In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Jun 2020: ASN Name Fixed-By 6939 HURRICANE 2020-06-03 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jun 2020: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 25019 SAUDINETSTC 2016-07-06 2020-06-18 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2020-06-26 34296 MILLENICOM 2017-04-28 2020-06-29 15802 DU-AS1 2018-09-22 2020-06-30 202365 Chronos 2019-07-10 2020-06-26 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-i...@caida.org _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list Menog@lists.menog.org http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog