Hi Jim, thank you very much for your encouraging comments and very useful references. I notice that you point to the difference between Berlin and Hayek, which is very important for political tactial matters. More general point I emphesise is the shift from the positive concept freedom to negative concept of freedom in liberal thought from classical liberalism to neoliberalism.I am very much aware that classical liberal thought is full of contradictions. They usually formulate and employ a concept of positive freedom in their more theoretical works but when they come to apply it to questions of pratical philosophy they normally justify a concept of negative freedom.Despite this they normally tried to combine both concepts. In neoliberal thought however the concept of positive freedom is either silently discarted or attacked openly. If we take in good Marxist tradition that theories mirror their time, then, for political theorist/philosophers it is important to investigate the reason for this shift. Rosa Luxemburg writes somewhere in her book Social Reform or Revolution? that liberalism was death because finans capital controls and dominates almost everything. This change in the structure of capital in particular and capitalism in general must be taken into account when we think about current political developments.
Thanks a lot again and best wishes, D.Göçmen http://dogangocmen.wordpress.com/ -----Original Message----- From: farmela...@juno.com <farmela...@juno.com> To: marx...@lists.econ.utah.edu; marxism-thaxis @lists.econ.utah.edu Sent: Fri, Jul 31, 2009 8:31 pm Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] [Marxism] The Nature and Paradoxes of Freedom Dogan's comments on Hayek remind me a bit of what the Canadian political philosopher C.B. Macpherson had to say about Milton Friedman. Milton Friedman in his 1962 book, *Capitalism and Freedom*, famously argued that a free market capitalist economy was a necessary requirement if political freedom and democracy were to flourish. He admitted that not all capitalist societies were democratic and that not all them safeguarded political freedom but he argued that as an empirical matter, there were no “free” societies around that not also capitalist. He also made the argument that a free market economy was necessary to provide checks against the ambitions of the state, and so in that way acted as a necessary basis for the preservation of political freedom and democracy. That’s also how, years later, he could justify his giving economic advice to the Pinochet government, which clearly was hostile to both democracy and political freedom, since while Pinochet himself might have been a fascist thug, his economic policies, so Friedman argued, were conducive to the eventual expansion of liberty and democracy. There are, however, several problems with Friedman’s arguments. First of all the claimed correlation between economic freedom and political freedom is not as simple as Friedman made out. Friedman claimed that “democratic soci alism” was an oxymoron. A “democratic socialist” society, in his view, would either in time become undemocratic or it would revert back to capitalism. However, his argument does not take into account that though most of the West, the expansion of political freedom coincided with the spread of social democracy. The Scandinavian countries, for instance, back in the 1960s and 1970s managed to develop quite extensive welfare states at the very same time that these societies were also exapnding the range of personal and political freedoms that they were willing to protect, Back in 1968 the Canadian political philosopher C.B. Macpherson wrote, what I believe to be one of the most effective demolition of Friedman’s arguments in his essay, “Elegant Tombstones: A Note on Friedman’s Freedom,” which first appeared in the journal, Canadian Journal of Political Science in March of that year. The following paragraphs should give the reader some of the flavor of Machpherson’s critique of Friedman. Here, Macpherson takes on Friedman’s contention that free market capitalism is noncoercive in nature. That contention is one of the basic premises that underly Friedman’s argument that capitalism is a necessary presupposition for the existence of political freedom. ————————————— “Professor Friedman’s demonstration [in _Capitalism and Freedom] that the capitalist market econ omy can coordinate economic activities without coercion rests on an elementary conceptual error. His argument runs as follows. He shows first that in a simple market model, where each individual or household controls resources enabling it to produce goods and services either directly for itself or for exchange, there will be production for exchange because of the increased product made possible by specialization. But since the household always has the alternative of producing directly for itself, it need not enter into any exchange unless it benefits from it. Hence no exchange will take place unless both parties do benefit from it. Cooperation is thereby achieved without coercion’…So far, so good. It is indeed clear that in this simple exchange model, assuming rational maximizing behavior by all hands, every exchange will benefit both parties, and that no act of coercion is involved in the decision to produce for exchange or in any act of exchange. Professor Friedman then moves on to our actual complex economy, or rather to his own curious model of it: As in [the] simple exchange model, so in the complex enterprise and money-exchange economy, cooperation is strictly individual and voluntary *provided*: (a) that enterprises are private, so that the ultimate contracting parties are individuals and (b) that individuals are effectively free to enter or not to enter into any particular exchange so that every exchange is strictly voluntary… …Proviso (b) is ‘ that individuals are effectively free to enter or not to enter into any particular exchange’, and it is held that with this proviso ‘every exchange is strictly voluntary’. A moment’s thought will show that this is not so. The proviso that is required to make every transaction strictly volunatry is not freedom not to enter into any *particular* exchange, but freedom not to enter into any exchange *at all*. This, and only this, was the proviso that proved the simple model to be voluntary and noncoercive; and nothing less than this would prove the complex model to voluntary and noncoercive. But Professor Friedman is clearly claiming that freedom not to enter into any *particular* exchange is enough: ‘The consumer is protected from coercion by the seller because of the presence of other sellers with whom he can deal…The employee is protected from coercion by the employer because of other employers for whom he can work…’ One almost despairs of logic, and of the use of models. It is easy to see what Professor Friedman has done, but it is less easy to excuse it. He has moved from the simple economy of exchange between independent producers, to the capitalist economy,without mentioning the most important thing that distinguishes them. He mentions money instead of barter, and ‘enterprises which are intermediaries between individuals in their capacities as suppliers of services and as purchasers of goods’…as if money a nd merchants were what distinguished a capitalist economy from an economy of independent producers. What distinguishes the capitalist economy from the simple exchange economy is the separation of labor and capital, that is, the existence of a labor force without its own sufficient capital and therefore without a choice as to whether to put its labor in the market or not. Professor Friedman would agree that where there is no choice there is coercion. His attempted demonstration that capitalism coordinates without coercion therefore fails.” ---------------- Concerning the concepts of negative freedom that were embraced by both Hayek and Isaiah Berlin, Dogan is quite correct that for both men, the embracing of negative liberty (and the rejection of positive liberty) was very much motivated by their desire to defend capitalism. Where the two men differed, is that Berlin's embrace of negative liberty was in the context of his "pluralism." By pluralism, Berlin meant a "value pluralism" or a pluralism of values (not unlike Max Weber's conception) in which there are a plurality of ideals, which may all be equally valid, but which are not entirely compatible with one another. For Berlin, while negative liberty was a valid social ideal, it was not the only one. Berlin recognized as valid, the social ideals of equality and solidarity. Therefore, for Berlin, unlike Hayek, the good society while embracing negative liberty also might embrace other ideals like equality or solidarity. Therefore, Berlin was able to rationalize the emergence of the welfare state in the UK and the New Deal in the US. In this way, as Dogan suggests, Berlin's pluralism of values was closely tied to the pluralism of classes under capitalism, and so Berlin like a good social democratic liberal attempted to mediate between the interests of capitalists and workers under capitalism. Jim F. ---------- Original Message ---------- From: Dogan Gocmen <dgn.g...@googlemail.com> To: farmela...@juno.com Subject: [Marxism] The Nature and Paradoxes of Freedom Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2009 10:37:33 +0300 Dear All, a draft paper by Ä°smail Åžiriner and me is available now. Comments are always welcome... -------- "The Nature and Paradoxes of Freedom ____________________________________________________________ Click to get free auto insurance quotes from top companies. http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2141/fc/BLSrjpTImHYsxS1zpPYm1SoENOdVHvGqOpftd0EoYgIRXqjAbTQp1ZsUpry/ _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
