Winning—and Losing—the First Wired War

Noah Shachtman, with reporting in Iraq by David Axe
Popular Science Magazine

Issue dated June 2006

http://www.popsci.com/popsci/technology/1b1a2fe0df34b010vgnvcm1000004eecbccdrcrd.html


The mission changes for Charlie Company seconds after the soldiers roll off 
the base. The dreary night patrol around Balad, a shambling Shi’ite town in 
north-central Iraq, has just been canceled. It’s time instead to hightail 
it west, to the Sunni neighborhood of Ad Duluiyah. “Alpha Company is taking 
direct fire,” a voice crackles over the radio in First Lt. Brian 
Feldmayer’s Humvee. “I need you to expedite."

Feldmayer, a 24-year-old Virginian with the smooth cheeks of a teenager, 
tries to straighten out a smile of excitement and nervous anticipation. He 
stares into the glowing touchscreen at his left elbow. The Army calls this 
system Blue Force Tracker, or BFT. It’s a militarized version of an 
automotive navigation aid, enhanced to track—and communicate with—other 
coalition vehicles. Firmly tapping the screen with his gloved fingers, 
Feldmayer calls up the grid coordinate just radioed to him and marks it 
with white crosshairs. Zooming out, he studies the roads leading there. He 
plots a course, then radios the rest of his patrol—two tanks, three more 
Humvees and an Iraqi Army Nissan truck—with orders to haul ass.

It doesn’t take long for Feldmayer to regret it. Nobody on the patrol knows 
the roads, and he’s wary of getting lost. Ordinarily, on his terminal, he 
should be able to track Charlie’s other BFT-equipped vehicles and follow 
the route they’re taking. But the satellite signal that feeds BFT is weak 
tonight. And the lieutenant doesn’t exactly trust the system’s maps: It can 
take the Army’s cartographers up to a year to update them; in Iraq, a lot 
can change by then.

Feldmayer curses loudly. He calls his command post for help, but he hears 
only static.

This wasn’t how the 75-man Charlie Company was supposed to operate. It’s 
part of the Army’s first “digital division,” the Ft. Carson, Colorado–based 
Fourth Infantry Division (4ID), outfitted with the military’s latest gear: 
new tanks, firearms and armored vehicles, but also flying reconnaissance 
drones, advanced sensors, electronic jammers and battlefield data networks. 
All of which should make the 4ID a model for the Pentagon’s vision for the 
future of combat—“network-centric warfare.” With the right technologies, 
soldiers should be able to communicate better and have a clearer picture of 
the battlefield. Their movements become lightning-quick and lethally 
effective. Think of it as combat on Internet time.


Dangerous Gaps

Every war becomes a proving ground for new tactics and new technologies. 
Battleships rose to prominence in World War I; tanks and bombers determined 
the course of World War II; Vietnam brought air power definitively into the 
Jet Age. The current conflict is no different. The Pentagon began this war 
believing its new, networked technologies would help make U.S. ground 
forces practically unstoppable in Iraq. Slow-moving, unwired armies like 
Saddam Hussein’s were the kind of foe network-centric warriors were 
designed to carve up quickly. During the invasion in March 2003, that 
proved to be largely the case—despite most of the soldiers not being wired 
up at all. It was enough that their commanders had systems like BFT, which 
let them march to Baghdad faster than anyone imagined possible, with half 
the troops it took to fight the Gulf War in 1991. But now, more than three 
years into sectarian conflict and a violent insurgency that has cost nearly 
2,400 American lives, an investigation of the current state of 
network-centric warfare reveals that frontline troops have a critical need 
for networked gear—gear that hasn’t come yet. “There is a connectivity 
gap,” states a recent Army War College report. “Information is not reaching 
the lowest levels.”

This is a dangerous problem, because the insurgents are stitching together 
their own communications network. Using cellphones and e-mail accounts, 
these guerrillas rely on a loose web of connections rather than a top-down 
command structure. And they don’t fight in large groups that can be easily 
tracked by high-tech command posts. They have to be hunted down in dark 
neighborhoods, amid thousands of civilians, and taken out one by one.

Even in the supposedly wired 4ID, it can take years for frontline soldiers 
to benefit from the technologies that high-ranking officers quickly take 
for granted. The finicky, incompatible equipment that’s given to the 
infantrymen and tank drivers in Charlie Company—the guys who are spending 
this cold, wet February night on the front—is primitive in comparison with 
the gear at the sprawling military base outside of Balad, where 
battalion-level commanders oversee the 300 troops in Charlie and three 
other companies. There, things are beginning to work like the 
network-centric theorists predicted, with drone video feeds and sensor data 
and situation reports flying in constantly. But to the guys in Charlie 
Company, this technological wizardry and the Pentagon’s futuristic 
hypotheses seem awfully far away.

There is a simple, but significant, reason why: Bringing frontline 
infantrymen into the network isn’t as easy as wiring up a headquarters. 
Battlefield gear has to be wireless, durable, secure, and completely 
effortless to use in the chaos of combat. The network is slowly expanding 
to meet the grunts. But the Department of Defense’s lumbering process for 
buying new equipment still virtually ensures that ground-level soldiers 
won’t be linked-in until early next decade. “The fog, friction and 
uncertainty of war are still there, same as always,” says retired Marine 
Col. T.X. Hammes, considered one of the leading authorities on 
counterinsurgency. “This net-centricity helps some, but it only goes as far 
as the battalion [the command echelon above the companies that do the 
actual fighting]. After that, these guys are on their own.”


Blind Spots and Incompatible Systems

Feldmayer radios the tank at the rear of his patrol and orders it to the 
front of the convoy. It’s the latest M1A2 Abrams, one of the most advanced 
tanks in the world, equipped with new night-vision sensors, thicker armor 
and BFT’s older (and, counterintuitively) more feature-packed cousin: Force 
XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below, or FBCB2. First built in the early 
1990s for Cold War–style conflicts, where armies are tightly bunched 
together, FBCB2 relies on a classified radio band to communicate. BFT, 
designed later for more-dispersed, unconventional warfare, uses more-open 
satellite transmissions; troops can share information at greater distances, 
but they can’t get the kind of secrecy that FBCB2 provides. The Army is 
working on a bridge between the two systems so that they will be able to 
share some basic information, but for now they are mostly incompatible. 
Feldmayer won’t be able to see where the tank is leading them, and he won’t 
be able to use FBCB2’s Instant Messenger–like tool to quickly relay 
commands. He won’t have access to any of the communications links that 
increase what the Pentagon calls “situational awareness” and that 
ultimately power network-centric warfare. If the navigation systems were 
working, every vehicle could split up or speed ahead if an attack came, 
without getting lost. But today they will all have to follow the tank’s 
taillights in a neat line, just as it was done in 1944.

Charlie Company takes off, racing toward the fight at Ad Duluiyah. 
Careening around traffic circles, blowing past checkpoints, the company is 
primed for combat: weapons loaded, 120-millimeter cannon shells rammed into 
breaches. Radio-frequency jammers form a protective bubble around the 
convoy, keeping remote-controlled roadside bombs from detonating. “They 
better have that shit wrapped up by the time we get there,” Feldmayer 
shouts, “or we’re going to blow some shit up!”

Then, suddenly, the lead tank lurches to a halt. Through roiling clouds of 
dust, illuminated by the tank’s headlights, Feldmayer sees a pile of 
concrete and earth. The lead tank’s fancy navigation system has just led 
them into a roadblock, too tall for the vehicles to climb. A dozen soldiers 
curse in unison.


By the time Charlie gets to Ad Duluiyah, 45 minutes later, the shooting is 
over. A dozen Humvees and Bradley fighting vehicles line a muddy road 
leading to a rickety pontoon bridge that’s nearly swamped by a surging 
stream. And all those soldiers’ chatter is creating cacophony over the 
Single Channel Ground and Air Radio System, or Sincgars, the radio system 
connecting the Army’s fleet of helicopters and ground vehicles. It’s the 
buzzing, chirping sound of information overload.

An officer from Alpha Company walks over to explain what’s going on. Alpha 
was following up on leads about a stolen Iraqi police truck when the 
soldiers spotted a suspiciously large gathering of cars in front of a 
single house. When Alpha got close, Iraqis spilled out, sprinting for their 
cars and shooting off tracer rounds. Alpha didn’t have enough men to pursue.

Now the idea is to start searching houses, one at a time, for insurgents. 
Charlie Company is assigned the northwest side of the stream. Feldmayer 
tells his tank commanders to use their infrared sights to watch over the 
foot patrols. Taking a last glance at his BFT, eyeballing the digital 
representation of the dark, foreboding neighborhood he’s about to 
penetrate, Feldmayer mutters, “Don’t need this anymore,” and switches the 
system off.


Inspired by Wal-Mart

The Pentagon’s pursuit of network-centric warfare began in the info-tech 
boom of the 1990s—largely influenced by, of all things, Wal-Mart. 
Ultra-wired retailers like that knew tons about their customers’ needs and 
habits, and their suppliers’ capabilities. And that helped the companies 
become more profitable, with less inventory and fewer employees, than their 
more-traditional rivals. This kind of “information superiority,” Admiral 
Arthur Cebrowski and Pentagon scientific adviser John Garstka argued in a 
1998 issue of the Naval Institute’s Proceedings, would allow the military 
to streamline similarly. Fewer troops could cover wider areas when 
networked. Tanks and ships could carry less armor and fewer guns, because 
they would know exactly where their enemies were. Lower-level commanders 
could make key decisions. Conventional armies wouldn’t stand a chance.

The Army’s leadership quickly embraced the idea. In 1999 Gen. Eric 
Shinseki, then Army chief of staff, accelerated an overhaul of the 
organization, primarily along the network-centric model. Every soldier and 
every machine would be tapped into a giant, wireless intranet for combat. 
Presidential candidate George W. Bush embraced the concept too, during the 
2000 election. And when Bush entered office, Cebrowski was installed as the 
director of a new Pentagon department: the Office of Force Transformation.

Then came the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The network wasn’t done, 
but the slices that had been set up—like BFT, which enabled American 
commanders to see one another’s locations—helped to decapitate Saddam’s 
regime almost instantly. Individual troops still had trouble communicating 
with one another; some Marine squad leaders were forced to use five 
different radios to share information. In the early days of the Iraq war, 
it didn’t seem to matter.

The gear was clearly saving lives. The number of friendly-fire incidents 
that plagued U.S. troops during the first Gulf War dropped significantly, 
for example, thanks to the new, networked equipment. In November 2004, 
10,000 marines participated in the assault on Fallujah. With drones 
watching overhead and commanders communicating better, not one marine was 
killed by friendly fire. Faith in the new technologies ran so high, the 
Pentagon decided to cut troop levels in key areas. This part of Iraq was 
patrolled by 1,200 soldiers in 2004; now, a single battalion —300 
troops—covers the same area.


The Situation Room

At the battalion command post outside Balad, cables spill along the floor 
like the guts of an electronic beast. Flat-screen monitors display both 
grainy black-and-white and color surveillance footage, as many as 20 feeds 
at a time. Tower-mounted cameras, unmanned spy planes, even Air Force and 
Marine Corps fighter jets toting infrared targeting pods supply the images. 
It’s an absolute torrent of information for the battalion’s rumpled 
intelligence officer, Captain Pete Simpson, and his team of five analysts. 
With it, they keep watch over more than 1,000 square miles of Iraq from 
their desks.

A few years back, a division headquarters supporting 10,000 or 20,000 
troops might not have had access to this much real-time footage. “We’ve got 
more stuff than we have any right to,” Simpson jokes. But he can do more 
than get views from overhead. Thanks to the Sincgars radios, junior 
officers like him can quickly coordinate ad hoc missions with whatever jets 
and helicopters happen to be in the air—and order them to attack. “When I 
was a junior officer, this happened at the corps level,” says Simpson’s 
commanding officer, Lt. Col. Jeffrey Vuono, referring to an Army unit with 
20,000 to 40,000 men. “Now we’re doing it at the patrol level.”

The air-ground collaboration is one of dozens of different ways that 
network-centric tools are slowly starting to rejigger the military’s 
hidebound hierarchies. In the Gulf War, the various armed services didn’t 
talk to one another much, except at the highest levels. That’s partly why 
there was a six-week air campaign and then a ground attack. During the 2003 
invasion, the air and ground assaults struck at once.

But one of the most powerful tools in battalion command posts like these, 
notes Garstka, the network-centric theorist, may be one of the simplest: a 
Web browser, so junior officers can log into secure online forums. There 
captains and lieutenants can swap tactics, well before they appear in 
printed field manuals. This is critical in a place like Iraq, where 
insurgents’ strategies change almost daily. When First Cavalry Division 
captain Chris Manglicmot first started seeing car bombs in his northeastern 
Baghdad sector, he turned to the division’s collaborative site, Cavnet, for 
advice. Spread out your checkpoint, he learned, so the bombers don’t have a 
central target. Look for vehicles that ride heavy and low. Watch for cars 
that drive aggressively, with shades pulled over the windows. There could 
be a bomb inside.


Paper, Not Pixels

Picking his way through the crumbling houses of Ad Duluiyah, Feldmayer is 
tied to the American grid by only the thinnest of threads. There’s no way 
for him to get on any collaborative Web site from here. Most of his men are 
out of reach, scattered throughout the town. Many don’t have radios; 
traditional Army fighting doesn’t call for individual soldiers to be 
separated from their squad very often.

Feldmayer follows the Iraqi soldiers he’s been teamed with across a dark, 
muddy, pothole-riddled yard. A locked gate bars the way to a group of 
houses. One of Feldmayer’s U.S. soldiers blasts it open with a shotgun, and 
the men spill into the yard in front of a large dwelling. Soldiers crowd 
the front door, pounding with closed fists and yelling in Arabic. Women and 
children dart around corners and disappear into rooms. Tired men scurry 
outside, obviously spooked.

Feldmayer doesn’t like the aggression. “Just take it easy,” he tells the 
Iraqi troops through the patrol’s interpreter, to the civilians’ palpable 
relief. One of the men gathered in the yard gestures to the lieutenant. 
Feldmayer grabs the interpreter and shakes the Iraqi man’s hand. “Salaam,” 
Feldmayer says. The three put their heads together, muttering in English 
and Arabic.

Suddenly Feldmayer cuts off the conversation and urges the man and the 
interpreter around a corner. “He says he knows who the bad guys are around 
here,” Feldmayer says. The interpreter takes notes as the informant rattles 
off names and addresses. If the Pentagon’s vision of networked forces were 
realized here, he would be typing into a handheld computer, wirelessly 
connected to a network. The names would immediately be cross-checked with 
databases of known guerrillas and disseminated to local commanders. But for 
now, the patrol’s interpreter writes down the Ad Duluiyah suspects on 
paper, using a pencil.

It’s at this point, just beyond the edge of the American network, where the 
guerrillas are best connected. Using disposable cellphones, anonymous 
e-mail addresses at public Internet cafés, and “lessons learned” Web sites 
that rival Cavnet, disparate guerrilla groups coordinate attacks, share 
tactics, hire bomb makers, and draw in fresh recruits. It’s an ad hoc, 
constantly changing web of connections, so it’s hard for U.S. spooks to 
know where to listen in next. It also lets the insurgents keep a loose 
command structure, without much hierarchy—just like the network-centric 
theorists call for. Even if their communications are compromised, only a 
small cell is exposed, not the entire insurgency. "They’re more effectively 
networked than we are," says Hammes, the guerrilla-war expert. “They have a 
worldwide, secure communications network. And all it cost them was two dinars.”

To compensate, some American soldiers are buying their own gear: $50 
Motorola walkie-talkies, so they can talk to their squad mates; $160 Garmin 
GPS receivers to make up for FBCB2’s gaps. It’s quicker than waiting for 
the wheels of the Pentagon bureaucracy to turn. At the Defense Department, 
there’s widespread recognition that it needs to get its frontline soldiers 
wired up. Pencil and paper just won’t do.

The technologies being readied, however sluggishly, could be a huge help to 
soldiers on patrol, like Feld-
mayer. The Warfighter Information Network–Tactical, or WIN-T, is a mobile 
wireless Internet for combat, scheduled to deploy early in the next decade.

Also in the next decade, the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) should 
start replacing the military’s tangle of analog radios with compatible 
digital models. Another project, Land Warrior, is a new set of soldier 
uniforms, packed with electronics and communications gear. Once it’s 
completed—perhaps by 2008—FBCB2-style information will appear on more than 
just a Humvee screen. It will flow to the infantryman, through a 
monocle-like display mounted to his helmet. Every soldier will see where 
his fellow fighters are.

If only these programs were progressing as planned, but each has been 
bogged down by lengthening to-do lists and sets of system requirements. 
JTRS recently went through a massive reorganization after billions of 
dollars were wasted. Land Warrior, started in the mid-1990s, is years 
behind schedule; managers are hoping that a 440-soldier test this summer 
will put it back on track. For now, all Army acquisition chief Lt. Gen. 
Joseph Yakovac will say is that “we continue to have that vision” of a 
networked infantryman.


Mission’s End

After hours of barreling down highways, blasting open locked gates, and 
pressing terrified Iraqis for information, Charlie and Alpha companies 
trickle home from Ad Duluiyah. Feldmayer’s Humvee is the last to leave, 
towing the sniper section’s broken-down truck. Feldmayer stares into the 
cold dark of the early morning. His shoulders sag. In his pocket, he 
carries the insurgent list he coaxed out of the Iraqi informant. His 
sergeant gripes about missed firefights. But Feldmayer just nods, his arm 
draped on the blank screen of the BFT.

---------------
Noah Shachtman is the editor of DefenseTech.org. David Axe has covered the 
Iraq war for the Village Voice and the Washington Times.



================================
George Antunes, Political Science Dept
University of Houston; Houston, TX 77204
Voice: 713-743-3923  Fax: 713-743-3927
antunes at uh dot edu



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