Phillip Frank's 52-page introduction to his book MODERN SCIENCE AND ITS
PHILOSOPHY (1949) is now on my web site:
Introduction - Historical Background
http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/frank-MSP/frank001.html
Frank gives a historical overview of key moments in the philosophy of
science of the 19th and early 20th centuries that influenced his ideas and
those of the Vienna Circle, together with key notions of logical positivism
and some remarks on the chapters of the book (previously published
essays). Members of the Vienna Circle not only had backgrounds in various
sciences but an interest or background in a variety of philosophical trends.
The philosophical point of departure is the breakdown of mechanistic
science and the ideological reactions to same. Abel Rey described this
sense of breakdown. The key contributions of Mach and Poincare are
summarized. Kant's ideas came in for criticism as presuppositions about
mathematics and physics were challenged. Interestingly, in section 4,
Frank mentions the influence of Nietzsche's criticism of Kant. Frank also
likens Mach and Nietzsche in section 8.
When Frank published a paper in 1907 (included in the book), there were
reactions from Einstein and Lenin, the first via personal contact, the
second via Lenin's book MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM, in which Lenin
attacked Mach with a sharp remark against Frank as well. (See section
5). Both men had an impact on Frank's thinking. Frank cites Lenin from
time to time in this chapter as well as in others.
After reviewing David Hilbert's impact on the foundations of mathematics,
Frank provides an interesting discussion of Pierre Duhem (section 7). It
is noteworthy that Duhem was both a positivist and a strict Catholic and
neo-Thomist. Frank does not attempt to account for this seeming disparity;
he simply accepts the one and rejects the other. And this is rather
typical of Frank. He is ideologically and politically sensitive to the
various philosophical trends circulating in society, but he evidences no
insight of a necessary relation between them. Hence he sees no intrinsic
interdependency between positivism and irrationalism (or reactionary
metaphysics in this case) as ideological phenomena.
There is another section on Mach, recounting massive opposition to Mach's
alleged subjectivism among scientists and philosophers, not to mention on
the part of Lenin and his followers. Frank's theme is the misunderstanding
of Mach on the part of his antagonists.
Einstein also had a decisive impact on the new philosophy of science. The
neo-Thomist and neo-Kantian schools had a hard time digesting the new physics.
The contributions of Schlick, Reichenbach, Wittgenstein, Carnap are
outlined. American pragmatism was recognized as being sympatico with
European developments.
The campaign of Neurath and others against "metaphysics" is the subject of
section 16. Neurath claims that the school's position, particularly its
gravitation to a physicalist perspective, has been misunderstood in terms
of the idealist-materialist schema. However, I find the evasion of
ontological questions and their replacement by "languages" evasive and
unconvincing.
The history of the Vienna Circle is described. Of particular interest is
Frank's account of the difficulties of selling scientists on the philosophy
of science (Section 19). Germans in particular had a predilection for
national chauvinism in philosophy.
More on Schlick's new turn in philosophy, Vaihinger, Bridgman, the
international diffusion of the Vienna Circle's ideas, and the fundamental
difference between logical empiricism and traditional philosophy.
In section 23, Frank mentions his reconsideration of his engagement with
metaphysics:
"In all my writing before 1947 I had stressed the point that science gives
no support to metaphysical interpretations, of whatever type. I had
discussed these interpretations only as reflecting the social environment
of the philosopher. However, after that time, as a result of contact with
my students and fellow teachers, I became more and more interested in the
question of the actual meaning of the metaphysical interpretations of
scienceĀidealistic, materialistic, relativistic, and others. For the fact
that a great many scientists and philosophers advance such interpretations
and cherish them is as firmly established, by our experience, as any fact
of physics.
"I now began a new series of investigations into the meaning of metaphysics
within the framework of logico-empirical and socio-psychological analysis.
The first preliminary result of these investigations is published in
Chapter 16 of the present book."
His contributions to the question while in the USA were related to the
question of relativism.
I would say, though, having read the whole book, that there is a peculiar
and at times ambiguous relation in the part of Frank to what he calls
metaphysics. At times he lends ontological issues some credence while
strictly separating them from science. (I.e., Frank seems to be not so
dogmatic on this matter as Neurath and Carnap.) Several chapters give
compelling reasons for this separation, based on the need already felt in
the 19th century to free scientific concepts from philosophical conceptions
to which they had been glued. But Frank's resolution of this problem does
not seem totally satisfactory to me.
In sum, there is some very interesting historical material here, usable
also for the exploration of the social ecology of ideas and the tensions
and contradictions within and between philosophical systems and their
relationship to the sum total of knowledge and the ideological issues
within society.
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