http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/marxism-thaxis/1999-January/013154.html
M-TH: Re: Marx conceiving of nature dialectically Andrew Wayne Austin aaustin at utkux.utcc.utk.edu Tue Jan 5 12:03:17 MST 1999 Previous message: M-TH: Re: Marx conceiving of nature dialectically Next message: M-TH: Political Prisoner's post Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- On Tue, 5 Jan 1999, Charles Brown wrote: >I would say Marxism has a REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION that the universe is >material. This is stronger than agnosticism or Kantianism, but weaker >than what I have put on this thread. This means that until something pops >up that is not material, then we presume and anticipate AND INVESTIGATE >everything presuming it is material. Two interrelated problems with this argument. First, if we presume that everything is material then we run into the same problem that we do when we presume that everything is dialectical or that everything is God or that everything is ideas, etc. Second, and this follows from the first, if we are precise in defining what we mean by material, then we can only do so by differentiating it from what is not material. Charles seems to believe that everything in the universe is material and that there is nothing that contradicts this presumption. But are the contents of thoughts material? No; they are ideas. And it cannot be said that the content of thoughts is a reflection of the material world for a very basic reason: Is God part of the material world? Is God not content for some thought? No, God is not part of the material world, and, yes, God is the content of thought, therefore not all thought is material, and if some thought is not material (actually no thought is material) then not everything that exists is material since surely people have thought. Therefore Charles' premise fails on the facts, not only on logic. There is more than material and thought in Marx's system; there is the social world, and there is the physical substratum. If we define material precisely, the way Marx does, then we don't run into the problems of vulgar philosophical materialism. >Otherwise, the fundamental question of philosophical materialism would be >revisited by every scientific investigation. First, revisiting assumptions in scientific investigation is extremely important and this procedure is more a part of Marxian analysis then any other form of analysis since Marx's approach is simultaneously a scientific realist position and a sociology of knowledge. Second, philosophical materialism is rejected by Marx, anyway, and is replaced by a practical materialism, so the point is sort of moot. >Marx even uses the Latin literary allusion "immortal death" as a paradox >similar to "change is the only constant" or the "non-universal as >universal" as it has been formulated on this thread. I'll quote it at >length when I bring the book in. The passages in my post were extensive quotes from the relevant section. What is to be gained by quoting this again? Unless Charles really plans to show how that passage means something other than what I said it means I don't see the benefit. >On the recurrent issue on this thread of all change being dialectical >making it meaningless. I don't think Jim F. has succeeded in >demonstrating that. Nobody has to demonstrate the point; it is illogical to say that all change is dialectical. The brute fact that reality contradicts the proposition is just icing on the cake. >Dialectical change is actually the COMBINATION of quantitative and >qualitative change and the transformation of the one into the other AND >VICA VERSA. Dialectics also holds that qualitative change turns into >quantitative. Of course, because this way the universal dialectic is an even more thorough-going self-sealing argument. You have it both ways coming. >We need a definition of "heuristic" from Jim F. I will provide a definition. A heuristic is a tentative and flexible scheme or model that indicates to the investigator systemic elements and relations that may be important to attend to in order to explain or understand the behavior or character of a given system. It is a tool for discovery. A heuristic model is not a theory. Many different theories can emerge from a single heuristic model. A heuristic model is neither true nor false, only more or less productive. The model of social reality, and social reality "in itself," are not the same thing; a model is a symbolic representation of social reality at variable levels of abstraction. Using a heuristic model has a twofold purpose: (1) it is a flexible framework that orders our perceptions of reality (the empirical/factual world); and (2) it serves as a conceptual toolbox for theory construction and a means for furthering investigation. It is a mistake often made to present the conceptual categories generated by historical materialism as transhistorical entities (note that there is a difference between "transhistoric" and "transhistorical"). To assert rigidified historical categories (such as "imperialism") is contrary to the Marxian method. This reduces a science to the level of ideology. Andy _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
