Best regards, Andrew Stewart
Begin forwarded message: > From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <[email protected]> > Date: April 22, 2021 at 9:18:30 AM EDT > To: [email protected] > Cc: H-Net Staff <[email protected]> > Subject: H-Net Review [H-War]: Klingele on Shirreff, 'War with Russia: An > Urgent Warning from Senior Military Command' > Reply-To: [email protected] > > Richard Shirreff. War with Russia: An Urgent Warning from Senior > Military Command. London Coronet, 2016. 400 pp. $16.99 (paper), > ISBN 978-1-4736-3225-7. > > Reviewed by Beth Klingele (Air University, Squadron Officer School) > Published on H-War (April, 2021) > Commissioned by Margaret Sankey > > _War with Russia_ is a "future history" set after the shocking > real-world invasion of Crimea by Russia in 2014. Since the end of > World War II, direct state-on-state war has been virtually > unthinkable in modern Europe and much of the policy in the early > 2010s was rooted in this assumption. The invasion of Crimea and then > eastern Ukraine in defiance of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and > Russia's continued aggression in the region has shown a fundamental > shift in Russian intentions toward the West, tearing away the façade > of assumed peace and stability that Europe had enjoyed for nearly > seventy years. General Sir Richard Shirreff, author and former Deputy > Supreme Allied Commander Europe, brings his considerable experience > as a top British military officer at the head of the North Atlantic > Treaty Organization (NATO) leadership to deliver a chilling scenario > where Russia is not content with annexing Crimea alone but makes good > on its 2014 promise to unite all ethnic Russian speakers under the > banner of Mother Russia. > > Largely aimed as a wake-up call for NATO governmental policymakers > and strategic thinkers, _War with Russia_ delivers valuable insight > for military professionals of all ranks and the general public alike > who are seeking to gain more knowledge about the politics and > challenges surrounding the Baltic states. Shirreff breaks down the > policies and government actions of NATO leading up to the Crimean > invasion and discusses how these actions--or inactions--may bring > NATO closer to an armed confrontation where nuclear escalation > becomes a very real possibility. I seek to present the four most > relevant concepts and issues presented that command and control > planners can take into consideration and learn from if they are faced > with a Russian invasion of the Baltic states like the one detailed in > this book. > > The first key problem Shirreff presents is knowing when to confront > covert Russian action when the Russians have become so good at > challenging other Great Powers in such a way so as not to trigger an > armed conflict. As described by security experts on the region, > Russia is adept at using social media and propaganda as informational > warfare campaigns to infiltrate the psyche of targeted populations in > order to create instability and subversion of the national > government.[1] This can be effectively combined with advanced > cyberattacks, attacks by proxy agents, and direct infiltration of > extremist political groups within a country's populace to create a > seemingly valid reason for Russian intervention that paints them in > the role of savior instead of would-be conqueror. > > Indeed, it is this very scenario that creates justifiable cause for > the Russians to invade the Baltic states in _War with Russia_. > Claiming to be protecting Russian compatriots who are being attacked > and oppressed, Russia executes a carefully and expertly planned > operation that creates significant political and social divide > between ethnic Russian speakers and the Balts. This leads ethnic > Russians within the Baltics to make public requests begging for > Russian intervention, a call that Russia is prompt to respond to. > Similar tactics have been used to justify the invasion of Georgia in > 2008 and eastern Ukraine in 2014. Shirreff points out that Russia > will continue to use these tactics against the Eastern Bloc states as > long as Russia feels NATO or the West will do nothing significant > against them. > > The challenge, then, is for command and control planners to recognize > when this is happening. NATO must be prepared to create a strong > deterrence to aggressive actions by the Russians while providing > active support, reassurance, moderation, and defense to the Baltic > states to prevent them from needing to seek the support of the > Russian government. This requires nuanced and redefined criteria for > when an "attack" has been conducted against a NATO ally and what > actions trigger a conflict beyond traditional warfare. Planners > should consider a scalable reaction with clear criteria that includes > nontraditional and cyber warfare while allowing sufficient buffer > time to employ counteractions in defense of vulnerable states. NATO > will be behind the eight ball if it waits for Russia to commit > conventional military forces to counter Russian aggression. > > Shirreff argues passionately that NATO has failed in this duty to > adequately challenge overt and covert Russian aggression up to this > point. Shirreff presents his second key problem concerning this > issue: NATO members' complacency toward European defense policy, > particularly those policies starting in 2010. He is especially > critical of the United Kingdom he once served and which has > historically been considered one of the most powerful military forces > in Europe. The UK 2010 Defense Review placed a premium on creating a > "lean" force that used only 2 percent of the national GDP, which > effectively cut twenty thousand regular army troops, reduced the UK's > naval support fleet, and scrapped its maritime aircraft capabilities > leading up to 2014. The prime minister further made statements in > 2016 that "Britain should avoid sending armies to fight" and implied > that the army would be primarily tasked for humanitarian missions.[2] > > The United States has similarly taken advantage of European peace and > began looking increasingly toward other parts of the world, > conducting an "Asia-Pacific" pivot in 2011 under the Obama > administration to challenge North Korean actions and grow economic > partnerships in the region.[3] The US also removed all of its tanks > from Germany in 2013 for the first time since World War II and > renewed its focus in the Middle East to combat the uprise of the > Islamic State in 2014. The US has continued to "drawdown" the number > of troops stationed in Europe, especially in Germany, under the Trump > administration.[4] > > This reduction in military presence by the US combined with previous > comments from presidential candidate Donald Trump on the > conditionality of American support to NATO allies in 2016, such as > only aiding NATO allies if they "fulfilled their obligations to > us,"[5] has, in Shirreff's words, "undermined the notion of NATO's > founding principle of collective defense [because] NATO is totally > dependent on strong US leadership and peace in Europe will only be > maintained if there is absolute certainty that the US will always be > there to defend its allies." He further warns that "Trump's comments > will embolden the [Russian] President and make the nightmare scenario > in this book more likely" (p. 13). > > Politically insensitive comments and public military drawdown can set > a dangerous precedent in a high-speed technological world where the > Russians can analyze and act on perceived weakness in real time and > should be handled carefully. Planners and policymakers must actively > monitor and shape NATO's world image in the face of such threats to > prevent Russia from taking attacks of opportunity on a weakened NATO > alliance. Russia is unlikely to wait and see if NATO members are able > to renew and strengthen their military forces prior to attack for the > simple reason that it would not suit their interests to do so. It is > the perception of NATO's weakness combined with a steady decrease in > military capability that spurs Russia into taking the initiative in > Shirreff's scenario. They swiftly invade the Baltic states to > capitalize on the opportunity before NATO has the chance to react and > generate sufficient conventional forces to counter them. > > This leads to the third key problem Shirreff presents: the continued > growth and development of conventional military forces. It is > seductive to policymakers and voters who are tired of decades of > fighting to reduce military forces and development to conserve > spending, but avoiding nuclear escalation requires both a strong > conventional military and nuclear deterrence when facing a nuclear > state. One does not work without the other and strength must be met > with strength on both fronts. If NATO becomes less reliant on > conventional military forces, then it will have to become more > reliant on nuclear deterrence, which makes the option of nuclear > retaliation in the face of unacceptable end states more likely. This > has the potential to push NATO closer to a nuclear conflict rather > than away from one. Lack of conventional troops and war material > ready to deploy is a major driver in Shirreff's invasion scenario. > Post invasion, NATO is left scrambling to organize a reactionary > force while facing the daunting prospect of a counter invasion to > liberate the Baltics against an advanced Russian threat that is > willing to protect its newly acquired states with tactical nukes (the > Russian version of nuclear de-escalation). > > Shirreff would be heartened to know that, since _War with Russia_ was > published, NATO has succeeded in deploying four rotating > multinational battalions to support the Baltic states and Poland > under the guidance of the US, UK, Germany, and Canada as agreed in > the 2016 Warsaw Summit.[6] This bolsters the defense of the Baltics > and serves to show conviction and resolve on behalf of the alliance > toward their defense. However, the underlying issue remains the same. > NATO must continue to support and advance its conventional military > forces to keep pace with the rapid military development of Russia, > for "once you cut capability, it requires a superhuman effort to > regenerate it" (p. 9). Russia has the geographical and temporal > advantage to launch its military forces directly across its border > and has put very capable military systems in place along that border > and in Russian-held Kaliningrad. To that effect, NATO forces will > have to contend with a sophisticated integrated air defense system > (IADS), advanced fighters, tactical nuclear defense, and Russia's > inherent ability to field reinforcements directly from its backyard. > > NATO must continue to develop and improve its conventional forces to > keep up with Russian advances. It also must remain relatively > flexible and willing to move war material and personnel quickly due > to NATO's geographic disadvantage and dependence on other states to > host NATO forces. Russia's proximity will allow it to field forces > faster than NATO can with the exception of any forces already > prepositioned within the Baltic states. This is especially worrisome > due to the increase in Russian snap exercises hosting upwards of > thirty to forty thousand troops along Baltic borders since 2015.[7] > For some NATO members who are significantly geographically separated > from the Baltics, this will require particular consideration in > manning and material that has been promised toward NATO defense. > Simply stationing equipment around Europe and storing it will not be > enough. Any war material that is mothballed must also be supported > with training, manning, logistics, and a clear structure of command > and control authority (which is not an insignificant challenge in a > multinational alliance) if it is to be counted toward military > capability. Otherwise, planners can count on it taking a significant > amount of time to bring up to combat readiness. > > However, no amount of military equipment will win a war if it cannot > get to the battlefield, and this leads to Shirreff's fourth key > problem: cultivating both political relationships and the political > will to commit military forces in a united effort. In the book, the > North Atlantic Council (NAC) in NATO took thirteen days from the > first indications of conflict to declare Article 5 (an agreement to > collectively go to war) in defense of the Baltic states. NATO was > unable to launch a counterattack until forty-seven days later due to > political and conventional force generation issues. This was largely > due to a number of political hurdles that greatly reduced their > ability to react in time to prevent the Russian invasion. > > The largest delay came from the requirement of a unanimous vote of > the NAC to declare Article 5, which becomes a risk when quick > reaction decisions are needed. This unanimous vote becomes more > difficult to secure with an increasing number of members in NATO, > which has grown from twelve nations to thirty in the years between > 1949 and 2020.[8] New members generally bring in a rich diversity of > heritage and ideologies that strengthen the alliance. However, some > countries in the fictional scenario had significant financial and > religious ties to Russia that made them rigidly disinclined to agree > to conflict with Russia despite the warning signs. Command and > control planners should work closely with their diplomatic partners > to put special effort toward building relations with these nations, > but planners must also take this probable delay into consideration > when planning operational contingencies and should be prepared for > unilateral or bilateral action to protect national interests. > > Once a decision to provide military defense of the Baltics was made, > NATO experienced additional delays moving their forces and war > material across the plethora of borders in Europe. Continued conflict > in the Middle East has generated a mass immigration into Europe by > refugees seeking to escape the violence. This has resulted in > stricter border protocols that has tied up many nations' fighting > forces to control the influx of people and prevent the rise in > terrorist acts in Europe, as Shirreff notes. Command and control > planners and policymakers should work to ensure that special license > is given to these forces to move rapidly across national borders > (especially states within the alliance) to ensure that reinforcements > can be fielded in time to make a useful contribution in deterrence > operations or armed conflict. > > Shirreff's nightmarish scenario ends in a major multinational > operation that is saved largely due to an unusually effective cyber > solution that provides Shirreff with his _deus ex machina_ to end the > scenario with a quick, decisive, and largely bloodless victory for > the NATO alliance. A fictional computer virus is introduced into the > Russian computer system by the British to bypass all Russian command > and control system redundancies to completely shut down Russia's > ability to control their surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems or > launch an effective counter air attack. NATO fighters and bombers are > able to overfly the Baltic states with near impunity. Special forces > from the UK and the US simultaneously overtake Kaliningrad's tactical > nuke sites and are able to hold Russia hostage with them to force a > resolution in NATO's favor. And, naturally, the strapping young > British officer who serves as one of the main protagonists gets the > girl. > > It is unlikely for a real Baltic invasion scenario to end so cleanly > for NATO forces and this fantastical conclusion should not take away > from the key problems Shirreff presents to his readers. Policies > based on assumptions of peace will not hold water and NATO must > continue to deploy troops and war material strategically and in > appropriate strength in anticipation of possible Russian attacks, > recognizing that Russian attacks are no longer as easy to spot as > they were prior to the invention of the internet and social media. > Russia will continue to develop nontraditional warfare techniques to > supplement its rapid development of advanced conventional forces and > NATO states must be prepared to meet them strength for strength in > both conventional and nuclear war capabilities. Lastly, political > relationships, the essential ingredient to the development of a > resolute NATO body, will be crucial for the proper defense of the > Baltic states. Only cooperation and a willingness to act in unity > will allow NATO to effectively combat an enemy that is not hampered > by the need for multinational consensus. > > The command and control community is uniquely positioned to provide > such insight and actionable solutions to policymakers and should make > every effort to do so, thoughtfully taking into consideration the > lessons learned from _War with Russia_. This "future history" is a > warning that NATO faces considerable challenges to deterring Russian > aggression, but it also provides hope that all is not lost and that a > few good men and women can make a difference if they put in the > effort to do so. > > Notes > > [1]. Keir Giles, _Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West: > Continuity and Innovation in Moscow's Exercise of Power_ (London: The > Royal Institute of Internationl Affairs, Chatham House, __March > 2016), > https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/2016-03-russia-new-tools-giles.pdf. > > > [2]. Caroline Wyatt, "Has Britain's Defence Budget Been Cut Too > Much?" _BBC _News, February 24, 2014, > https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-26271018#:~:text=British%20forces%20are%20undergoing%20a,in%20the%20number%20of%20reservists. > > > [3]. Brent Reininger et al., "Assessing the Obama Administration's > Pivot to Asia," ResearchWorks Archive__, 2016, > https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/40759. > > [4]. Joe Gould and Sebastian Sprenger, "Trump's Troop Drawdown from > Germany Will Take 'Years,' Says Inhofe," _Defense News_, July 24, > 2020, > https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/07/24/trumps-troop-drawdown-from-germany-will-take-years-says-inhofe/. > > > [5]. David E. Sanger and Maggie Haberman, "Donald Trump Sets > Conditions for Defending NATO Allies against Attack," _New York > Times_, July 20, 2016, > https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/us/politics/donald-trump-issues.html. > > [6]. "Boosting NATO's Presence in the East and Southeast," North > Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), October 20, 2020, > https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm. > > [7]. Espen Stiberg, "Russian Snap Military Exercise in March of 2015: > What Implications Did This Exercise Have?" (MA thesis, U.S. Army > Command and General Staff College, 2017), > https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1039547.pdf. > > [8]. "Enlargement," North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), May 5, > 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm. > > Citation: Beth Klingele. Review of Shirreff, Richard, _War with > Russia: An Urgent Warning from Senior Military Command_. H-War, H-Net > Reviews. April, 2021. > URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=56169 > > This work is licensed under a Creative Commons > Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States > License. > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. 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