On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 07:25:45 -0400 Ralph Dumain <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Of these definitions, the one that really matters is (2). But I would > add > that positivism tends toward phenomenalism, a merely descriptive > rather > than explanatory view of science, science as the economy of thought > rather > than objective reflection of underlying processes (also what Marx > calls > real relations as opposed to phenomenal forms, or what Bhaskar > refers to as > depth realism). I do not like 'positivism' as a mere synonym for > 'scientism'. This creates a misleading impression of where the > problems > really lie.
I think that I would ammend the scientistic thesis slightly to state that it involves not only taking science as the only valid form of human knowledge but also invovlves taking the natural sciences as the model of how science, and hence, human knowledge should be formulated. This may also involve a commitment to a radical reductionism, where one might attempt to reduce sociology to psychology, psychology to neurophysiology, and biology to the laws of chemistry and physics. Not all proponents of the scientistic thesis accept this radical reductionism, but many have. > To call Engels and Kautsky positivists distorts the > issues. I'm willing to grant, though, that positivism in > ethics/moral > philosophy may mean something different than positivism as a > philosophy of > science. Historically, positivists have been divided over the nature of ethics. Many have subscribed to some form of ethical naturalism, in which moral predicates would be seen as reducible to non-moral natural properties. For example, one might equate goodness with pleasure or with Darwinian fitness etc. On the other hand, many positivists, including most of the Vienna Circle, have subscribed to some sort of non-cognitivism such as emotivism or prescriptivism. I am not sure that either Engels or Kautsky would necessarily fit comfortably within these categories. > > Cornel West has his own motives for equating positivism with > scientism. And > there is an additional problem: if we go by definition (1), we could > easily > argue that Marx is a positivist. Of course, this also hangs on the > definition of 'science', which in German historically does not have > the > restricted scope of the English term. > > At 06:58 AM 6/9/2007 -0400, Jim Farmelant wrote: > >On Fri, 08 Jun 2007 06:09:54 -0400 Ralph Dumain <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > writes: > > > > > > > > > > West begins with a definition of positivism: "Positivism differs > > > from other > > > philosophic quests for objectivity or searches for foundations > in > > > that it > > > deems the scientific method the only legitimate way in which > > > knowledge > > > claims about the self, the world, and God can be tested. (118) > > > While, this > > > may be a capsule definition of Comte's positivism, it hardly > serves > > > as > > > criteria to isolate positivism as it developed later on from all > > > other > > > philosophical positions down to the present time. West concedes > that > > > there > > > are differing conceptions of the scientific method. This renders > his > > > > > > definition useless, and in any case, how would one distinguish > > > positivism > > > from materialism with such a definition? > > > > > > > > > > > (1) Positivism: West's definition of positivism does not address > > > what > > > matters about positivism from the late 19th century to today. > One > > > needs to > > > show how Kautsky's self-professed materialist view of history is > > > actually > > > positivist. Furthermore, whether it is or not, is Kautsky's > moral > > > theory > > > positivist? Is Kautsky's descriptive ethics positivist? Is his > > > normative > > > ethics positivist? > > > > > > >I would suggest that in following discussions concerning > >whether such and such a thinker is a positivist it might > >be useful to keep in mind the typology of positivism that > >Russell Keat presented in his 1981 book _The Politics of Social > Theory_. > >There, he provided the following typology of positivist theses in > social > >theory: > > > > > >1). The 'scientist' thesis which asserts that science alone > represents > >a genuine form of human knowledge. That all legitimate human > >knowledge is science. > > > > > >2). The positivist conception of science which holds that science > aims > >at the explanation and prediction of observable phenomena by > >treating them as instances of universal natural laws. What Carl > >Hempel referred to as the covering-law model of scientific > >explanation is adhered to. The scientific validity of > >statements describing natural laws is assessed solely in terms > >of their logical relationships to other statements describing > observation > >data. The positivist conception of science was developed over > >the years by such thinkers as Berkeley, Hume, Comte, J.S. Mill, > >Ernst Mach and in the last century by the logical positivists > >including Schlick, Carnap, Feigl, Reichenbach and Frank > >amongst others > > > > > >3). The advocacy of a scientific politics, that is the ideal that > >science can provide rational solutions to all problems concerning > the > >organization of society and that such decisions can be freed from > >nonscientific influences. This view can be traced back to Lord > >Bacon. In the 19th century Saint-Simon and August Comte were > >very notable exponents of scientific politics, and in the 20th > century > >there have been a host of thinkers who have subscribed to it. > > > > > >4). The doctrine of value-freedom which is the doctrine that is > both > >possible and necessary to separate out the realm of science > >from the realms of moral and political values. The validity of > >scientific theories does not depend on the acceptance or > >rejection of any particular moral or political commitments. > >Science is therefore 'value-free.' This doctrine can be found > >the writings of Hume, Kant and Mill but its greatest exponent > >in the social sciences was probably Max Weber. > > > > > >These four positivist theses are logically independent of each > >other. There have been many thinkers who subscribed to only > >one or two of these theses while rejecting the others. Thus, > >Popper rejected the first thesis - the 'scientist' thesis while > >subscribing to a modified version of the second one and largely > >rejecting the ideal of a scientific politics as being incompatible > with > >an "open society." Many people have subscribed to a positivist > >conception of science while rejecting the 'scientist' thesis. > >Althusser seems to have largely subscribed to the first thesis > >but seems to have rejected a positivist conception of science > >while subscribing to a variant of the ideal of a scientific > politics. > >Weber as pointed out before defended the third thesis (the > >value-freedom thesis) and he held to a positivist conception of > >science but he rejected the possibility of a scientific politics > >in favor of a decisionsm. > > > _______________________________________________ > Marxism-Thaxis mailing list > Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu > To change your options or unsubscribe go to: > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis > _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
