Regarding  https://bugs.meego.com/show_bug.cgi?id=16284
Chromium browser sandbox feature is not working in MeeGo builds
.....................
In investigating why even the latest google-chrome emits "you are not
adequately sandboxed" message on MeeGo 1.2, I believe I've discovered a
kernel-shortcoming in MeeGo 1.2 as distributed on the ExoPC's
at 2011 MeeGo SF conference, and on latest
http://download.meego.com/live/MeeGo:/1.2 (for which repos on both
netbook and tablet have updated w/ "zypper dup --from
'MeeGo:1.2:non-oss (MeeGo_1.2)' --from 'MeeGo:1.2:oss (standard)'")
...  and yes this egregious security flaw still exists, along with
this new-found related problem in the build of the MeeGo 1.2 pinetrail
kernel:

http://phajdan-jr.blogspot.com/2011/05/chromium-linux-kernel-configuration.html
("Chromium: Linux kernel configuration options needed for SUID
sandbox") suggests the following  kernel configuration options which
are apparently missing in MeeGo 1.2 (
kernel-adaptation-pinetrail-2.6.38.2-8.12.i586  ):

  General setup  --->
        -*- Namespaces support  --->
                [*]   PID Namespaces
                [*]   Network namespace

Here's my test script with detailed comments:

$ diff /usr/bin/meego-app-browser /usr/local/bin/meego-sandboxed-browser
8a9,48
> ## NPM: per
> ## http://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSUIDSandboxDevelopment
> ## chrome-sandbox binary taken from
> ## 
> https://dl-ssl.google.com/linux/direct/google-chrome-stable_current_i386.rpm
> ## which installs at:
> ## ROOT-meegotab-108-~> ll /opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox
> ##  -rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 10420 2011-05-19 18:10 
> /opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox*
> ## Note that it must be SUID.  See below also where 
> "--enable-seccomp-sandbox" added to launch
> ## suggested by http://bugs.gentoo.org/363907 ...
> ## checking that this isn't bullshit:
> ## $ strings meego-app-browser | grep SANDBOX
> ## CHROME_DEVEL_SANDBOX
> ## However, it appears MeeGo kernel not config'd correctly per
> ## 
> http://phajdan-jr.blogspot.com/2011/05/chromium-linux-kernel-configuration.html
> ## on Fedora the equivalent (google-chrome-stable-11.0.696.71-86024.x86_64) 
> version of google-chrome
> ## reports:
> #### ## Sandbox Status
> #### ## SUID Sandbox  Yes
> #### ##   PID namespaces      Yes
> #### ##   Network namespaces  Yes
> #### ## Seccomp sandbox       No
> #### ## You are adequately sandboxed.
> ## On MeeGo 1.2, google-chrome-stable-11.0.696.71-86024.i386, about:sandbox 
> reports:
> #### Sandbox Status
> ####
> #### SUID Sandbox     Yes
> #### Seccomp sandbox  No
> #### You are not adequately sandboxed!
> ## The reason for the inadequate sandbox is hidden, but suggested in the
> ## blogpost link above:
> ##
> ## It turned out that to make the SUID sandbox fully effective, the kernel
> ## must support PID (process id) and network namespaces. Adding to the
> ## confusion, when the kernel supports them, about:sandbox displays entries
> ## for "PID namespaces" and "network namespaces" and a green "yes" next to
> ## them. But if the kernel doesn't support those features, nothing is
> ## displayed, which makes it difficult to diagnose what's wrong with the
> ## sandbox.
> ##
> export CHROME_DEVEL_SANDBOX=/opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox
>
151c191
<   exec $LIBDIR/$APPNAME "--fullscreen" "--opengl"
"--disable-accelerated-compositing" "--enable-click-to-play" "--tabs-limit=8"
"$@"
---
>   exec $LIBDIR/$APPNAME "--fullscreen" "--opengl" 
> "--disable-accelerated-compositing" "--enable-seccomp-sandbox" 
> "--tabs-limit=8" "$@"
152a193,194
>
>
...........................

-- Niels
http://nielsmayer.com

PS: my test script failed to deliver an adequately sandboxed browser
on my ExoPC tablet, which is why I started investigating what was
going on with my "reference" software and sandbox, the latest stable
chrome browser from google.com .

PPS: On the ExoPC MeeGo Tablet UX, I'm happily using using
http://wiki.meego.com/MeeGo-Lem-Firefox4 which runs everything in its
own version of the sandbox. Perhaps one not vulnerable to the same
class of attack as
http://www.vupen.com/demos/VUPEN_Pwning_Chrome.php
https://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/researchers-say-new-bugs-can-bypass-google-chrome-sandbox-050911
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