In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Jan 2019: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jan 2019: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2019-01-08 15802 DU-AS1 2018-09-22 2019-01-30 58224 TCI 2018-10-22 2019-01-24 8376 2018-12-16 2019-01-29 48953 Broadmax 2018-12-26 2019-01-25 44285 Shahrad 2019-01-04 2019-01-18 48629 iclik 2019-01-23 2019-01-23 34619 CIZGI 2019-01-24 2019-01-24 206375 NETSPEED 2019-01-28 2019-01-29 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
