In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Mar 2021: ASN Name Fixed-By 212219 HostingDunyam 2021-03-04 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Mar 2021: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 5384 EMIRATES-INTERNET 2017-02-17 2021-03-26 9121 TTNet 2017-07-14 2021-03-31 202365 Chronos 2019-07-10 2021-03-29 24835 RAYA 2020-08-04 2021-03-23 202254 LDL 2021-01-03 2021-03-24 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-i...@caida.org _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list Menog@lists.menog.org http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog