marx also demonstrates considerable interest in the > physics of machine engineering, but not as an objective description of > Nature, but specifically as it relates to the historical development of > human productive and social practice. Marx and Engels also adapt > contemporary thinking on organism and on pre- and proto-human, behaviour to > describe the fundamental material conditions for the development of human > practice. > > In short, the objectives of the practice of the Natural Sciences are > distinct from those of Marxist theory, and their products satisfy needs > different from those that engender social historical theory. Even the > methods are different insofar as the natural scientist enjoys a bit more > distance from the subject of his research (except for quantum > indeterminism)than the social-historian. Natural Science can be the subject > of investigation by social historical scientists and some of its products > can, with suitable modifications, be adopted to the objects of social > history, but social history has no more qualifications for determining the > practices (theory and activity) of Natural science than do the natural > scientists for the determination of the practices of social historical > science (e.g. the silly foray of Pinker and Dawkins into Memics). > > Wirh regards, > Victor > > > > _______________________________________________ > Marxism-Thaxis mailing list > Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu > To change your options or unsubscribe go to: > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis > > > -- > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. > Version: 7.0.308 / Virus Database: 266.6.2 - Release Date: 04/03/05 > > -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. 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