Hard drive search warrants: should there be any limits?

By Matthew Lasar
Ars Technica

March 24, 2011 11:55am

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/03/hard-drive-search-warrants-should-there-be-any-limits.ars


Here's the latest hot debate among Fourth Amendment scholars: when 
magistrate judges issue search warrants on computers, should those 
warrants limit where in the machine's directory system the police may 
look, or for how long they can scan the drive?

Professor Orin Kerr of George Washington Law School says no (PDF). 
Assistant Professor Paul Ohm of the University of Colorado Law School 
says yes (PDF).

As personal information is increasingly stored on digital devices like 
computers and smartphones, the issue becomes hugely important, and 
argument about it often relies on metaphors. In the case of the net 
neutrality debates, comparisons were always made to the highway system; 
when it comes to computer searches, it's all about the filing cabinet.


Just like file cabinets?

Some courts and legal scholars have characterized computer drives as 
analogous to offices or warehouses, with their cabinets full of business 
files. Just as judges grant the cops warrants to enter those offices and 
rummage through files that aren't relevant to a case in order to find 
those that are, these scholars argue that police should be able to 
search through hard drives full of private data not relevant to the 
suspected crime.

But other courts have put the brakes on this kind of data searching, 
limiting what police can look for and where they can look for it. These 
sorts of restrictions are "unauthorized," insists Professor Kerr, 
because the Fourth Amendment "contemplates a narrow role for magistrate 
judges. Magistrate judges have no inherent power to limit how warrants 
are executed beyond establishing the particularity of the place to be 
searched and the property to be seized."

Here are some of the warrants Kerr mentions, which put limits on both 
data and time. Most relevant is In the Matter of the Search of: 3817 W. 
West End, in which a judge compelled the government to develop a 
specific search protocol before inspecting the computer of a tax fraud 
suspect.

Then there's United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing. In that case, 
a magistrate judge stipulated that a warrant required forensic 
specialists rather than case agents to go through a computer looking for 
evidence of illegal steroid use.

Time-based restrictions include United States v. Brunette, a child 
pornography sting in which a magistrate judge imposed a time frame of 30 
days for the searching. Agents seized two computers five days later. 
Then they applied for another 30-day search period, which they received.

Only one problem—they peeked inside the second machine shortly after the 
second time window closed. A district court ruled that the images found 
in computer number two were inadmissible because of the government's 
failure "to adhere to the requirements of the search warrant and 
subsequent order."


The hands-on approach

Professor Kerr thinks that the Supreme Court's record casts doubt on 
these warrant limitations. He points to Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, an 
"extreme case," in his words, "of a magistrate judge controlling the 
execution of the warrant by participating in the search," which was 
eventually overturned by the High Court:

Lo-Ji Sales involved a search of a bookstore for obscene materials. A 
police officer had purchased two obscene films from an adult bookstore, 
and he approached a local magistrate for a warrant to search the store. 
The officer wanted to seize obscene films beyond the two that he already 
purchased and viewed, but he did not know which of the other films 
satisfied the constitutional test for obscenity. He therefore asked the 
magistrate to help him execute the search. Under the officer’s proposal, 
the magistrate would accompany the officers to the store with a warrant 
that initially listed only the two known films as items that that the 
government could seize. The magistrate judge would review the additional 
materials himself onsite, and then tell the officers which films they 
could seize based on the magistrate’s judgment about what was obscene. 
The magistrate agreed, and he came to the search site and preapproved 
which films counted as obscene and therefore were seizable. After the 
magistrate approved the seizure of a particular film, he would add the 
name of the film to the warrant and the government would seize the film.

The Supremes made short work of this procedure. The judge "allowed 
himself to become a member, if not the leader, of the search party which 
was essentially a police operation," they ruled.

Kerr acknowledges that this isn't a computer case, but he also points to 
Dalia v. The United States. In this legal dispute the Supreme Court cast 
aside the objection of a defendant who complained that the police 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the wiretap warrant didn't 
explicitly grant them permission to enter his presence to plant a bug.

Bottom line—these ex ante restrictions on search warrants violate the 
spirit of the Fourth Amendment, Kerr writes.

"A warrant is a judicial order allowing the government to enter the 
place to be searched to seize the items the judge has allowed to be 
seized," he says. "In contrast, how a warrant should be executed is 
traditionally a question for the police rather than the judge issuing 
the warrant."


The "preferable" way

But responding to Kerr's article, Colorado law professor Ohm finds 
jurisprudence suggesting that ex ante restrictions are indeed feasible. 
His authorities include that already mentioned Comprehensive Drug 
Testing case, in which the Ninth Circuit warned that a warrant "should 
normally include, or the issuing judicial officer should insert, a 
protocol for preventing agents involved in the investigation from 
examining or retaining any data other than that for which probable cause 
is shown."

And in Dalia, Ohm notes that the Supreme Court conceded that "[a]lthough 
explicit authorization of the entry [into an office to install a bug] is 
not constitutionally required, we do agree... that the 'preferable 
approach' would be for Government agents in the future to make explicit 
to the authorizing court their expectation that some form of 
surreptitious entry will be required to carry out the surveillance."

The bottom line for Ohm is that just letting the police ramble around or 
"oversearch" hard drives will allow them to survey more private data 
owned by innocent citizens than was ever permitted by warrants back in 
the days of searching warehouses full of paper. This will disrupt the 
balance between Fourth Amendment privacy interests and the needs of law 
enforcement to solve and prevent crime:

Warehouses—and even less so filing cabinets—are insignificant containers 
of information compared to today's hard drives, and the analogy will 
only become more mismatched over time. As the filing cabinet analogy 
fails, it takes with it the careful balance of the filing cabinet 
solution—haul it all away now and sort later. Today's technology poses a 
constitutional puzzle that is different in kind, not just in degree, 
from the one solved only a few decades ago.

Computers make everything different, Ohm warns. When asking for search 
warrants, the government must accept limits on how much digital data it 
can collect.

"The FBI and other law enforcement agencies are resourceful 
organizations full of industrious, creative, intelligent, and 
hard-working agents, who are dedicated to finding evidence of crime," 
his response concludes. "If the Fourth Amendment imposes new 
restrictions on what law enforcement agents can do, those agents will, 
as they have so many times before, find a way to continue to do their 
jobs efficiently and successfully while at the same time respecting the 
rights of the people."

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