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On 2014-03-13, at 6:48 PM, Louis Proyect wrote: > To recapitulate my views on the Ukraine briefly as I have been developing > them over the past few weeks: > > 1. Poverty, corruption and hatred toward Russian domination fueled the > protests that led to the collapse of Yanukovych's government. > > 2. Sympathy for the far right as indicated by polling about attitudes toward > the fighting forces in WWII amounts to 16 percent nationwide and only nears a > majority in Galicia, a province that has 10 percent of the country's > population. In Kyiv, 89 percent of the population views the Red Army > favorably, as opposed to 2 percent favorable toward the armed wing of > Bandera's ultraright group. > > 3. In the past 15 years, there are only two reports of violent attacks on > Jews in the Ukraine. Social scientists who follow anti-Semitic trends view > France and Britain as far more worrisome. > > 4. There is nothing more progressive about Russia in comparison to the EU. > The Eurasian Trade organization is not COMECON and Putin is not Brezhnev. > > 5. Fascism is not on the agenda anywhere in Europe despite the fact that > there are fascists everywhere. If you are going to worry about the > ultraright, worry about France where Le Pen got twice the vote of Svoboda. > > 6. The new power in Ukraine is poised to impose a Greek-style austerity. > People who have been suffering from a total economic collapse are not likely > to rally around a government imposing it because it invokes nationalistic > themes. In fact, as I indicated already, there are reports that the average > citizen who supported Euromaidan views it as having a "dirty past", according > to the Estonian foreign minister. > > That's about it, I guess. I don't think we're that far apart, but I may be wrong. Here are my comments: a) You understate the ethnic divisions between west and east Ukraine which were as important in fuelling the protests as the living conditions and corruption of the Yanukovych government. The ethnic divisions were present before the arrival of Yanukovych, and the Crimean crisis, if anything, has exacerbated them. b) In rejecting the hysterics of those who believe there has been a fascist coup in the Ukraine, you bend the stick back too far in dismissing the pro-fascist groups as having little or no significance. While it's true the wartime historical memory of the Ukrainians is pro-Soviet, that's less important than the leading role played by the far right in the recent protests which led to the change in regime. By most accounts, and as you would expect, that's won Svoboda and the lesser pro-fascist groups the increased respect of the masses, especially in the western half of the country. In the absence of any remotely comparable left parties, they stand to make the most gains if the right of centre Yatsenyuk government should falter. The previous Yushchenko-Tymoshenko leadership contributed to their present legitimacy by burnishing the image of Bandera and the other pro-fascists who fought on the Nazi side. c) I'm not as convinced that the new government is poised to initiate a Greek-style austerity. The US/EU/IMF axis is not stupid, and, in the present volatile conditions with the far right waiting in the wings, it likely understands its immediate need is to restore order and consolidate the pro-Western regime before risking an attack on fuel and food subsidies and other social programs. I'm attaching a recent opinion piece by the Larry Summers, who knows his way around the issue, which I think is a good indicator of the slow pace of "reform" being contemplated. d) It's equally difficult to anticipate how much, if any, mass resistance there would be to austerity. The expected challenge from the left to the capitalist states and traditional parties in the crisis-racked European periphery never really materialized except in Greece. In Ukraine, the potential for a class-based response led by a left-wing party is out of the question since, to my knowledge, no such party exists - even in embryo. Socialist ideology and left-wing parties were rejected in reaction to the Soviet experience, and replaced by an idealized view of Western bourgeois democracy and conservative leaders like Reagan and Thatcher. The identification with nation rather than class, and the promise of EU membership, may be sufficient to persuade the Ukrainian masses to reluctantly bear the "necessary sacrifices" that their leaders and Western governments will be demanding. ‘Potemkin money’ is the wrong way to help Ukraine By Lawrence Summers Financial Times March 9 2014 Events in Ukraine have underscored the importance of effective external support for successful economic and political reform. The international community is finally responding with concrete indications of support. At one level the situation in Ukraine is unique – a product of the country’s sensitive location between Russia and Europe. At another, however, it is merely the latest example of a phenomenon that recurs all too often. A government that is illegitimate or at least highly problematic is brought down. The world community seeks to support economic reform. A new government, purportedly more democratic and legitimate, is installed in its place. Think, for example, of the transition that occurred after the Berlin Wall fell; or after the Arab uprisings; or in more isolated cases such as East Timor or Rwanda. As a general rule, outsiders acted with the best of intentions in offering their support. But the results have often fallen short of their aspirations. I have seen close to a dozen cases over the past quarter-century where the precedent of the Marshall Plan was invoked. None was as successful as the original. This reflects the truth that functioning institutions cannot be imposed from the outside. Countries and their peoples shape their own destinies. Still, there are important lessons for the design of support programmes. First, immediate impact is essential. New governments will not last unless they deliver results that are felt on the ground. Outside support can be made conditional on progress towards reform but the conditions need to reflect political reality. Assistance must be delivered promptly so that its impact quickly becomes visible. For example, social safety nets need to be strengthened before subsidies on items such as food and fuel are removed – not afterwards, as has too often been the case in the past. The international community needs to understand that, even when the conditions they impose are economically rational, they may be more than the political process can bear. It is no use for international agencies to blame the country they are trying to assist when this results in the adoption of bad policies. Such moments are surely a time for political concerns to trump technocrats’ fears. Second, avoid “Potemkin money” – the tendency to announce huge assistance packages that grab the headlines but belie the inevitable truth that much of the cash will take time to arrive. The result is disappointment followed by disillusionment as recipients realise that not all assistance can materialise quickly or meet urgent local needs. It bears emphasis that the original Marshall Plan was announced without any figures or fact sheets. In Ukraine the west should make modest promises – and then strive to deliver more than the country has been led to expect. Third, be realistic about debts. Ukraine’s debt-to-income ratio is low compared with those of the crisis countries of the European periphery. Honouring these obligations may be worthwhile, given the benefits of financial stability. However, Ukraine’s private creditors have for some years received risk premiums of 500 basis points or more. Careful consideration should be given to rescheduling or restructuring the country’s debts. Debt relief can provide a strong signal of political support – as it did in Poland in 1989. Countries in crisis should be wary of taking on debt to finance projects that will not generate the cash flows necessary to repay it. In such cases, donors should offer support in the form of grants rather than loans. Fourth, honest management is as important as prudent policy. Policy makers have traditionally focused on the latter. But that is a mistake. Theft of public resources is a major source of poor economic performance. The international community should do everything it can to recover ill-gotten gains from former Ukrainian officials and to put in place procedures that will prevent future skulduggery. The benefits would be political, as well as economic. Fifth, countries need to pursue broad policies in a way that benefits Ukraine. For example, Congress needs to demonstrate that the US is as committed as the rest of the world to providing full funding for the International Monetary Fund. America should also move to allow crude oil and natural gas exports to flow more freely. Over time, this would contribute to Ukraine’s autonomy and economic strength. All of this goes for Europe, too – which is far closer to Ukraine and has an even greater stake in the country’s future prosperity. The possibility of a closer partnership with the EU is a North Star that can guide Ukrainian reformists. Respect for these principles does not ensure success. But ignoring them almost guarantees failure. Given what is at stake with Russia in Crimea, that gloomy outcome must be strenuously avoided. The writer is Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasury secretary ________________________________________________ Send list submissions to: Marxism@greenhouse.economics.utah.edu Set your options at: http://greenhouse.economics.utah.edu/mailman/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
