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On 2014-04-05, at 2:32 PM, Ken Hiebert wrote: > > This is a response to Marv Gandall's message of April 2nd. See message at > bottom. > > You said, "...it's a mistake to see the behaviour of the Russian government > as being driven by an affinity for fascism.." > I am not sure that Louis or myself have argued that the Russian government > has an affinity for fascism. You haven't argued that, but Louis has. Louis explained that his purpose in drawing on an article published by an obscure US-based outfit called the Institute of Modern Russia was "to show the affinity between Putin and the European far right." > I think the friendly relations with far right groups could be motivated by > simple opportunism. The far right groups are typically bigger than he far > left groups and have more clout in the short term. I would say the nature of any contact between the Russian government and foreign far right groups is incidental and inconsequential compared to the ties between the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian parties and groups which are sympathetic to fascism. The Ukrainian far right played a central role in organizing the protests which brought the present government to power and was subsequently invited to join it as a junior partner. Though it does not control the government, it appears to have significant influence over the security apparatus. Louis' effort to shift attention to Aleksandr Dugin and Russian fascism is the mirror image of those who, admittedly on stronger evidence, exaggerate the influence of Ukrainian fascism. My own view, as expressed in the message you copied below, is that fascism is not the dominant ideology at either the state or mass level in either country, although it has a stronger tradition in Ukraine, where it has emerged strengthened by the current crisis. > The National Question > I'm not sure that we have a difference on the national question in general. > We may have a different understanding of this question as it applies to the > Ukraine. > In his article in International Viewpoint Kowalewski has this to say: > > "Ukraine bears an extraordinary burden of several centuries of national > oppression, mainly Polish and Russian. In Soviet Ukraine, after several years > of intense positive discrimination known as Ukrainisation, a return to the > policy of Russification came with the advent of the Stalinist regime, behind > which Russian imperialism was hidden. The intelligentsia was massacred and > several million peasants, that is to say the basis of national identity, were > exterminated by famine. After the Second World War, Russification affected > all the Ukrainian lands, now reunited; although in western Ukraine, > previously under the Polish colonial yoke, a vigorous anti-Soviet resistance > of Ukrainian nationalists was maintained until the mid 1950s. Outside the > period of the government of Petro Shelest (1963-1972), Russification was > pursued virtually until the fall of the USSR. On the eve of the proclamation > of independence by Ukraine, I wrote in the review “Nouvelle Europe”, > published in the European Parliament: “what makes the Ukrainian process > vulnerable is the fact that as a nation without a state, subject to a long > term oppression, it has not yet completed its national formation” . And this > is still the case. Barely two decades of existence as a state is too short a > time to overcome the legacy this oppression has left behind it inside > Ukrainian society." > > Do you think this is an accurate statement of the question? I do. The Ukrainian-speaking population, concentrated in the western provinces, has its own language, culture, history, and territory, and many of them experienced the Russification policy of the USSR as national oppression. At the same time, I don't think successive generations of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the eastern part of the country should be held accountable for that oppressive policy. In fact, the ethnic Russians today also claim their own distinct "national" characteristics within the Ukrainian state and describe the Kiev government as an instrument of oppression on the other side. Both groups arguably have the same right to self-determination the left has generally accorded the Basques, the Scots, the Catalans, and the Québécois, and this right can be further extended to smaller groups within these larger nationalities, eg. the Tatars. > You refer to "...an ethnocentric (movement) dominated by right-wing > nationalists..." Even if you and I were to agree on the term "ethnocentric," > we still have to figure out what our response should be. > Kowalewski tells us that in the early years of the Russian Revolution there > was a policy of "Ukrainisation." We know that at one point Trotsky advocated > an Independent Soviet Ukraine. Does your use of the word "ethnocentric" > allow for such far-reaching policies? I don't believe in the right of self-determination as an absolute principle, especially as ethnic populations become increasing dispersed and intertwined. In particular, I think it depends on who is wielding the slogan and for what purpose and whether their program will improve or worsen the condition of the oppressed nation. Trotsky was not simply calling for an independent Ukraine; he was advocating an independent Soviet Ukraine. Let's recall Ukraine was already a Soviet republic within the USSR at the time. A large part of the population had participated in the Bolshevik revolution and supported the Soviet system. Their quarrel was with the Russification policy directed from Moscow. In that context, the slogan of an independent, socialist Ukraine advanced by Trotsky was progressive and nowhere near as utopian as it would be today where there is no left to advance it nor constituency to hear it. Ukraine for the Ukrainians is today the rallying cry of right-wing Ukrainian nationalists, as it has been for some time, and the current crisis has given it broader popular appeal. This is not surprising. As Trotsky noted: "Not a trace remains of the former confidence and sympathy of the Western Ukrainian masses for the Kremlin...The worker and peasant masses in the Western Ukraine, in Bukovina, in the Carpatho-Ukraine are in a state of confusion: Where to turn? What to demand? This situation naturally shifts the leadership to the most reactionary Ukrainian cliques who express their ‘nationalism’ by seeking to sell the Ukrainian people to one imperialism or another in return for a promise of fictitious independence." http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1939/04/ukraine.html 75 years later, the masses have not broken with the leadership of their "reactionary cliques", as Trotsky and his followers fully expected in developing their slogan. The nationalism expressed by their leaders is still being used to sell the Ukrainian people to US imperialism and its allies for a promise of fictitious independence. > Your description of "...an ethnocentric (movement) dominated by right-wing > nationalists..." could apply to Palestine, without much stretching. And > various Kurdish organizations have made deals with the US, perhaps even with > the Israelis. Of course, we should not try to hide this. But does this tell > us how to correctly respond? Don't we have to start by asking if there is, > in fact, a legitimate national struggle? Yes, this is the starting point, but it's a question which has bedevilled and divided the left for the past three decades. The Ukraine is the latest example where there is no agreement that it's a "legitimate" national struggle. I don't think the two of us would have the same disagreement about Palestine and the Kurds. Even where movements are deemed legitimate, other disagreements arise within them and among their international supporters about their tactics and goals. Not all national struggles are aimed at statehood; some aim at, or are forced to accept, a measure of national autonomy within a federated state. In the case of Palestine, as we know, divisions have opened up between those who favour an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel, and those who have concluded a viable state is now unrealizable and propose instead an anti-apartheid struggle against Zionism on both sides of the 1967 border. BTW, I wouldn't describe the Palestinians as "ethnocentric" and dominated by right-wing nationalists in the same way as are the Israelis. My impression has always been that oppressed peoples tend to be more generous and inclusive than oppressor nations who tend to be viciously arrogant and parochial in outlook. > The future of the revolutionary left. > Referring to Russia and the Ukraine you say. "The liberal left is very weak > and the revolutionary left virtually absent in both countries." > I cannot dispute what you say. But at least as it applies to the > revolutionary left, the same could be said of many countries. > In any case, even if they are small, we are in touch with left groups in > Russia and the Ukraine. I think we should do what we can to assist them. That's also a more complicated question today as a result of the virtual disappearance of the once powerful international socialist movement. When we were younger, the national liberation struggles in Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, and elsewhere were typically led by left-wing leaderships, often avowedly Marxist, who were opposed to capitalism and imperialism. Extending political, financial, and other forms of solidarity to these movements quickly united the left, even where there were disagreements about how best to provide that solidarity or about the political leadership and direction of these movements. Today, national movements are typically led by religious and tribal leaders or one or another faction of their ruling class, and they do not mobilize their supporters around anticapitalist programs. The Ukrainian movement is a stark illustration of such a movement; it is led by oligarchs and right-wing politicians who, far from being opposed to capitalism and imperialism, seek to turn Ukraine into another Greece within the EU and NATO. Consequently, it has become much more difficult for the left to unite around the "legitimacy" of such movements today, and to extend support to them. They're as apt to be seen as cat's paws of Western imperialism as much or more than as authentic liberation movements. You and Louis may believe, for example, that you are acting in solidarity with the small Ukrainian and Russian left, although I don't know which groups or individuals you have in mind. On the other hand, I've referred several times to interviews in Links with the Russian Boris Kargalitsky as well as several Ukrainian revolutionary left activists whose analysis of the situation greatly varies from your own. Far from supporting them, Louis has vilified them. You have a more disciplined approach and tone, but I expect you would also not consider them deserving of support because their analyses and aims so fundamentally contradict your own. > I am sure that you are right to suggest that the left is small and isolated. > But is it condemned to stay that way? > In his article The Emergence of the New Left in Slovenia (The Bullet) Gal Kim > has this to say. > "Only a few years ago anyone advocating socialism in the Slovenian public > media was seen either as an old nostalgic decrying "good old times" and Josip > Broz Tito (leader of the former Yugoslavia), or as a leftist extremist, who > in the political spectrum does not sit far away from the extreme > right-wingers. Due to the tragic break-up of socialist Yugoslavia in early > 1990s, socialism and Marx have long remained buried in the dustbin of > history, or in the best case limited to scarce theoretical discussion within > alternative circles." I believe that the far left can break out of their > isolation. Apparently, the far right fears this as well. They were willing > to resort to physical assault to keep the left away from Maidan. The Russian dissident, Andrei Amalrik, wrote an essay in 1970 called "Will the USSR survive until 1984?" which, as a Trotskyist at the time, filled me with a mix of mirth and contempt. I never would have believed that Amalrik would only be out by five or six years, and that the Soviet Union would collapse - with the peaceful acquiescence, moreover, of its working class. Same goes for the abrupt restoration of capitalism in China and the decline of the trade unions and demise or transformation of the parties based on them in the West. All this by way of saying that I agree with you that history can turn on a dime, and I don't rule anything out. However, I think predicting the movement of history is as difficult as long-range weather forecasting, so I just try to make sense of what is happening today and in the near term without adopting the mantle of either a cynic or a Pollyanna. > On 2014-04-02, at 1:19 PM, Ken Hiebert wrote: > >> Marv Gandall said: >> Re: [Marxism] [Pen-l] Dugin Tells Separatists in Ukraine What to Do Next | >> The Interpreter >> >> You (referring to Louis) have persistently argued the Ukrainian far right >> played little role in the recent protests and formation of the new >> government. If I understand you correctly, you have have now taken it a step >> further by suggesting that it is instead the Putin government - rather than >> groups like the Right Sector and Svoboda - which has more "affinity" with >> the ideology and symbols of fascism. These are precisely the talking points >> used by Western politicians and pro-Western commentators to portray the >> Ukrainian right nationalists and their EU-US sponsors as the targets of >> Russian aggression, rather than as the instigators of the current crisis. >> >> I think that is a nonsensical interpretation of what has transpired, but it >> makes your reliance on outfits like the US-based Institute of Modern Russia >> to make your case more comprehensible. >> >> >> Ken Hiebert replies: >> Louis has posted items reporting a connection between Putin and far-right >> organizations in a number of European countries. I have reposted one of >> these items to another list. full: >> http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141067/mitchell-a-orenstein/putins-western-allies >> If this report is inaccurate, I need to know that, so that I can acknowledge >> my mistake. Is there any reason to believe that these reports are inaccurate? > > I can't say, and neither can you. In any case, it's a mistake to see the > behaviour of the Russian government as being driven by an affinity for > fascism - as much or more of a mistake as to exaggerate the influence of the > far right on the centre-right government of Ukraine. Each preside over > capitalist states based on rapacious oligarchs who switch sides with abandon > whenever they perceive a shift in the balance of forces. They differ only in > the degree of their independence from the US and the EU. They each appeal to > traditional nationalism and enjoy a high level of mass support. The liberal > left is very weak and the revolutionary left virtually absent in both > countries. > > In other words, they are much more alike than dissimilar at the level of both > the state and mass political culture. I became interested in this discussion > because I don't believe, as I said at the time, that we have a dog in this > fight. Louis and others, perhaps including yourself, believe that we do, > having idealized the Euromaidan as a class movement rather than an > ethnocentric one dominated by right-wing nationalists inviting confrontation > with Russia and the Russian-speaking Ukrainian provinces in the east. In > effect, you've thrown in your lot behind a process which has both dangerously > destabilized the region and will almost certainly lead to a further lowering > of living standards for the mass of the population in both halves of the > country. > > Whether Putin has or has not some nebulous "connection" to European far right > individuals or parties is beside the point. > ________________________________________________ > Send list submissions to: Marxism@greenhouse.economics.utah.edu > Set your options at: > http://greenhouse.economics.utah.edu/mailman/options/marxism/marvgand2%40gmail.com ________________________________________________ Send list submissions to: Marxism@greenhouse.economics.utah.edu Set your options at: http://greenhouse.economics.utah.edu/mailman/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
