"In a land in which millions of Palestinians live and millions more have a
right to return, the question is not whether Jewish power will be exercised
with compassion or malice. The question is whether it will be shared. That
sharing of power could take various forms: one or two genuinely equal
states, a federation. "





 

 
<https://jewishcurrents.org/the-guilty-conscience-of-jewish-empire/?fbclid=I
wAR3FUj_H7NqpR18s4r0cHH5Fv_eIkZn0ScAExSp0pDoGlmTSsZT_KrggfJs>
https://jewishcurrents.org/the-guilty-conscience-of-jewish-empire/?fbclid=Iw
AR3FUj_H7NqpR18s4r0cHH5Fv_eIkZn0ScAExSp0pDoGlmTSsZT_KrggfJs

 


*          <https://jewishcurrents.org/category/review/> Review


The Guilty Conscience of Jewish Empire


 <https://jewishcurrents.org/2021/06/28/> June 28, 2021 

Posted 

by  <https://jewishcurrents.org/author/daniel-may/> Daniel May

Discussed in this essay: The Wondering Jew: Israel and the Search for Jewish
Identity, by Micah Goodman, translated by Eylon Levy. Yale University Press,
2020. 264 pages.


OVER THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS, the Israeli center has drifted steadily closer
to the Israeli right. But the partnership at the heart of Israel’s new
government—between Yair Lapid, a supporter of “two states for two peoples,”
and Naftali Bennett, formerly a leader of the settlement movement—still
presents a contradiction: How can the ostensibly anti-occupation center
reconcile itself to the right’s policies of perpetual occupation? 

The philosopher Micah Goodman has in the last half-decade become perhaps
Israel’s most prominent public intellectual by arguing that it’s possible to
find a compromise between these seemingly incompatible views. Goodman’s 2017
book Catch-67 spent an entire year atop the Israeli nonfiction bestseller
list, was discussed on the floor of the Knesset, and was
<https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-ehud-barak-reviewed-a
-book-for-haaretz-and-wrote-a-political-manifesto-1.5471053> reviewed in
Haaretz (critically) by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak. This rise to
prominence led to a
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/09/world/middleeast/a-best-selling-israeli-
philosopher-examines-his-countrys-inner-conflict.html> lengthy, favorable
profile of Goodman in The New York Times, and later to an English
translation, released in 2018. Goodman has developed a powerful following:
Lapid has appeared to
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/opinion/netanyahu-israel-yair-lapid.html
> paraphrase his views on Jewish morality, while Bennett has openly cited
Goodman’s argument that the asymmetrical conflict between Israel and the
Palestinian people cannot be resolved, so the goal should be
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/3/no-difference-palestinians-react-to
-israeli-coalition-deal> to “shrink” it. 

What made Catch-67 such a phenomenon was its promise of an alternative to
the failed framework of the Oslo peace process. Goodman begins from the
premise that the occupation is both wrong and inescapable: thus the “catch”
of the book’s title. But he argues that even if this impasse cannot be
solved, it can be “shrunk” by granting the Palestinian Authority greater
autonomy, withdrawing from certain segments of the West Bank, and extending
Israeli residency to some West Bank Palestinians. Though Goodman’s policy
prescriptions are hardly novel, he defends them with a particular line of
moral reasoning that he calls “pragmatic.” According to Goodman, truly
ethical behavior occurs only when we are forced to balance competing moral
commitments—the survival of the Jewish people, for example, alongside
support for basic democratic norms. As he puts it in Catch-67, “pragmatism
is based on a complex moral conviction.” It rejects “the left’s monopoly on
the fear of the corrupting potential of Israel’s power” as well as “the
right’s monopoly on the fear of the threatening power of Israel’s enemies.”
Instead, pragmatism “refuses to renounce either moral concern but rather
insists on clinging to both of them without compromise.” In practice, for
Goodman, this means accepting the necessity of military rule while
attempting to minimize its worst excesses.

Goodman’s framework epitomizes a common line of Jewish argument about
Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. When Israel bombed Gaza last month,
<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/opinion/gaza-hamas-israel.html> many
insisted that the country had reconciled the competing claims of
self-defense and human rights—for example, by seeking to minimize civilian
casualties by notifying residents of the impending destruction of their
homes. According to this framing, the bombing and destruction in Gaza—the
<https://apnews.com/article/israel-middle-east-israel-palestinian-conflict-h
ealth-coronavirus-pandemic-9b59e6d675531576e819b6b948eba99d> deaths of at
least 227 Palestinians, over 60 of them children; the
<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/21/world/middleeast/gaza-damage.html>
destruction of about 1,000 homes; the
<https://www.businessinsider.com/un-says-58000-palestinians-displaced-in-gaz
a-by-israels-bombing-2021-5> displacement of upwards of 58,000 people—
<https://bariweiss.substack.com/p/the-bad-optics-of-fighting-for-your> were
above all a burden for Israel, which was forced to balance two contradictory
commitments. 

Given the prevalence of this view, Goodman’s work is valuable less for its
distinctiveness than for the way it reveals the assumptions that shape so
much Jewish discussion about Israel. If Catch-67 captures the current
discourse, Goodman’s newest book, published last fall in English as The
Wondering Jew, clarifies the ideology behind it. The topic of the new book
at first seems only tangentially related to the political polemic of
Catch-67. Goodman’s argument here is that neither religious nor secular
Judaism can offer a way forward for Jewish life: The former is too hobbled
by irrational dogma, the latter too untethered from any Jewish past. But
Goodman’s solution to this dilemma leads directly back to his political
program. Only by accepting the Zionist precept of Jewish sovereignty over
the whole of the land of Israel, he argues, can secular Jews embrace a
liberal, pluralistic worldview without ceasing to be distinctly Jewish. In
short, liberal Judaism requires maximalist Zionism. 

With this argument, Goodman helps illuminate a central but often
unarticulated phenomenon of contemporary Jewish politics. Today, support for
permanent Jewish rule over non-Jewish subjects is not limited to far-right
settlers and religious fanatics who want to inhabit the land to fulfill
God’s plan. Rather, many who consider themselves liberal—and who agonize
over the destruction, death, and loss caused by Israeli assaults like the
one in May—view occupation as both morally repugnant and incontrovertibly
necessary. By providing a philosophical and religious defense of this
position, Goodman reveals how a stated opposition to occupation can so
easily rest alongside support for its perpetuation.


IN THE SUMMER of 2019, I saw Goodman speak to a room packed with Americans
at the Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem, a Jewish pluralist research
center (where Goodman has long been affiliated, and where I’m also a
fellow). He is a compelling and gracious public speaker, and the audience
adored him. But there was one awkward moment. A young Israeli in the
audience asked him how he could lament the moral injustice of the occupation
as a resident of the settlement Kfar Adumim and as a founder of Ein Prat, a
beit midrash located in the West Bank. “That’s a personal matter,” he
replied. “We’re talking about ideas.” But the questioner wouldn’t let it go,
and finally Goodman asked to speak with him after the talk. A group gathered
to hear the response. Diffusing the tension with a warm smile, Goodman
explained that while the Palestinian people are occupied, the land is not.
There was, therefore, nothing inconsistent in opposing the occupation of the
Palestinian people while living in the West Bank.

Goodman presents this argument late in Catch-67, but it turns out to be
central to the book’s thesis. Although he begins the text with the more
familiar claim that the occupation is necessary to ensure the survival of
Israel, it becomes apparent that security is not his main concern. Though
the Israeli center left has argued for decades that the country can be
defended without the territory of the West Bank—citing, as Barak did in his
review, all the wars Israel won defending borders Goodman declares
“indefensible”—Goodman doesn’t acknowledge or respond to that point.
Instead, he insists that as immoral as the occupation may be, ending it is
also immoral—above all because relinquishing the land would mean conceding
ownership of what rightfully belongs to the Jews. 

Goodman develops this argument by reiterating common talking points of the
Israeli right. One is that the land was occupied by Israel only after a war
of self-defense; to relinquish it now would therefore “reward the crime of
aggression.” But to Goodman, that war only returned to the Jews what was
already theirs. The dilemma that Goodman perceives, then, is not one pitting
security against morality, but one shaped by the unfortunate fact that
non-Jews happen to live on Jewish land. The question that guides Goodman’s
policy proposals is therefore not how to ensure Israel’s security while
governing according to basic democratic norms, but how to make Jews’
supposedly morally justified rule over the Palestinian people less morally
horrendous for the occupier who carries it out. He proposes that granting
Palestinians greater autonomy while maintaining control of their territory
would transform the struggle “from a conflict between a state and its
subjects into a conflict between a state and its neighbors.” But giving a
prisoner a few more free hours in the yard does not make them any less a
prisoner. What it does is allow a morally anguished jailer to feel a bit
better about running a prison.

While Goodman believes that Zionism, as a movement concerned with a people’s
self-determination, may contradict its own principles “by subjugating
another people,” he insists that it would likewise “contradict itself by
relinquishing parts of the land of its forefathers and foremothers.”
Withdrawal, he argues, would “be an admission that Judaism is not a healthy
nationality, but rather a lightweight religious culture.” 

In The Wondering Jew, Goodman elaborates on what it means for Judaism to
function as a “healthy nationality.” As he explains, there are two basic
forms of modern Judaism: one defined by observance of halakha, or religious
law, and another that takes its secular authority from universal moral
principles, accessible through reason. Each has its strengths, but both are
ultimately destined to fail. Traditional Jewish observance, he argues,
offers meaning and community but requires a betrayal of “intellectual
integrity” and too often demands a sacrifice of “humanistic values.” Secular
Judaism, on the other hand, is free from the irrationality of a strict
adherence to halakha, but uproots Jews from their culture and past. 

The only alternative, for Goodman, is a Judaism in dialogue with its past
but freed from an unchanging Jewish law. But such a Judaism, he argues, can
only survive in a Jewish state. In liberal states, defined by individual
autonomy, Goodman argues that Jews who don’t observe halakha will simply
drift away from Judaism, leaving Jewish life unable to sustain itself. As
evidence of the phenomenon, Goodman notes oft-cited
<https://www.pewforum.org/2013/10/01/jewish-american-beliefs-attitudes-cultu
re-survey/> data on the decreasing numbers of non-Orthodox Jews in the
United States. But a Jewish state, he argues, solves the dilemma of Jewish
continuity by ensuring that the grandchildren of Israeli Jews will be Jews
regardless of their observance. Only in a country in which Jews rule can
Judaism survive untethered from Jewish law.

Goodman calls his vision for Judaism “non-diasporic.” As he narrates Jewish
history, diaspora consigned Jews to a constant preoccupation with their own
perpetuation. Achieving Jewish sovereignty in the land of Israel is the sole
way that Jews can finally free themselves to “worry less about how to
preserve Judaism and wonder more about what its purpose should be.” For
Goodman, central to that purpose is a commitment to universal morality. As
he puts it, “the State of Israel is the place where a new Jewish religiosity
can flourish, elevating morals above rituals without threatening Jewish
continuity.” Once they can stop worrying about whether or not Judaism will
survive, Jews can turn to matters of universal moral concern. 

Goodman’s conflation of Jewish identity with the Jewish state is not
unusual, and it’s tempting to class it as simply another articulation of
Jewish nationalism. But doing so obscures what is distinctive about his
project: What Goodman defends is not just a Jewish nation-state, but a
Jewish empire. At its most basic, the term “empire” describes any political
body
<https://books.google.com/books?id=XlluDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA30#v=onepage&q&f=false>
in which a single sovereign rules over subordinate peoples. Throughout
history, most empires have
<https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/E/bo6206919.html>
defended their rule as serving a civilizing mission; the empires of the
modern era, including the American one, have tended to explain their rule in
democratic terms, justifying the inherent inequality of their regimes on the
grounds that the ruled are incapable of self-governance. While such
arguments aren’t hard to find on the Israeli right, Goodman provides a
distinctive defense of Jewish rule over non-Jewish polities, framing the
issue in terms of morality.

In his defense of empire, Goodman appeals to a long tradition of Jewish
thought, dating back to the Bible, according to which Jewish residence in
the land of Israel is contingent upon Jewish moral character. But he argues
that the Bible’s central moral teaching is “that memories of past weakness
will counterbalance an awareness of present strength”—and that this balance
is impossible in the diaspora. “Only when the nation is strong can memories
of weakness balance out their power,” Goodman writes. “When the Jewish
people are neither strong nor sovereign, memory loses its role as a
counterweight. The Exile rendered the biblical injunction to constantly
remember weakness absurd.” Thus a genuine Jewish morality is “only relevant
to the Jewish people when they are sovereign in their own land.” 

Though Goodman’s “pragmatic” morality is theoretically an exercise in
balancing competing commitments, Jewish sovereignty over Jewish land turns
out to be the sole commitment that cannot be compromised to any degree, as
it’s the condition for any Jewish morality at all. Other values, such as
democracy, are not above sacrificing. What emerges is an agonized but still
resolute Jewish empire, one whose moral character is exhibited in its
reluctant embrace of the requirements of permanent sovereignty over
non-consenting subjects. Goodman’s is an empire with a guilty conscience. 

Despite Goodman’s attempt to show why the morality of Judaism rests on the
morality of Jewish rule, the actual manifestation of that rule tells us
otherwise. Domination inevitably provokes resistance, and despite Goodman’s
rosy description of a kinder occupation, control of those who do not consent
can only be maintained through violence. In a land in which millions of
Palestinians live and millions more have a right to return, the question is
not whether Jewish power will be exercised with compassion or malice. The
question is whether it will be shared. That sharing of power could take
various forms: one or two genuinely equal states, a federation. By
indicating that it will
<https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/1624475373-new-west-bank-settlement-c
onstruction-approved-in-a-first-for-israel-s-governing-coalition> uphold the
status quo in the West Bank—and thus conditioning its existence on a
not-so-tacit acceptance of ongoing Jewish empire—the new governing
coalition, despite its inclusion of the Arab party Ra’am and the
left-leaning Meretz, only affirms how far we may be from such a vision. The
violence and death of the last months have certainly only made it harder to
imagine what that sharing of power might look like, and whether it is even
possible. But they have also revealed its necessity. Even if it’s a path
that he attempts to block, Goodman helps illuminate the only way out of the
darkness.


Daniel May teaches at Hebrew Union College.

 

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