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>From Richard Seymour of Lenin's Tomb:

Syriza has been defeated in the first round of negotiations.

After a period of enjoyable defiance
<http://www.leninology.co.uk/2015/01/you-just-killed-troika.html>, during
which they won the backing of the overwhelming majority of the Greek people
- 80% according to a poll taken before the latest deal, published in
today's *Avgi*
<http://left.gr/news/dimoskopisi-public-issue-gia-tin-aygi-80-egkrinei-toys-heirismoys-tis-kyvernisis>
- they have come back with small change.  Pushed to the point where they
were at risk of a collapse of the banking system, and unprepared for a
Grexit (and thus unable to use it as a bargaining chip), they accepted the
most comprehensive drubbing
<http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/greece-got-outmaneuvered>.

Tsipras has tried to put the best possible gloss on this, but what he said
was delusional.  He said that the deal shows that Europe stands for
mutually beneficial compromise.  No such thing.  It stands, as Schauble
crowed
<http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/20/eurozone-chiefs-meet-for-last-ditch-talks-to-avert-greece-cash-crunch>,
for Syriza being forced to implement austerity against its own mandate.  It
stands for the crushing of national democracy.

Tsipras said that the deal creates the framework for Syriza to address the
humanitarian crisis.  Not with the commitment to a primary surplus and
troika oversight, it doesn't.  Not with the agreement that Syriza will not
'unilaterally' roll back austerity, it doesn't.  We can admit that a 1.5%
primary surplus is better than a 4.5% primary surplus.  Yet even 1.5% in a
depressed economy is harsh, and coupled with troika assessment of reforms
for fiscal sustainability (according to neoliberal maxims), this amounts to
the repudiation of most of Syriza's reform agenda.

Tsipras said that austerity and the Memorandum had been left behind.  That
is precisely the opposite of what has happened.  The Thessaloniki
programme, itself a carefully trimmed agenda shorn of the most radical of
Syriza's goals, is what has been left behind.

The problem with Tsipras's speech goes further than this, however.  Not
only is it deluded.  It recalibrates the government's language and goals in
order to rationalise not just this thrashing but future routs.  Having said
that austerity and the Memorandum are now left behind by this deal, the
government shifts the goalposts and terms of future negotiations.

And this is part of the reason why those who speak of 'buying time' are
wrong.  Time is not a simple quantity that only one side gains from. The EU
ruling classes have also 'bought time' and they have the resources and are
on the offensive, while Syriza has retreated.  There are no grounds for
thinking that Syriza's bargaining position will be better in four months
time than it is now.  It has already weakened its stance, while its
political position, after four months of continued austerity, will probably
be worse.

One can hardly pin most of the blame for this on Syriza.  They are in a
weak position, and it is doubtful that any government could have obtained
better against an EU determined to humiliate Greece.  Yet, the line of
Tsipras and Varoufakis is simply untenable.  Their commitment to trying to
resolve this crisis within the terms of the euro must fail.  They were
simply wrong to think that they would have a single ally or interlocutor in
the EU.  The southern European governments are even more fanatical than
Berlin on this question.  Hollande, far from being a friendly face, told
Syriza to shove it fairly early on: he made his decision on austerity some
time ago.

The question of the currency, then, was not simply a nationalist
distraction as some claimed: getting an anti-austerity government elected
with the specific goal of confronting the EU and struggling to overturn
austerity was always going to come to a head on this very question.

The alternative, what one might call a People's Grexit, is far from
straightforward, as Dave Renton points out
<https://livesrunning.wordpress.com/2015/02/21/when-a-pause-may-be-the-best-that-could-be-acheived/>
in
the latest of a series of excellent posts on Greece.  The economic risks
would be considerable.  It would require not just economic preparedness, or
secret war room gaming, but mass social and political preparedness.  It
would require the mobilisation of a workers movement that has been
relatively quiet since 2012.  And it would require a government willing to
risk economic and political isolation from trading partners and a fight to
the finish with the oligarchs, the Right, and the repressive state
apparatuses for the future of Greek society.

Nevertheless, there will now be a huge argument within Syriza over the
acceptance of this deal, and the old slogan of 'not one sacrifice for the
euro' will make a come back.  Manolis Glezos, an iconic figure from the
antifascist resistance and prominent within Syriza, is the first to have
gone public with his dissent.  He is calling for a campaign up and down the
party not to accept this deal, and will vote against it.  He will not be
the last.  Next week, there will be a rally in Syntagma Square, with the
slogan 'We're not afraid of Grexit'.

We have no right to be surprised by any of this.  And not just because we
were warned
<https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/02/greece-syriza-backtrack-europe-negotiations/>
by
informed sources that a retreat was taking place.  Even if it was not
inevitable, we knew very well that the balance of forces favoured precisely
this kind of defeat.  If we didn't know
<http://www.leninology.co.uk/2012/06/challenge-of-syriza.html> that a
Syriza-led government would be "in perpetual crisis", a "spot-lit enclave,
under constant assault from capital and the media", we shouldn't be in this
game.  If we didn't guess <http://www.leninology.co.uk/2015/01/athens.html>
that Berlin would want to "make an example of Greece one way or another",
and that any concessions offered would probably "be deliberately
insulting", we really weren't paying attention.

We can be disappointed, but not surprised.  But throwing in the towel is
likewise only possible with a certain degree of detachment - the sort of
detachment that allows some leftists to sound even more triumphant about
Syriza's rout than even Schauble.  This is still a far better and more open
situation for Greek workers than had New Democracy been re-elected.  Even
the modest reforms in favour of immigrants, workers' bargaining rights, and
protesters - supposing they are not scotched by the troika - are worth
having.  And it is only because we have now had the experience of an
anti-austerity government go to the wall in an attempt to reverse austerity
within the eurozone that we can now contemplate the emergence of a
significant anti-euro constituency within Greece.  Further, there will be
opportunities to build this: every time the troika rejects a needed reform,
this can and should be held up as an object lesson in what Europe means.

This is, as was anticipated by anyone with their eyes open, a nodal point
and not the end point in the process of Greek workers finding a solution to
their dilemma.
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