Is the Ponziness and sort of musical chairs of the overall thing that every firm cannot effectively hedge every bet ? So , when the music stops and the bubble bursts, somebody is going to be without a chair, somebody too big to fail when most or all too big to failers take actual risks .
Those that got bailed out were not taking a risk , retrospectively. Charles Firm's response to criticism of AIG payments Goldman Sachs has maintained that its net exposure to AIG was 'not material', and that the firm was protected by hedges (in the form of CDSs with other counterparties) and USD 7.5B of collateral.[87] The firm stated the cost of these hedges to be over USD 100M.[88] According to Goldman, both the collateral and CDSs would have protected the bank from incurring an economic loss in the event of an AIG bankruptcy (however, because AIG was bailed out and not allowed to fail, these hedges did not pay out.)[89] CFO David Viniar stated that profits related to AIG in Q1 2009 "rounded to zero", and profits in December were not significant. He went on to say that he was "mystified" by the interest the government and investors have shown in the bank's trading relationship with AIG.[90] Considerable speculation remains that Goldman's hedges against their AIG exposure would not have paid out if AIG was allowed to fail. According to a report by the United States Office of the Inspector General of TARP, if AIG had collapsed, it would have made it difficult for Goldman to liquidate its trading positions with AIG, even at discounts, and it also would have put pressure on other counterparties that "might have made it difficult for Goldman Sachs to collect on the credit protection it had purchased against an AIG default."[91] Finally, the report said, an AIG default would have forced Goldman Sachs to bear the risk of declines in the value of billions of dollars in collateralized debt obligations. Goldman argues that CDSs are marked to market (i.e. valued at their current market price) and their positions netted between counterparties daily. Thus, as the cost of insuring AIG's obligations against default rose substantially in the lead-up to its bailout, the sellers of the CDS contracts had to post more collateral to Goldman Sachs. Thus, the firm claims its hedges were effective and the firm would have been protected against an AIG bankruptcy and the risk of knock-on defaults, had AIG been allowed to fail.[88] However, in practice, the collateral would not protect fully against losses both because protection sellers would not be required to post collateral that covered the complete loss during a bankruptcy and because the value of the collateral would be highly uncertain following the repercussions of an AIG bankruptcy. As with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, wider and longer-term systemic and economic turmoil brought on by an AIG default would probably have affected the firm and all other market participants. _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
