Best regards, Andrew Stewart
Begin forwarded message: > From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <[email protected]> > Date: April 25, 2021 at 7:53:56 AM EDT > To: [email protected] > Cc: H-Net Staff <[email protected]> > Subject: H-Net Review [H-Socialisms]: Milani on Williamson, 'Europe and the > Decline of Social Democracy in Britain' > Reply-To: [email protected] > > Adrian Williamson. Europe and the Decline of Social Democracy in > Britain. Woodbridge Boydell Press, 2019. 380 pp. $24.99 (e-book), > ISBN 978-1-78744-573-4; $34.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-78327-443-7. > > Reviewed by Tommaso Milani (European University Institute) > Published on H-Socialisms (April, 2021) > Commissioned by Gary Roth > > Social Democracy in Britain > > Quite predictably, the outcome of the 2016 United Kingdom referendum > has sparked a flurry of interest in the historical backdrop of > Britain's decision to leave the European Union (EU). In their effort > to pin down the causes of an event that--rightly or wrongly--has been > widely perceived as a watershed moment in the relationship between > the United Kingdom and Continental Europe, scholars have come up with > a variety of explanations based on different combinations of > structural and contingent factors. Many would probably agree that > Brexit was neither foreordained nor a mere accident of history: while > there is some truth in the claim that the decision to call a > referendum on EU membership proved to be "David Cameron's great > miscalculation," any thoughtful account of Britain's departure from > the EU must dig deeper into the sources of British Euroscepticism.[1] > After all, one does not have to endorse a teleological view of > history to maintain that--whatever key political players did in > 2016--"Britain's singular macropolitical economy" substantially > increased the "degree of probability that the denouement of Britain's > membership of the EU would be reached under the conditions of the > Conservative party being in office" or that several developments > occurring both in the UK and within the EU since the Maastricht > Treaty made Brexit "an accident waiting to happen."[2] If anything, > history can help us discern between long-term trends and > happenstances. Sometimes, as William Shakespeare famously put it, > what's past is prologue. > > Adrian Williamson's _Europe and the Decline of Social Democracy in > Britain: From Attlee to Brexit _is a valuable addition to an already > rich body of literature seeking to connect the 2016 vote to the > domestic political transformations that took place in Britain since > the 1970s, most notably the shift from consensus politics to > Thatcherism. In a nutshell, the book contends that the erosion of the > social democratic center of British politics undercut the appeal of > EU membership, exacerbating social fractures and divisions that > created the perfect conditions for millions of Britons to vote Leave > in June 2016. While rejecting any deterministic interpretation > narrowly based on socioeconomic drivers, Williamson successfully > brings political parties as well as intraparty rivalries to the fore > of the Brexit story, reminding readers of how important political > elites have been in shoring up (but also in undermining) popular > support for European integration in Britain. > > According to Williamson, from the end of the Second World War until > the late 1970s, a succession of British governments pursued an array > of "social democratic" policies, including "an explicit commitment to > full employment as a central goal of macro-economic strategy; > egalitarian and redistributive approaches to taxation and public > spending; strong trade unions, with a substantial role in both > industrial and political affairs; a mixed economy, with utilities > held in public ownership; comprehensive education; the welfare state; > and a substantial public rented housing sector" (pp. 4-5). > Politicians who favored this policy mix within the Labour as well as > the Tory Party not only gained the upper hand against advocates of > full socialism on the one hand and free-market fundamentalists on the > other but also strove to align Britain with the rest of the Continent > by applying to the EU's predecessor, the European Economic Community > (EEC), for membership. Williamson maintains that figures like Harold > Macmillan, Edward Heath, and Roy Jenkins agreed that "the UK was to > embark with the Europeans upon a joint venture, with a significant > social component" for they "saw no contradiction between their > support for that [social democratic] state domestically and the need > to achieve further integration with the EEC" (pp. 61, 92). Dissident > voices, like those of Tony Benn on the left or Enoch Powell on the > right, were pushed to the fringes by "the custodians of the post-war > accommodation between the political parties," who happened to be also > "the guardians of the UK's proposed accommodation with the EEC" (p. > 122). > > Things began to change in the aftermath of the 1975 referendum, when > stagflation and fears of a free-fall decline paved the way to a > Conservative Party government fixed on dismantling the "social > democratic" compromise while the leadership of the Labour Party fell > into the hands of the previously marginal hard left. Even though > Williamson underscores Margaret Thatcher's early pragmatic, albeit > unenthusiastic, attitude toward the EEC and concedes that her second > government marked "an era in which the UK's involvement with Europe > became steadily deeper," he also claims that her unflinchingly > anti-statist and anti-socialist convictions put her on a collision > course with the EEC Commission president and proponent of Social > Europe Jacques Delors (p. 169). Meanwhile, by 1983 British social > democracy was "in headlong retreat" as his most unrepentant > center-left supporters broke with Labour and coalesced, without much > electoral success, into the Social Democratic Party (SDP) (p. 162). > > The final chapters of the book document how Conservatives, under the > spur of their backbenchers, became increasingly hostile to EU > membership throughout the 1990s, whereas, under Neil Gordon Kinnock > and Tony Blair, the Labour Party reconverted to Europeanism, even > though in a somewhat shallow and half-hearted form. Williamson > believes that New Labour cabinets "pursued policies that left the UK > once more on the periphery of a Europe with whose social democratic > instincts they felt little sympathy" (p. 232). This went hand in hand > with a domestic agenda that did little to overturn the legacy of the > Iron Lady: during the Blair era, "there were strong continuities with > Thatcherism and equally stark departures from what previous Labour > (and some Tory) governments had attempted to achieve" (p. 225). As > the SDP eventually dissolved into the increasingly market-friendly > Liberal Democrats, social democracy ceased to play any meaningful > role in British politics. When the 2008 financial crisis broke out, > this vacuum--which Gordon Brown's latter-day neo-Keynesian turn fell > short of addressing--enabled the Coalition government to pass > unusually severe austerity measures from 2010 onward and socialist, > Eurosceptic hardliners managed to seize the Labour leadership once > again. As the referendum came, the balance of forces proved to be > overwhelming: "without the stoutly social democratic framework that > had brought the UK into Europe in 1973, and kept it there in 1975, > the pro-European case simply lacked sufficient robustness to fight > off the nationalist forces ranged against it" (pp. 237-38). > > Williamson's main argument is clear and generally well deployed, but > specific sections of the book are quite unpersuasive. In the context > of a contribution for H-Socialisms, three seem especially significant > to me. The first--despite Clement Attlee being cited in the book's > title--is the lack of attention paid to the first postwar Labour > government's record about European cooperation, and supranational > integration more specifically. If, as Williamson writes, British > pro-Europeans in the 1970s sat on a "comfortable three-legged stool" > composed of "domestic social democracy, EEC membership and enthusiasm > for the continental political model," one is left wondering why the > very leaders who laid the foundations of the modern British welfare > state not only declined the invitation to join the European Coal and > Steel Community in 1950 but also went on to denounce supranational > integration as both anti-democratic and anti-socialist (p. 83).[3] > Overall, Williamson seems to underestimate the powerful strand of > nationalism underpinning Labour's European policy from the mid-1940s > up to the 1960s as well as the intimate connection between the > party's economic agenda and what David Edgerton has recently > described as the "nationalisation of the post-war economy."[4] While > this may have had no direct role in bringing about Brexit, it should > be acknowledged that "social democratic" (in other words, centrist) > Labourites were by no means naturally inclined toward _supranational_ > integration or European federalism, and that, in the long run, their > views may have been even more than influential than those of the > quixotic Labour left in providing intellectual ballast to the > contemporary Eurosceptic movement.[5] > > The second weakness of the book lies in the too close identification > of the EEC/EU with the principles and practices of the mixed economy. > Although the European Communities were meant to buttress the > reconstruction process and facilitate the building of more generous > social security systems at the national level, as Alan Milward showed > in his landmark works (especially _The European Rescue of the > Nation-State _[2000]), it does not follow that European integration > was _ipso facto_ a "social democratic" undertaking, namely, one bent > on creating supranational institutions that were supposed to be > heavily interventionist, or _dirigistes_, in the economic field. In > fact, many Continental pro-European politicians (mostly from the > center and the center-right) envisioned integration as a convenient > tool to institutionalize free trade among member states, thus > restraining collectivist tendencies at home while accepting > controlled liberalization, that is, a gradual, step-by-step opening > of once-protected national markets in order to stimulate domestic > growth.[6] Furthermore, it must be stressed that EEC/EU > policies--especially on monetary and fiscal issues--have been hardly > immune from the widespread resurgence of neoliberal, deregulatory, > and anti-statist ideas since the 1970s-80s.[7] Whether today's EU is > still committed to an egalitarian social and economic model in line > with the one Continental European countries sought to establish and > uphold during the _Trente Glorieuses_ is a complex and controversial > issue, one that Williamson could have examined in greater detail.[8] > > The third problematic aspect of Williamson's thesis is that > Euroscepticism is neither a purely British phenomenon nor a culture > rooted in neoliberalism or radical socialism only: this fairly > obvious but substantive point may have led the author to reflect more > extensively on how exceptional the British case is in today's Europe. > A full-fledged comparative analysis would have certainly fallen > beyond the scope of a book focused on Britain. Nevertheless, > arguing--as Williamson does--that the United Kingdom embraced > neoliberalism while the rest of Europe did not fails to do justice to > the far-reaching global trend toward market liberalization affecting, > albeit to a different degree, all the EU member states, as well as > the Western world more broadly, in the last forty years.[9] All in > all, Williamson's approach runs the risk of exaggerating the > uniqueness of the British experience, whose uneasy relationship with > Continental Europe, however peculiar, bears at least some resemblance > to that of the Scandinavian countries, including those that had not > ditched their own "social democratic" settlement.[10] > > These limitations notwithstanding, Williamson's book deserves praise > for its intriguing narrative, sharp writing style, and solid > structure. Unlike too much academic literature on this topic, it is > accessible to the general public and offers a lucid, up-to-date > synthesis of the main British parties' evolving views on European > integration from which readers unfamiliar with the subject will > certainly learn a great deal. Crucially, duly resisting the > temptation to ascribe Brexit to what Sir Isaiah Berlin used to call > "the great impersonal forces, natural and man-made, which act upon > us," Williamson highlights the importance of agency and places > responsibility for policy squarely on human--in fact, > political--shoulders.[11] In that respect, _Europe and the Decline of > Social Democracy in Britain _is right on target. > > <p>Notes > > [1]. See Andrew Glencross, _Why the UK Voted for Brexit: David > Cameron's Great Miscalculation _(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). > Despite being an instant book written in the aftermath of the > referendum, even Glencross's account features a sketchy portrait of > the British Eurosceptic movement since the 1970s (see pp. 7-20). > > [2]. Helen Thompson, "Inevitability and Contingency: The Political > Economy of Brexit," _The British Journal of Politics and > International Relations _19, no. 3 (2017): 435; and Justin O. Frosini > and Mark F. Gilbert, "The Brexit Car Crash: Using E. H. Carr to > Explain Britain's Choice to Leave the European Union in 2016," > Journal of European Public Policy 27, no. 5 (2016): 775. > > [3]. See, for example, European Unity: A Statement by the National > Executive Committee of the British Labour Party (London: The Labour > Party, 1950); and the more nuanced, but still firm, position > articulated by Denis Healey, "Power Politics and the Labour Party," > in New Fabian Essays, ed. Richard H. S. Crossman (London: Turnstile > Press, 1952), 161-79. On the Labour Party and the European Coal and > Steel Community, see also Edmund Dell, The Schuman Plan and the > British Abdication of Leadership in Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, > 1995), esp. 90-109, 190-214; and R. D. Douglas, The Labour Party, > Nationalism and Internationalism, 1939-1951 (New York: Routledge, > 2004), 214-65. > > [4]. David Edgerton, The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A > Twentieth-Century History (London: Penguin, 2019), 310. As Edgerton > points out, "the Labour Party presented itself to the post-war > electorate in a remarkably national way. It was a nationalist as well > as a social democratic party" (p. 43). Edgerton's work is likely to > have a major impact on future historians set on revisiting Britain's > awkward relationship with the EEC. > > [5]. On the influence of Douglas Jay and Peter Shore in particular, > see Mark Gilbert, "The Intellectual Origins of Brexit: Enoch Powell, > Douglas Jay and the British Dissenting Tradition," in > Euroscepticisms: The Historical Roots of a Political Challenge, ed. > Daniele Pasquinucci and Mark Gilbert (Leiden: Brill 2020), 121-39. > > [6]. On the free-market approach to integration, see John Gillingham, > European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy? > (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). On "controlled > liberalization," see Frances M. B. Lynch, France and the > International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome (London: > Routledge, 1997). The influence of German ordo-liberalism should not > be underestimated: see, for example, Laurence Warlouzet, "The EEC/EU > as an Evolving Compromise between French Dirigism and German > Ordoliberalism (1957-1995)," Journal of Common Market Studies 57, no. > 1 (2019): 77-93. > > [7]. See, for example, Kathleen R. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: > Monetary Politics in the European Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell > University Press, 1998); Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, The > Road To Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union (Oxford: > Oxford University Press, 1999); Nicholas Jabko, Playing the Market: A > Political Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985-2005 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell > University Press, 2006); and Laurent Warlouzet, Governing Europe in a > Globalizing World: Neoliberalism and Its Alternatives following the > 1973 Oil Crisis (New York: Routledge, 2018). > > [8]. For two recent, thought-provoking accounts of the EU's response > to the financial crisis and its implication for the so-called > European Social Model, see Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James, and > Jean-Pierre Landau, The Euro and the Battle of Ideas (Princeton, NJ: > Princeton University Press, 2016); and Adam Tooze, Crashed: How a > Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (London: Allen Lane, > 2018). Williamson observes that "the EU emerged from the [2008-9] > crisis as a force for neoliberalism and financial orthodoxy" but > overlooks the link between this and the policy turns of the 1970s-80s > (p. 241). > > [9]. For an overview, see Simon Reid-Henry, _Empire of Democracy: The > Remaking of the West since the Cold War_ (New York: Simon & > Schuster, 2019); and, about the EU, see Hagen Schulz-Forberg and Bo > Stråth, _The Political History of European Integration: The > Hypocrisy of Democracy-through-Market_ (New York: Routledge, 2010). > > [10]. See, for example, Christine Ingebritsen, The Nordic States and > European Unity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); and > Malin Stegmann McCallion and Alex Brianson, Nordic States and > European Integration: Awkward Partners in the North? (London: > Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). > > [11]. Isaiah Berlin, "The Pursuit of the Ideal," in The Proper Study > of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, ed. Henry Hardy and Roger > Hausheer (London: Pimlico, 1998), 2. > > Citation: Tommaso Milani. Review of Williamson, Adrian, _Europe and > the Decline of Social Democracy in Britain_. H-Socialisms, H-Net > Reviews. April, 2021. > URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55734 > > This work is licensed under a Creative Commons > Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States > License. > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. 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