Lehman's collapse almost brought down the money-market industry By Sam Mamudi, MarketWatch September 9 2009 NEW YORK (MarketWatch) -- As the threat of a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy grew last September, many money-market fund managers were wary but not worried.
Their industry had quietly grown over the past generation to become a major rival to the banking system, with $3.5 trillion in assets. It had weathered crises such as the collapse of Baring Plc, the Asian currency mess of the late 1990s and the fall of hedge fund giant Long-Term Capital Management. Though some managers were talking to their boards and their staff, there wasn't a feeling of impending disaster. But all that changed in the late afternoon of Sept. 16, the day after Lehman actually went down. Reserve Primary Fund -- the oldest and fifth-largest fund in the business -- said it had about $785 million in Lehman debt that was now worthless and as a result it would price its shares at 97 cents. The impact of the first major retail money-market fund to fall below $1 a share -- to actually lose money for its investors -- was immense. In the two days after Reserve Primary's announcement, roughly 22% of all assets in institutional prime money-market funds -- those that invest in corporate debt -- were pulled out by panicked investors. As Lehman's fall spread fear throughout the financial system, money-market fund managers were squeezed on both sides: investors demanding their money and frozen credit markets where no one was buying. "Countless other money-market funds were poised to break the buck," said Peter Crane, president of Crane Data. "The mini-run would have spread to all funds." It was a pull-out unprecedented in scale. In the space of just two days -- Sept. 17 and Sept. 18 -- $210 billion was redeemed from institutional prime money-market funds. Overall the money-market fund industry saw roughly 7% of its total assets redeemed in those two days. While some of that was invested back into government money funds, the industry lost almost 4% of its assets in 48 hours, according to data from iMoneyNet. Even managers at funds with portfolios considered safe from the crisis were struggling with the market -- because there were no buyers, pricing the assets in some cases could have meant breaking the buck. In such cases, managers talked to their boards to explain when they didn't do daily pricing for their funds. "It was a shock in that the people who keep the machine going -- the broker-dealers -- suddenly weren't there to keep things going," said Mira Stevovich, manager of Ivy Money Market Fund and Waddell & Reed Advisors Cash Management. "You weren't sure when re-investing that there'd be anyone behind the securities to make a market if you had to sell." "There was a lot of fear, and no one knew what was going to happen," added Stevovich. Even without federal bank insurance, money funds had ballooned in the past several years as alternatives to holding cash. They often offered better interest rates than bank deposits, which were insured by the federal government up to $100,000 at the time (now $250,000). The sudden prospect of investors losing their savings following the Lehman collapse caused the run, but because it was mostly in electronic transactions, it didn't summon visions of anxious crowds banging on bank doors during the Great Depression. For many, however, the fear was just as palpable. "There was a concern that if something wasn't in place to regain investor confidence, after four or five days [the high redemption rate] would cause problems," said Debbie Cunningham, head of money-market funds at Federated Investors Inc. . "Selling into the market [to meet redemptions] was already a problem -- there was no liquidity." The panic was averted only after the Treasury Department on Sept. 19 stepped in and announced it would backstop money-fund assets, in a series of measures that slowly restored investor confidence. But industry officials are under no illusions about what might have happened. A year of trouble In reacting to that week's panic, the industry was both helped and hindered by its experiences over the previous 12 months. Troubles in the asset-backed securities market and exposure to special investment vehicles had hit money-market funds from late 2007 and into 2008. A MarketWatch study conducted at the time found that more than a dozen funds had looked to parent companies or other sources of credit to ensure they didn't break the buck. At least 20 had sought regulatory approval for support if needed. But the fact that the funds had come through such a choppy period unscathed meant that even though some funds were known to hold Lehman paper, few expected a fund to go under. "We'd gone through a series of problems leading up to Lehman," said David Glocke, who oversees Vanguard Group's taxable money-market funds and also manages its Treasury and Admiral Treasury funds. The funds didn't hold any Lehman paper. "Watching from the outside, we were completely shocked," when Reserve Primary broke the buck, he added. The shock was probably biggest among investors. At roughly $3.5 trillion, the money-market fund industry had grown by $1.5 trillion in the previous two years and much of that money, said Crane, likely came from investors fleeing other troubled assets, such as SIVs and auction-rate securities. At the first sign of trouble in money-market funds, these investors were likely to bolt once again. "It wasn't Lehman that killed Reserve Primary Fund, it was the run," said Crane. And fleeing investors caused the effective collapse of another fund, Putnam Prime Money Market Fund. Putnam closed the fund on Sept. 17 after it came under heavy redemption pressure -- investors cashing out created a liquidity squeeze that could only have been met by selling assets below par and thus breaking the buck. Putnam later sold the fund's assets to Federated, where it was merged into Federated Prime Obligations Fund . The Reserve had previously valued its Lehman paper at par, but then suddenly announced it was valuing the assets at zero, causing the panic. While many investors are still waiting to get their cash out of Reserve Primary, the firm said in late August that it values the Lehman debt at about 17 cents on the dollar and "shareholders could possibly receive up to 99 cents per share." Reserve Primary's basic problem was, of course, that it held Lehman paper on Sept. 15. All the managers who spoke to MarketWatch said they had no Lehman exposure and many said they had during the previous year's troubles been heading more and more into shorter-duration debt as well as Treasurys and agency debt. When the Lehman crisis hit, many managers said they doubled their holdings of debt with seven days or less to maturity, for instance, up from 15% of a portfolio to 30%. "One of the strengths of money-market funds is the ability to retool and adapt to the market conditions quickly," said Joe Benevento, manager of the DWS money market series of institutional funds. Dealing with a crisis But despite these efforts, even the most conservative managers found themselves on high alert. "There was a mismatch that lasted over the course of a few days due to the seizing up of the market and not having the liquidity to meet demands," said Benevento. The head of one of the largest money-market fund lines, who declined to be named because of the delicate nature of last year's events, said his fund managers, fearing the worst for Lehman, met with the funds' board during the weekend of Sept. 13 and Sept. 14 to apprise the board of the funds' status, none of which had Lehman debt. The funds had also been pulling in their average maturity and credit risk levels. The group head added that conference calls with sales staff around the country were also held during the weekend to provide them with talking points to deliver to worried clients. Federated's Cunningham said that had the investor panic lasted, Federated had a "bevy" of resources, both internal and external, to maintain liquidity, but that the firm "came closer than we ever thought possible" to using those measures. "You always talk about contingency planning in meetings, and then all of a sudden you find yourself in a situation where you could have to use that planning," she said. The worst of the crisis passed on Friday Sept. 19, when Treasury said it would insure all money-market funds that pay a fee -- the entire industry eventually joined the program. At the same time, the Federal Reserve said it would buy agency discount notes from primary dealers, acting as a backstop when and if money-market funds wanted to sell their assets. "The [Fed program] was one of the key things done to provide liquidity," said Benevento. Cunningham agreed, saying the program was a "great solution." Coupled with the insurance plan, due to expire on Sept. 18, the two measures were "enough for everyone to step back and take a breather," she said. Lower yields more safety One year later, and the money-market fund industry is roughly back to where it was just before Lehman collapsed, standing at about $3.5 trillion in assets and serving as a refuge for those on the sidelines. But last year's experience prompted government action on two fronts: from the Obama administration and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The administration's recommendations are still vague and won't be clear until the financial reform package is unveiled on Sept. 15. The SEC's proposals were published at the end of June. The plan calls for better credit quality, shorter maturities and more disclosure. "The proposals offer a greater level of protection for fund investors," said Vanguard's Glocke. "The rules now are for credit events, not liquidity events." Among the proposals are requirements for certain levels of assets that must be held in cash, Treasurys or holdings that can be cashed within one day, and limiting the maximum weighted average maturity of a fund's portfolio to 60 days, from the current 90 days. The SEC estimates its proposed changes would lower yields by between 0.02 to 0.04 percentage points. In a comment letter to the agency, Fidelity Investments said the potential yield reduction could be between 0.19 to 0.43 percentage points for institutional funds and 0.14 to 0.31 point for retail funds. Robert Deutsch, head of the global cash business at J.P. Morgan Funds, estimated the fall in yields would on average be between 0.05 and 0.1 percentage points. "You're giving up that yield to get extra safeguards," said Deutsch. "It seems like a good trade-off." Deutsch said he didn't think the lower yields would put off investors. After last year's panic, "there's been a big shift in how investors think, moving away from yield-chasing funds." Reserve Primary was among the highest-yielding funds in the industry. Despite the reform efforts, some say that last year's events may simply have to be seen as a once-in-a-lifetime event. "The SEC may be able to prevent one or two dominos from falling, but nothing could have prevented the complex series of events that led to what happened [last September]," said Crane. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
