(Behind a pay wall, so no url. SR)

The Texas Freeze: Why the Power Grid Failed

The state’s electricity system was considered a model. This week’s outages 
revealed shortcomings in the market structure.

By Katherine Blunt and Russell Gold/Wall Street Journal/Feb. 19, 2021 6:41 pm ET

A fundamental flaw in the freewheeling Texas electricity market left millions 
powerless and freezing in the dark this week during a historic cold snap.

The core problem: Power providers can reap rewards by supplying electricity to 
Texas customers, but they aren’t required to do it and face no penalties for 
failing to deliver during a lengthy emergency.

That led to the fiasco that left millions of people in the nation’s 
second-most-populous state without power for days. A severe storm paralyzed 
almost every energy source, from power plants to wind turbines, because their 
owners hadn’t made the investments needed to produce electricity in subfreezing 
temperatures.

While power providers collectively failed, the companies themselves didn’t 
break any rules. Texas officials don’t require plant owners to prepare for the 
worst by spending extra money to ensure they can continue operating through 
severe cold or heat. The high prices operators can reap from such periods of 
peak demand were supposed to be incentive enough for them to invest in 
safeguarding their equipment from severe weather.

Bill Magness, chief executive of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, or 
Ercot, which operates the state’s power grid, explained during a Thursday news 
conference how the system was supposed to work: High peak prices provide the 
incentive for producers to keep operating in all weather. Generators that can’t 
produce power when it is most needed risk missing out on windfalls. “They’ll 
face financial consequences in the marketplace,” he said.

Texas Gov. Greg Abbott, facing a political uproar 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-power-outages-after-deep-freeze-prompt-governor-to-urge-probe-11613513090?mod=article_inline
 as the state of 29 million people virtually ground to a halt, tacitly 
acknowledged in a statewide address Thursday that these market incentives 
weren’t sufficient. He called upon legislators to mandate that power generators 
prepare for extreme winter storms. The state, he said, should also supply the 
funding to make it happen.

“What happened this week to our fellow Texans is absolutely unacceptable and 
can never be replicated again,” he said. His office didn’t respond to requests 
for comment.

The system broke down this week when 185 generating units, including gas and 
coal-fired power plants, tripped offline during the brunt of the storm. Wind 
turbines in West Texas froze as well, and a nuclear unit near the Gulf of 
Mexico went down for more than 48 hours. Another problem emerged: Some power 
plants lost their pipeline supply of gas and couldn’t generate electricity even 
if they wanted to capture the high prices.

Such mechanical problems might have been avoided if operators had chosen to 
equip their plants like those that operate in traditional cold-weather states.

It was a policy failure that state and federal officials are already 
scrutinizing as electricity, a public necessity as critical as water and heat, 
becomes even more important as more vital functions become electrified.

Nationwide, the grid is evolving to support more renewable energy and the 
emerging demand for power for electric vehicles. That makes balancing supply 
and demand more complex. Many climate scientists expect an increase in extreme 
weather events, which would further test the system’s vulnerabilities.

The U.S. is becoming more reliant than ever on electricity, but has no perfect 
model for running a power market in the 21st century. Before this week’s 
meltdown, the Texas market had been widely regarded as one of the best. Now, 
most everyone agrees that major changes—including more regulatory 
intervention—will be needed to keep it working.

The Ercot breakdown affected millions of Texans, many of whom resorted to 
desperate measures to stay warm 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-frigid-texas-desperate-families-take-risks-to-stay-warm-11613599101?mod=article_inline
 . The outages shut down hundreds of stores and businesses, limiting supplies 
of food and water. Cities including Austin, Houston and San Antonio are under 
boil-water notices until Monday after a wave of burst water pipes caused 
shortages.

While Texas is now the most prominent U.S. power market failure, others have 
faced serious challenges in recent years. California’s grid operator last 
summer resorted to rolling blackouts 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-california-keeps-having-blackouts-11598198401?mod=article_inline
 when a severe heat wave swept the West, reducing the state’s ability to import 
power and pushing demand into the evening hours after solar production declined.

Energy markets have moved away from the monopoly-style power-delivery systems 
that once were common. The current system has roots in the 1990s and early 
2000s, when fossil fuels supplied the majority of the nation’s electricity and 
extreme weather risks were more predictable.

“The premises of that paradigm have changed,” said Bernard McNamee, a former 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission member who is now a partner at law firm 
McGuireWoods LLP. Renewable-energy sources cannot be turned on and off like a 
power plant, making it harder to ensure sufficient supply at any one time. 
“That’s why public policy makers and electricity officials need to address some 
of the shortcomings.”

William Hogan, an energy economist at Harvard University who helped design the 
Texas market, said this week’s blackouts weren’t indicative of a major design 
flaw, but rather inevitable imperfections stemming from extraordinary weather 
challenges.

“I don’t know of any market design that exists anywhere that would have 
anticipated and have been prepared for something of this scope and scale,” he 
said.

The Texas power grid is essentially an electrical island. That is by design. 
Because it doesn’t ship power across state lines, the grid doesn’t fall under 
federal oversight, a status state leaders have sought to preserve for decades.

Ercot runs the hourly market to set power prices and ensure sufficient 
generation. It is regulated by the Texas Public Utility Commission, a 
three-member body appointed by the governor and overseen by the state 
legislature. Ercot, the grid operator, is required to maintain a balance 
between electricity supply and demand, but has no regulatory authority.

Some critics of the state’s system say the alphabet soup of Texas energy 
oversight bodies, which includes other agencies regulating oil and natural gas, 
resulted in inaction.

“The real factor is not anticipating what needed to be done to the 
infrastructure,” said Texas Rep. Donna Howard, a Democrat from Austin. “That 
had to do with a failure of multiple agencies to address how things work 
together in a deregulated market.”

Texas has long prided itself on its wholesale power market. It was born from a 
legislative effort in the 1990s that broke up the state’s utility monopolies, 
introducing competition among a larger universe of power generators and retail 
electricity providers.

The result was a laissez-faire market design that rewards those who can sell 
power inexpensively and still recover their capital costs. That keeps prices 
low when demand is steady. When demand spikes, however, so do prices, which can 
climb as high as $9,000 per megawatt-hour to incentivize power plants of all 
kinds to fire up.

If an electricity producer agrees to supply power into the market and then 
fails to deliver, the producer has to pay for the cost of replacing it. But if 
a plant trips offline and stays out of the market for an extended period, as 
happened this week, there is no penalty besides lost revenue.

Electricity supply crunches tend to occur during extreme temperature swings, 
when customers crank up their heat or air conditioning. That makes it critical 
for power plants to be able to function in severe weather.

in Texas, the system has largely worked during the sweltering summer months, 
when air conditioners are blasting. But it hasn’t always worked in winter 
because the equipment remains vulnerable to less-common cold snaps.

In February 2011, a severe winter storm barreled through Texas and knocked out 
nearly 200 power plants, many of which ran on coal. Ercot called for rolling 
blackouts that affected millions of Texans for about eight hours. In 2014, 
another January cold snap forced power plants offline. The emergency—and 
rolling blackouts—lasted for about four hours.

Ercot devised a set of best practices for power-plant owners to prepare for the 
possibility of extreme cold. But the guidelines remain suggestions. The grid 
operator has no authority to mandate them, although it does do some spot 
checks. The state utility commission doesn’t even employ inspectors to visit 
the plants and check on whether they are winterized.

Mr. Magness, Ercot’s chief executive, said that regulatory authority falls in 
part to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, a nonprofit 
overseen by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that develops standards 
for utilities and power producers. The organization last year began drafting 
requirements for power-plant owners to prepare for polar vortexes, but hasn’t 
completed them.

Steve Wolens, a former Democratic state representative who helped lead the 
effort to deregulate the Texas power system, said lawmakers are responsible for 
stepping in to fix any problems emerging in the market they created.

“Their duty is to find out why it happened and keep it from happening again, 
and ensure that Texas is prepared for future growth, which means enormous 
demands for electricity,” he said.

Within the competitive Texas power market, there is a strong incentive for 
generators to keep costs down to recoup their investments. The rapid buildout 
of wind and solar power, which are now among the cheapest sources of 
electricity, have pushed prices even lower in recent years, making it more 
difficult for gas and coal plants to compete.

For plant owners, that presents a paradox: Should they add to their capital 
costs by preparing for severe cold snaps that occur only occasionally, or skip 
the preparation and risk tripping offline, missing out on high prices and 
exacerbating a potential supply shortage?

“With everything there is a trade-off,” said Ari Peskoe, director of the 
Electricity Law Initiative at Harvard Law School. “More resilience is 
potentially more expensive, but electricity is an essential service. These are 
hard decisions.”

Texas deregulated its power market at a time when policy makers across the 
country were considering ways to reduce electricity costs by modernizing the 
utility model. For most of the 20th century, utilities were vertically 
integrated, controlling every aspect of electricity supply from generation to 
delivery.

That remains the model through much of the Southeast, where utilities remain 
responsible for grid reliability. State regulators oversee their investments in 
power plants and grid improvements and allow them to recoup costs through 
customers. That has sometimes resulted in cost overruns that drive up the price 
of electricity.

Other market designs have emerged elsewhere. PJM Interconnection, an 
electricity market serving 13 states from Virginia to Illinois, runs a 
“capacity market” meant to ensure enough power is available to meet peak demand 
three years in the future. It is an insurance policy against uncertainty and 
extremes. Power producers who promise to show up are paid for that commitment, 
and penalized if they fail to deliver.

Critics of that model say it is more expensive than others because it pays for 
power that might never be needed. And PJM has fewer wind and solar farms in its 
territory than some other markets, making it easier to contract for resources 
that can fire up on demand. Gas plants can start up on demand, but wind and 
solar production depends on weather, time of day and storage.

Texas has what is known as an “energy only” market. Producers are paid only for 
the power they generate. If they were paid to be on standby for all weather 
conditions, that would encourage investments to ensure they are ready to go, 
electricity-market veterans say.

Regardless of the model, all power markets face a common challenge: how to 
prepare for the possibility of extreme events that are statistically unlikely 
and difficult to predict.

This week’s Texas breakdown began Sunday night when a powerful winter front 
began to move over the entire state, plunging temperatures well below 20 
degrees in a state where many homes and businesses aren’t insulated for extreme 
cold.

Residents blasted the heat. Electricity demand topped 69 gigawatts, a winter 
record, Ercot said. For the grid operator, the paramount objective was to keep 
supply and demand in line. A major imbalance could damage critical pieces of 
equipment and cause the grid to be inoperable for weeks.

In rapid succession, power plants tripped offline, many hobbled by frozen 
parts. Demand threatened to exceed supply. At 1:25 a.m. on Monday, the grid 
operator called on the state’s electricity providers to begin rolling blackouts 
to reduce strain on the grid.

Around 5:30 a.m., one of the two units of the South Texas Project, a 
nuclear-power plant near the Gulf of Mexico, shut down. The unit’s water supply 
froze, causing two pumps to fail, according to Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
officials and the plant’s operator. The pumps delivered water that is turned 
into steam and used to generate electricity.

More plants followed, paralyzed by subfreezing temperatures. Natural gas 
pipelines froze at the wellheads, reducing the amount of fuel available to 
supply power plants. Wind turbines built for the heat of West Texas froze under 
coats of ice.

Ercot called for more outages, leaving millions of homes without power. 
Electricity providers typically rotate outages among customers so that no one 
is in the dark for too long. But they would soon prove unable to rotate and 
spread the pain.

Ercot ordered the electricity providers to shed as much as 14 gigawatts, enough 
to serve about 2.8 million households. The grid operator said that about 46 
gigawatts of natural gas, coal and wind generation wasn’t working 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-winter-storm-threatens-fragile-electrical-grids-in-texas-other-parts-of-u-s-11613588298?mod=article_inline
 —roughly 40% of what it had expected to be available.

On Thursday, companies began restoring power as Texas started to thaw, but 
millions remained without water 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-power-is-restored-in-many-places-water-remains-a-problem-11613759202?mod=e2tw&mod=article_inline
 because of frozen pipes and damaged municipal water systems. As residents 
began to assess the damage and search for provisions, the Texas Public 
Utilities Commission issued an order mandating that electricity providers do 
more to rotate future blackouts.

Electricity customers, the agency said, couldn’t be without power for more than 
12 hours. By that point, some Texans had been without light or heat for nearly 
72 hours.








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