In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Oct 2024: ASN Name Fixed-By 210538 2024-10-08 216285 2024-10-15 200040 2024-10-19 396982 GOOGLE-PRIVATE-CLOUD 2024-10-23 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Oct 2024: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 25019 SAUDINETSTC 2016-07-06 2024-10-30 9121 TTNet 2017-07-14 2024-10-16 34984 TELLCOM 2018-11-20 2024-10-31 51375 VIVABH 2023-03-06 2024-10-25 29262 IDEALHOSTING 2024-05-28 2024-10-30 203399 Extranet 2024-05-28 2024-10-30 209275 nimanet 2024-06-12 2024-10-21 205424 ulunet 2024-09-07 2024-10-29 48660 ULTRAASP 2024-09-27 2024-10-25 205935 farknet 2024-10-31 2024-10-31 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
