> I think the Soviet material support came in the early 1950s, to better > arm and get ready for even more fighting
Better correct myself on that. For example, see this (the site even has a photo of a Messerschmidt that went to Israel). It seems like a fairly pro-Israeli source at that. The aid was cut off by 1953. http://www.tamilnation.org/books/International/israel_soviet.htm >From Chapter 3: Czechoslovakia and the First Arms Agreement ISRAEL'S declaration of independence on May 14, 1948, was a spontaneous and emotional commitment made in the midst of international diplomatic maneuvering and fruitless negotiations. In fact, the war had begun many months before. As early as November 30, 1947, the day following the momentous partition resolution in the United Nations, armed Arab bands were active all over Palestine. Despite the presence of 100,000 British troops and the fact that a Jewish state would not come into existence for another six months, the widespread terrorist attacks on Jewish settlements reinforced the convictions held by David Ben-Gurion and the majority of Palestinian Jewish leaders that a full-scale invasion by six well-armed Arab armies was inevitable. The inescapable odds in population were 65o,000 Jews against 40,000,000 Arabs.' An immediate campaign was initiated to bring the Haganah, the Jewish underground army, to fighting capacity to unify the various political factions it contained, and to augment its dismally small and antiquated supply of arms and munitions. In 1947 Ben-Gurion had made a thorough investigation of the Haganah's total underground arsenal, and found the following: 10,073 rifles (8,72o in the settlements for local defense; 336 in reserve; 656 with the Palmach Brigade; 361 with the field force) 1. An unofficial estimate placed the military strength of the Arab League armies at over 120,000 men, with Egypt alone allocating $72,000,000 for defense. Arab News Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), no. 13 (September 27, 1947), p. 2. 1,90o submachine guns (785 in the settlements; 424 with the field force; 13o with Palmach; 561 in reserve) 186 machine guns (31 in the settlements; 35 with the field force; 5 with Palmach; 115 in reserve) 444 light machine guns (338 in the settlements; 37 with the field force; 33 with Palmach; 46 in reserve) There was not a single cannon, and only one heavy machine gun. There was no anti-tank weapon, or anti-aircraft gun, no armored car, and nothing at all for naval or air combat. There was no communications equipment.2 As if the situation were not dismal enough, the Palestinian Jews were well aware that the six major Arab states were heavily equipped with modern weapons and were busily obtaining more, both on the open market and through the sympathy of the several British military commanders in the Middle East. It became imperative to the very survival of the as-yet-unborn state to secure the arms—from any available source and at any cost—necessary to repel the imminent invasion. As chairman of the Jewish Agency executive body, Ben-Gurion turned to the dedicated and experienced Haganah to obtain the weapons. The Haganah grew out of the early pioneer settlements in Palestine and expanded with the periodic influx of refugees as the only Jewish defense force against roaming Arab bands. Declared illegal under the British Mandate, the Haganah continued to protect Jewish settlers... Ben-Gurion dispatched dozens of special Haganah agents all over the world to buy anything they could—obsolete aircraft, machine guns, rifles that were barely usable, damaged tanks, and anything else that was for sale. The major problem revolved around the fact that the Jewish Agency represented an underground army and not a legitimate government. The FBI and British authorities, therefore, maintained steady pressure on these emissaries and made frequent arrests—a problem that did not face Arab buyers of military equipment. The young Haganah agents invented all kinds of stratagems to get their purchases out of the country of origin and to hide them in various places in Europe, ready to be dispatched to Palestine. In the United States, for example, the Schwimmer Aviation Company of Burbank, California, Service Airways, Inc. in New York, and an airline of Panamanian registry called Lineas Aereas de Panama, were used as cover organizations for purchasing planes and flying them to Latin America, from where they could be dismantled and smuggled into Palestine. In England, a legitimate film company was persuaded to make a war documentary in order that disguised Haganah pilots could obtain permission for a number of their planes to take off—planes which did not land again in England. The Haganah agents involved in the film company and their British accomplices were later tried and convicted for their parts in the illegal export of aircraft and arms to Israel, as well as a complicated side-issue involving the death of a Jewish car dealer and the disposition of his body. [See The Times (London), April 26 and October 10, 1948; January 26 and December 23, 1950.] Fictitious companies were also established in South Africa, Spain, France, and South America.' The most important source of military supplies, however, came from Eastern Europe, and especially Czechoslovakia... ...What, then, can be concluded about the roles and motivations of the Czech and Soviet governments in supplying military aid to the Haganah? During the period between the first arms purchase in December, 1947, and the coup d'etat in February, 1948, the Czech government offered to supply the Jewish Agency with surplus weapons, in defiance of the United Nations embargo and heavy British and American pressure. ... Based upon Stalin's previous influence over Czechoslovakia's economic affairs, there can be little question that, although it was opposed by most of the Communist members of the government, the decision was allowed to become operational with the Kremlin's permission. It is further evident that the behind-the-scenes efforts by the "roaming ambassador," Mordechai Oren, had a decided influence on the Kremlin's adjudication. Following the February coup.. military supplies available to the Jews increased enormously as did the help they received in transporting the consignments from Czechoslovakia, through several Eastern European countries, to Palestine. The weight of evidence indicates that Moscow stood directly behind the new emphasis and that the Soviet leaders were influenced, perhaps by promises of an impending pro-Soviet socialist Israel government made by Shmuel Mikunis. Characteristically, Stalin implemented his decision to add critical military aid to Russia's earlier diplomatic commitment through Czechoslovakia rather than directly through Russian arms manufacturers. If at any time the current close relations between the Soviet bloc and the new Jewish homeland underwent a change, it would be the Czechs and not the Russians who would bear the responsibility for the "ideological error." The Slansky trials of 1952 were the hard results of that responsibility. At the moment, however, the relationship between the Jewish Agency, represented in Prague by the Haganah Rechesh team, and the new Czech government, were at their closest point. From February through midsummer of 1948, the members of the Rechesh, under Avriel's leadership, were shown a new horizon in military hardware and their only real limitations revolved around their ability to pay the enormous costs in dollars and the myriad intrigues involved in their transportation to the hard-pressed front lines of Israel." _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
