In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during May 2025: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during May 2025: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2025-05-30 9121 TTNet 2017-07-14 2025-05-27 34984 TELLCOM 2018-11-20 2025-05-02 8376 2018-12-16 2025-05-31 51375 VIVABH 2023-03-06 2025-05-24 204203 Takallou 2023-11-02 2025-05-31 29262 IDEALHOSTING 2024-05-28 2025-05-29 205935 farknet 2024-10-31 2025-05-30 9051 2025-03-27 2025-05-26 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
