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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/11/AR2011031103244.html
Gen. Wesley Clark says Libya doesn't meet the test for U.S. military action
By Wesley K. Clark
Friday, March 11, 2011; 8:00 PM
In March of 1974, when I was a young Army captain, I was sitting in a
conference on civil-military relations at Brown University. Rep. Les
Aspin (D-Wis.) was onstage expounding on the lessons from Vietnam about
military interventions. He then stopped and looked right at me and the
four West Point cadets at my side. "You, the young officer and cadets
sitting there - never in your lifetimes will you see us intervene
abroad," I recall him saying. "We've learned that lesson."
For all his brilliance, Aspin couldn't have been more wrong.
We have launched many military interventions since then. And today, as
Moammar Gaddafi looks vulnerable and Libya descends into violence,
familiar voices are shouting, once again: "Quick, intervene, do
something!" It could be a low-cost win for democracy in the region. But
before we aid the Libyan rebels or establish a no-fly zone, let's review
what we've learned about intervening since we pulled out of Vietnam.
The past 37 years have been replete with U.S. interventions. Some have
succeeded, such as our actions in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), the
Persian Gulf War (1991) and the Balkans (1995-2000). Some were awful
blunders, such as the attempted hostage rescue in Iran (1980), landing
the Marines in Lebanon (1982) or the Somalia intervention (1992-94).
Some worked in the short run, but not the longer term - such as the
occupation of Haiti in 1994. Others still hang in the balance, such as
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, consuming hundreds of billions of
dollars and wrecking thousands of American lives. Along the way, we've
bombed a few tyrants such as Saddam Hussein and Gaddafi himself,
operated through proxies in Central America, and stood ready with
fly-overs, deployments, mobility exercises and sail-bys across the globe.
I've thought about military interventions for a long time - from before
my service in Vietnam to writing a master's thesis at Fort Leavenworth
to leading NATO forces in the Kosovo war. In considering Libya, I find
myself returning to the guidelines for intervention laid out by Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger in 1984. The world has changed a great deal
since then, so I've adapted and updated his vision to develop my own
rules for when the United States should deploy its blood and treasure in
operations far from home.
Understand the national interests at stake, and decide if the result is
worth the cost.
We went into Lebanon with a reinforced battalion of Marines in 1982
because we believed that it was in our national interest to stabilize
the situation after the Israelis had been forced out of Beirut. But
after the terrorist bombing of their barracks killed 241 U.S. service
members the next year, we pulled out. After the tragedy, any benefits
seemed to pale in light of the cost and continuing risks.
In 1999, when we launched the NATO air campaign against Serbian ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo, President Bill Clinton had to state publicly that
he didn't intend to use ground troops. He did so in an effort to limit
the costs of an initiative that the public and Congress did not consider
to be in our nation's vital interest. The administration and I, as the
NATO commander in Europe, were in a difficult position, and Serbian
dictator Slobodan Milosevic knew it. But what Milosevic didn't
understand was that once we began the strikes - with NATO troops
deployed in neighboring countries and the Dayton Peace Agreement to
enforce in Bosnia - NATO couldn't afford to lose. And the United States
had a vital interest in NATO's success, even if we had a less-than-vital
interest in Kosovo.
In 2001, when the United States went into Afghanistan, it was clear that
we had to strike back after the attacks of Sept. 11. And we're still
there, despite all the ambiguities and difficulties, because we have a
vital interest in combating al-Qaeda and similar terrorist groups there
and across the border in Pakistan.
How do we apply this test to Libya? Protecting access to oil supplies
has become a vital interest, but Libya doesn't sell much oil to the
United States, and what has been cut off is apparently being replaced by
Saudi production. Other national interests are more complex. Of course,
we want to support democratic movements in the region, but we have two
such operations already underway - in Iraq and Afghanistan. Then there
are the humanitarian concerns. It is hard to stand by as innocent people
are caught up in violence, but that's what we did when civil wars in
Africa killed several million and when fighting in Darfur killed
hundreds of thousands. So far, the violence in Libya is not significant
in comparison. Maybe we could earn a cheap "victory," but, on whatever
basis we intervene, it would become the United States vs. Gaddafi, and
we would be committed to fight to his finish. That could entail a
substantial ground operation, some casualties and an extended
post-conflict peacekeeping presence.
Know your purpose and how the proposed military action will achieve it.
In 1989, when the United States wanted regime change in Panama, a
powerful U.S. force took over the country, captured dictator Manuel
Noriega and enabled the democratic opposition to form a new government.
Panama today is a thriving democracy.
On the other hand, in Somalia in 1992-94, we started out on a
humanitarian mission, gradually transitioned to greater use of military
power and then had a tragic tactical stumble trying to arrest a warlord.
The loss of 18 Americans caused national outrage, and eventually we
pulled out. We experienced classic mission creep, without reconsidering
the strategy or the means to achieve it.
In Libya, if the objective is humanitarian, then we would work with both
sides and not get engaged in the matter of who wins. Just deliver relief
supplies, treat the injured and let the Libyans settle it. But if we
want to get rid of Gaddafi, a no-fly zone is unlikely to be sufficient -
it is a slick way to slide down the slope to deeper intervention.
Determine the political endgame before intervening.
In Haiti in 1994, it was a matter of getting rid of the military junta
that had forced out the democratically elected president and restoring a
democratic government. We prepared and threatened an invasion, we used
it as leverage in negotiations, and within four weeks of its start,
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was back in power.
But in Iraq in 2003, we failed to chart a clear path to democracy before
taking action. So after we toppled Hussein, we lacked a ready
alternative. Eight years later we've come a long way, but at a very high
price.
In Libya, we don't know who the rebels really are or how a legitimate
government would be formed if Gaddafi were pushed out. Perhaps we will
have a better sense when Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton meets
with rebel leaders, as she is scheduled to do this coming week. In a
best-case scenario, there would be a constitutional convention, voter
lists, political parties and internationally supervised free and fair
elections. But there could also be a violent scramble for authority in
which the most organized, secretive and vicious elements take over. We
are not well-equipped to handle that kind of struggle. And once we
intervene, Libya's problems would become our responsibility.
Get U.S. public support, obtain diplomatic and legal authority, and get
allies engaged.
Offensive war is, in general, illegal. In the Persian Gulf War, Iraq's
actions in 1990 were a clear case of aggression; we obtained full U.N.
support. We had a congressional resolution. And we enjoyed the
overwhelming backing of our allies and Arab partners. They even paid
most of the cost of Operation Desert Storm, to the tune of tens of
billions of dollars. The resulting military action was widely hailed as
a legitimate and moral victory.
In 1999 in Kosovo, the United States and NATO had a humanitarian U.N.
resolution backing our actions. The American public was mostly
unengaged, but NATO was able to wield its diplomatic power and the
incremental use of force to compel Milosevic's surrender. (The coup de
grace was his indictment for war crimes by the International Criminal
Tribunal on Yugoslavia.)
By contrast, going it alone, without substantial international legal and
diplomatic support, is a recipe for trouble. Our haste and clumsiness
going into Iraq in 2003 - without a compelling reason to intervene, in
my view - has cost us dearly.
In Libya, Gaddafi has used and supported terrorism, murdered Americans
and repressed his people for 40 years. The American public may want to
see him go. But his current actions aren't an attack on the United
States or any other country. On what basis would we seek congressional
support and international authorization to intervene in a civil war? Do
we have the endorsement of the Arab League? A U.N. Security Council
resolution?
Avoid U.S. and civilian casualties.
In Kosovo, NATO had the upper hand from the outset. We weren't losing
aircraft (we lost only two in combat out of 36,000 sorties flown over 78
days); we never lost a soldier or airman in combat; and because we
minimized innocent civilian casualties and the destruction of
nonmilitary property, we maintained our moral authority.
But once Americans start dying, public tolerance for military action
wanes sharply. We've seen it time and again, from the aborted attempt to
rescue our hostages in Iran in 1980 to Afghanistan today. Intervening
successfully isn't so much a matter of how many troops and planes you
use, it's about mustering decisive power - military, diplomatic, legal,
economic, moral - while avoiding the casualties and collateral damage
that discredit the mission.
A no-fly zone in Libya may seem straightforward at first, but if Gaddafi
continues to advance, the time will come for airstrikes, extended
bombing and ground troops - a stretch for an already overcommitted
force. A few unfortunate incidents can quash public support.
Once you decide to do it, get it over with.
Use decisive force - military, economic, diplomatic and legal. The
longer an operation takes, the more can go wrong. In 1983, we went in
with overwhelming force against an attempted communist takeover in
Grenada. With 20,000 U.S. troops against 600 Cuban military engineers
and some ill-trained locals, it was over in three days. The Cubans were
out, the American students who had been held hostage were freed and
casualties were minimal. Grenada transitioned to democracy.
The operation in Panama lasted about three weeks; the ground fight in
the Gulf War only 100 hours. We pushed the limit in Kosovo with a 78-day
air campaign, but fortunately, Milosevic ran out of options before NATO
had to commit to planning an invasion.
Given these rules, what is the wisest course of action in Libya? To me,
it seems we have no clear basis for action. Whatever resources we
dedicate for a no-fly zone would probably be too little, too late. We
would once again be committing our military to force regime change in a
Muslim land, even though we can't quite bring ourselves to say it. So
let's recognize that the basic requirements for successful intervention
simply don't exist, at least not yet: We don't have a clearly stated
objective, legal authority, committed international support or adequate
on-the-scene military capabilities, and Libya's politics hardly
foreshadow a clear outcome.
We should have learned these lessons from our long history of
intervention. We don't need Libya to offer us a refresher course in past
mistakes.
Wesley K. Clark, a retired Army general and NATO's former supreme allied
commander in Europe, is a senior fellow at the Burkle Center for
International Relations at the University of California at Los Angeles.
He will be online to chat on Monday, March 14, at 11: 30 a.m. Submit
your questions or comments now.
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