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Subject: H-Net Review [H-Asia]: Shankar on Guyot-Réchard, 'Shadow States:
India, China and the Himalayas, 1910-1962'
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Bérénice Guyot-Réchard.  Shadow States: India, China and the
Himalayas, 1910-1962.  Cambridge  Cambridge University Press, 2018.
347 pp.  $31.99 (paper), ISBN 978-1-316-62724-2.

Reviewed by Mahesh Shankar (Skidmore College)
Published on H-Asia (July, 2020)
Commissioned by Sumit Guha

Mahesh Shankar on Guyot Réchard, _Shadow States: India, China, and
the Himalayas, 1910-1962__

As scholars, students, and observers of the region well know, there
is no dearth of scholarship on the Sino-Indian border dispute in the
period leading up to the 1962 war. Over the past decade or so, in
fact, the greater availability and relatively easier accessibility of
newer archival material in both countries (albeit to a lesser extent
in China) has led to a welcome burgeoning of literature on the
relationship, from historians, political scientists, and other
scholars as well as policy practitioners. For any new work to stand
out in this newer landscape requires, therefore, for it to offer some
truly new and interesting insights, and it is only the rare work that
offers a genuinely new perspective from which to view the Sino-Indian
relationship and its history. It is exactly this which Bérénice
Guyot-Réchard accomplishes in _Shadow States: India, China and the
Himalayas, 1910-1962_.

With some exceptions, most works on the Sino-Indian relationship
share some underlying characteristics that are by now familiar to
observers and scholars of the region. Primarily, this scholarship has
been interested in discovering the origins and causes of the
Sino-Indian relationship (some term it a "rivalry") in a broad sense,
as well as to develop understandings of more specific issues of
contention, most notably of the territorial dispute, and even more
specifically, the causes of the 1962 war. On these questions, the
scholarship has settled (for the most part) into legislating and
debating matters such as to what extent the dynamics of the
relationship and on specific issues are driven by broader strategic
(realist) concerns, and factors related to historical legacies,
ideology, domestic political imperatives, and the individual
perspectives and proclivities of leaders and elites.

This focus on rivalry (territorial, strategic, and ideological) has,
in turn, engendered a second characteristic in much of this work: an
almost exclusive preoccupation with the "high politics" that shaped
and continues to shape the relationship. The emphasis, perhaps
understandably, has been on the structural constraints and incentives
faced by these governments, and the ideas and ideologies--about
history, borders, and the nature of international politics at
large--that guided the leaders of these states in their perceptions
of and approaches toward each other. The central protagonists in this
"high politics" are, quite naturally, the elite leaders and
organizations--civilian and military--of the respective states, and
the primary subject of analysis their thoughts and decision-making.
This is clearly apparent, for instance, in how prominently the likes
of Jawaharlal Nehru, Mao Zedong, and Zhou Enlai (as well as their
most important officials and confidantes) and their ideological
proclivities, strategic preferences, and decision-making take center
stage in the narratives of almost all of the prominent scholarship.

It is in this intellectual milieu that Guyot-Réchard makes a truly
novel and significant intervention. Like much of the extant
scholarship, this book too is animated by the desire to understand
the causes, nature, and evolution of the territorial disputes between
India (in both its British colonial, and postcolonial avatars) and
China in their Himalayan borderlands. But here is where the
similarities end. For one, this book offers a novel explanation for
the Sino-Indian territorial contest. It suggests that any
understanding of the dispute is impoverished by a sole focus on
differing interpretations of historical borders, strategic and
domestic political concerns, or the broader power contest between the
two countries. Instead, the author asserts the importance of a
heretofore missing (and crucial) dimension of the story. For her, "it
is not just the boundary dispute or power games that create tension,
but the fact that India and the PRC both seek to consolidate their
presence in the regions east of Bhutan by achieving exclusive
authority and legitimacy over local people" (p. 3). In other words,
in the author's telling of the story, key to understanding the
dynamics of the Sino-Indian relationship in the border areas is the
very process of state making in both countries in the postcolonial
era, and how this manifested in these border areas where their
presence and legitimacy ran weakest, inspiring thereby a process of
"state shadowing" involving "mutual observation, replication, and
competition to prove themselves the better state--becoming in short,
anxiety-fueled attempts at self-definition against one another" (p.
4). Over time, it is this competitive "state shadowing," as much any
military-strategic considerations, that animated the conflictual
dynamic--a "security dilemma"--that eventually precipitated war in
1962 (p. 229).

While the argument about state shadowing is in itself a valuable
contribution to the scholarship, it is in the detailing of how these
dynamics played out on the ground, and influenced state policy, that
the truly novel nature of this work shines through. By focusing on
the competition between the two states for not just sheer _control_
of the territory, but more importantly, _legitimacy _among the local
populations, Guyot-Réchard offers a vital corrective to existing
scholarship in decentering the narrative away from the states and
elites on either side of the border and giving voice and agency to
both the diverse populations who actually inhabit these border areas,
and have and continue to negotiate and navigate this competition on a
day-to-day basis, as well the state's own local agents. In doing so,
the story then ceases to be one concerned with the high politics of
the Sino-Indian relationship alone, but importantly introduces the
"low politics" as an important, and oft-neglected, shaper of the
territorial dispute, resulting in a fascinating bottom-up account of
the state-making effort on both sides, where policy was shaped by
interactions of officials at the local level with local populations
and their awareness of, and indeed "constant preoccupation" with, the
other side's initiatives across the border and how those were
perceived by the Himalayan people (p. 18). More importantly, this
focus on low politics in the book beautifully reveals how local
populations themselves negotiated agency for themselves in complex
ways, by utilizing varying strategies of engagement, acceptance,
invitation, and resistance as they responded to the entreaties of
both the Indian and Chinese states. What emerges from this story is
the fascinating finding that "rather than possessed of an innate
drive to escape the state, NEFA's inhabitants were adverse to _a
certain kind _of state presence--a presence based primarily on the
use of violent coercion or the constant possibility of it and
precluding local agency" (p. 119).

Such responses, of course, depended to a great extent on how the
Indian and Chinese states themselves sought to shape local opinions.
And here again, the book has some interesting insights in store.
Contrary to popular perceptions, Guyot-Réchard contends that the
approaches of the two sides to the task of state making in the
frontier regions in fact shared some basic commonalities. While India
(certainly by the 1950s) had adopted a clear policy of "expressing
state presence in benevolent terms" (p. 128) (articulated in a policy
document titled _A Philosophy for NEFA_), with a focus on welfare
measures related to areas such as education and health care, the
Chinese too seemingly aspired to a similar process of "peaceful
liberation" in Tibet (pp. 166-69). Nevertheless, it is a fact--made
most apparent by developments in Tibet--that the Indian state
confronted significantly less resistance (although certainly not
none) compared to China in this effort at integrating frontier
populations.

How then do we understand this? Guyot-Réchard's explanation for this
puzzle is that some of it likely had to simply do with contingent
factors--for instance the fact that in Tibet, China was dealing with
a previously full-fledged state. Such conditions in turn perhaps
naturally necessitated a more military-first approach over time,
something that was much less needed on the Indian side. Be that as it
may, the clear impact of all of this was that India was more
successful in adopting a more "hearts and minds" strategy vis-à-vis
the local populations, which arguably allowed for it to create more
_legitimacy _among frontier tribal peoples. More fascinatingly,
though, it was not just the fact of India's approach being
philosophically and practically softer that made local populations
more amenable to associating with India. Equally important was the
fact that the relative absence of a military element in India's
"expansion" in to the region, accompanied by what was arguably
relative inefficiency in creating hard infrastructure such as roads
and railways that would allow for such power projection, meant that
in contrast to China, India was relatively lax in establishing
physical _control_ over the territories and peoples in questions. All
of this, Guyot-Réchard perceptively notes, rendered India vulnerable
in ways that made it a _more _attractive partner to local
populations. Indeed, "insofar as attempts of Indian authorities were
successful from the mid-twentieth century onwards, these had much to
do with the paradox of their vulnerability--a weakness that rendered
their entrenchment precarious unless local people acquiesced to it,
but which also made this acquiescence more likely" (p. 126). In
essence, then, there is an irony to the state-making efforts of India
and China detailed in this book: the very fact that India was unable
to establish reliable _control _in the frontier regions made it more
viable for local populations to exercise agency, which in turn made
them more likely to acquiesce to Indian approaches; for China, on the
other hand, the very display of efficiency and control--as they did
even during the 1962 war--ironically made them more problematic
partners for their local audience, since it portended a limiting of
their own agency.

The focus on "state shadowing" and the low politics of it also
generates one final and crucial insight about both countries, an
uncomfortable truth about the hypocrisy underlying the nature of
their own state-making enterprise. It reveals, as the author
summarizes things, that "the story of China and India is that of two
post-colonial _and _imperial polities seeking to deepen their rule
over Himalayan regions where they encounter people starkly different
from their 'core' citizenry" (p. 3). These facets of Indian and
Chinese conduct in the postcolonial period often escape attention,
both in these countries as well as in the scholarship on their
domestic and international politics. By offering this unique
perspective on the Sino-Indian competition on their borders, this
book does the great service of highlighting these problematic
elements of states that have often understood and defined their roles
in international politics on the basis of highlighting their own
experiences with colonialism and imperialism.

In all, then, Guyot-Réchard has made a truly important contribution
in this work to our understanding of the Sino-Indian border dispute,
especially in reintroducing agency for the people who actually
inhabit those contested lands, people who rarely (if ever) feature in
much of the existing scholarship. The effort is rendered even more
compelling by the thorough and meticulous research that underlies the
work, based on primary sources from national and local archives,
private papers of key decision makers, and other such documents.
Indeed, the focus on low politics has required the author to discover
and analyze primary source material that has rarely (if ever) been
used before. The use of local sources (both governmental and
otherwise) and archives, in particular, is admirable, given the
well-known challenges of both physical access to these areas, and
even more so the availability and preservation of the documents
themselves. As those who do archival research in these two countries
can well attest, acquiring access to such resources can often be a
daunting task even in the best of conditions (in capital cities and
national archives); to then find and use sources from the frontier
regions--the "peripheries" so to speak--could only have been an even
more formidable task. For this the author deserves much credit.

If there is any weakness in this work, it lies perhaps in there being
somewhat of an imbalance in the treatment and analysis of India and
China respectively. While the argument itself is framed in a way that
applies to both states, the India portions of the narrative are
significantly richer, more detailed and nuanced than those that
concern China. For instance, the low politics that is a key emphasis
of this book really shines through when the author is detailing the
Indian approach to, and interaction with, people of these Himalayan
border regions, in comparison to which the discussion of China packs
relatively lesser depth. That this is the case is perfectly
understandable, given the simple fact of a greater availability and
access to primary sources on the Indian side of the border. Despite
this, one is left with the distinct impression--which the author
gracefully acknowledges (p. 265)--that much of the China part of the
story (and therefore any conclusions that can be drawn from it)
requires more research, a gap that hopefully other researchers can
fill. More, in other words, needs to be known to truly understand the
nature of Chinese state making in the frontier areas. No such
reservations can exist with this work in regard to its telling of the
story of Indian state making.

This is, however, a minor quibble about what is otherwise an
outstanding piece of scholarship. _Shadow States _is a truly
important work--well written and based on solid research--thatoffers
a novel and necessary perspective from which to view the Sino-Indian
border dispute in their shared Himalayan frontier region. It will no
doubt change the way scholars and observers of the region view the
yet-to-be-resolved border dispute, and the broader relationship
itself, and hopefully inspire more scholarship which takes the low
politics of such relationships, and the agency of local populations
in disputed areas in the region, more seriously.

Citation: Mahesh Shankar. Review of Guyot-Réchard, Bérénice,
_Shadow States: India, China and the Himalayas, 1910-1962_. H-Asia,
H-Net Reviews. July, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=54660

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.




-- 
Best regards,

Andrew Stewart

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