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---------- Forwarded message --------- From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-rev...@lists.h-net.org> Date: Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 8:26 AM Subject: H-Net Review [H-War]: Canning on Gorrochategui Santos, 'The English Armada: The Greatest Naval Disaster in English History' To: <h-rev...@lists.h-net.org> Cc: H-Net Staff <revh...@mail.h-net.org> Luis Gorrochategui Santos. The English Armada: The Greatest Naval Disaster in English History. Translated by Peter J. Gold. London Bloomsbury Academic, 2018. viii + 323 pp. $36.95 (paper), ISBN 978-1-350-01941-6; $108.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-350-01697-2. Reviewed by Ruth A. Canning (Liverpool Hope University) Published on H-War (August, 2019) Commissioned by Margaret Sankey The year 1588 looms large in English memory. It is regarded as a moment of national self-definition when a ragtag bunch of English sailors aboard ill-equipped ships faced the greatest naval power of the age: Spain. But this was not the momentous victory of popular imagination; it was an accident, and, as Luis Gorrochategui Santos points out, the English were not nearly as weak, unprepared, or unskilled as they are often portrayed. Interpretations of how the English managed to outmaneuver the Spanish in 1588 warrant revision, but so too does the English naval response of 1589. Santos's book, _The English Armada: The Greatest Naval Disaster in English History_, helps fill a historical void by offering a deep investigation of the ill-fated and oft-forgotten English Armada of 1589. As the remnants of the Spanish Armada limped back to Spain, the English decided to hammer home their victory by sending a fleet to attack what was left of the Spanish navy. This would firmly establish England's reputation as a great naval and imperial power, and it would also give England greater control over the lucrative trade between the Americas and Europe. The English Armada of 1589 was a massive enterprise, yet little is known about it, probably because it did not come close to achieving its aims. Santos's _The English Armada_ has been translated from its original Spanish by Peter J. Gold. It is an impressive 323 pages divided into three parts containing thirty-six chapters and an epilogue. Part 1 begins by placing the Spanish Armada and the Anglo-Spanish rivalry in the wider European context, giving particular attention to naval activities during this period. It then provides a synopsis of military operations before, during, and after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, detailing the size of ships and crew, navigational routes, and problems with food and weapon provisions. The day-to-day operations of these ships are carefully pieced together through archival records, offering the reader a glimpse into the personal experiences of captains and crew members. Through his analysis of the Spanish Armada, Santos challenges the historiographical myth that the armada was actually defeated. Instead, he argues that "it never shied away from fighting the English. It continued to rule the waves after each of the four battles that were fought in the channel. But the English strategy of avoiding proper confrontation ended up by exhausting the capacity of the Spanish fleet to remain in the theatre of operations" (p. 27). Notwithstanding Spanish resolve and English luck, there is no escaping the fact that the Spanish expedition was an immense failure. Part 2 is the longest section in this book, comprising twenty-seven chapters. It contends that Queen Elizabeth was determined to make the defeat of the Spanish Armada a reality by launching an offensive on the surviving ships. She had an additional goal of setting up Dom António as the puppet king of Portugal, thereby removing it from Spanish control and making it little better than a vassal state of England. Santos offers a day-by-day analysis of the English Armada, from preparations at Plymouth to the tactical decisions made at La Coruña and Lisbon. The attack and capture of Pescaderia is described in detail, as is the scramble to make effective defensive arrangements by Spanish commanders. After two weeks and more than 1,500 casualties, the English were forced to withdraw from La Coruña, from whence they made their way toward Lisbon. While the English fleet had been preoccupied in La Coruña, the Spanish had established strong defenses in Lisbon. The decision to land English forces at Peniche and march toward Lisbon proved disastrous as they were harassed by Spanish forces and worn down by the heat. Upon arriving at Lisbon these English forces were easily overrun and forced to retreat. Santos continues to trace the movements of the English fleet, engagements with Spanish forces, and poor decision-making by English commanders over the following two months. The evidence presented leads to the impression that the private economic ambitions of English captains compromised their military zeal and led to poor decision-making. Sir Francis Drake, in particular, is shown to be more interested in protecting pilfered treasure than in leading a major expedition force. In the end, the English Armada did not achieve any of its goals: it did not destroy the Spanish navy or seize the West Indies fleet, it did not establish Portugal as an English protectorate, and it did not take control of the seas and secure English colonial interests. The English adventure was nothing short of a disaster; in fact, the English Armada lost double the number of ships and men that the Spanish had the year before. Santos should be commended for writing a history that offers not only a different interpretation of events but also a different narrative. This is a well-written and well-researched account of an all too often overlooked event. Santos makes great use of a wide variety of primary and secondary materials. The impressive detail on the size and strength of individual ships along with official decision-making, military strategy, tactics, and engagements will appeal to scholars and public audiences interested in early modern military history and Anglo-Spanish relations. It thoroughly challenges English naval historiography by demonstrating the biased nature of sources traditionally used by English historians. In doing so, Santos suggests that certain events do not attract the attention of English historians because they undermine a popular narrative. This study also makes it clear that greater exploration of Spanish archives will provide a more balanced interpretation of these events. Nevertheless, while Santos's aim is to provide a reinterpretation of misunderstood events, his assessment too is prone to bias. By relying largely on Spanish sources, the book recounts a Spanish version of events that was no less partial than that of the English. There are a number of factual errors in part 3 that weaken the analysis of the following fourteen years of war. For instance, Sir John Norreys did not lead the siege of Craon in 1592, as he was safely back in England at the time. Such errors may be due to the nature of some of the source materials used for this book. That being so, _The English Armada_ is an important addition to current historiography on the Spanish and English Armadas because it offers an alternative to the typically English version of events. Citation: Ruth A. Canning. Review of Gorrochategui Santos, Luis, _The English Armada: The Greatest Naval Disaster in English History_. H-War, H-Net Reviews. August, 2019. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=53211 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. -- Best regards, Andrew Stewart _________________________________________________________ Full posting guidelines at: http://www.marxmail.org/sub.htm Set your options at: https://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
