In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Aug 2024: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Aug 2024: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 25019 SAUDINETSTC 2016-07-06 2024-08-04 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2024-08-19 34984 TELLCOM 2018-11-20 2024-08-29 51375 VIVABH 2023-03-06 2024-08-30 44620 COSMOIX 2024-05-27 2024-08-27 29262 IDEALHOSTING 2024-05-28 2024-08-28 203399 Extranet 2024-05-28 2024-08-28 210538 2024-06-11 2024-08-27 209275 nimanet 2024-06-12 2024-08-20 396982 GOOGLE-PRIVATE-CLOUD 2024-07-04 2024-08-22 42724 talido 2024-08-07 2024-08-30 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
