Here's the straight poop. A piece I did for briefing a Kiwanis group
several months ago.
GOLDSBORO BROKEN ARROW
By Wilton Strickland
BROKEN ARROW - an accident with a nuclear weapon or component that does not
pose threat of nuclear war.
For more than 40 years after WW II, The United States and The Soviet Union
did not trust each other, and each felt certain that the other was about to
attack. Therefore, The US developed a policy of deterrence and Mutually
Assured Destruction (MAD) - an attack by one would result in complete
destruction of both by an all-out nuclear exchange.
As a result of this deterrent policy, the US Air Force Strategic Air Command
kept nuclear-armed long range bombers and intercontinental ballistic
missiles on ground alert for 35 years ready to launch at a moment's notice
and strike targets in the Soviet Union. They also kept B-52's on airborne
alert for at least 7 years (1961-'68), also loaded with nuclear weapons and
ready to turn at a moment's notice and strike targets in the Soviet Union.
Seymour Johnson AFB, NC, (Goldsboro) of course, was deeply involved in all
of this. B-52's were on ground alert with nuclear weapons at Seymour
Johnson for 23 years (1959 - '82), and crews at Seymour Johnson also flew
many airborne alert missions, as did I from Robins AFB, GA.
One of these airborne alert missions began on the morning of Jan 23, 1961,
when crew R-10 at Seymour Johnson took off on a B-52 on a 24-hour airborne
alert mission with 2 MK 39 nuclear weapons aboard. The crew was composed of
the normal crew of 6 plus 2 extras. The normal crew consisted of the pilot,
co-pilot, electronic warfare officer (EW) and gunner in upward ejection
seats on the upper deck and the radar-navigator/bombardier (RN) and
navigator (Nav) in downward ejection seats on the lower deck. One of the
extra crew members was a wing staff electronic warfare officer sitting in
the instructor navigator's (IN) seat, a non-ejection seat, on the lower deck
5 feet or so behind the 2 navigators. The other extra crewman was a third
or relief pilot sitting in the instructor pilot's (IP) seat, a non-ejection
seat immediately behind and slightly to the right of the pilot. Planned
bailout procedures call for crewmen not in ejection seats to proceed to the
lower deck and jump or drop manually out through one of the navigators' open
hatches after they have ejected.
The planned route for this mission was to track back and forth several times
over the eastern third of the US. This was the very early days of airborne
alert, and the overseas routes had not yet been fully established. About 3
years later, I flew several 24-hour airborne alert missions from Warner
Robins, GA, up across Greenland, across the North Pole and back and from
Robins, out across the North Atlantic, across Spain, into the Mediterranean
and back to Robins.
After about 10 hours into the mission by crew R-10 and during air refueling
over SC, the tanker boom operator noticed fuel streaming from a gushing leak
in the right wing a few feet outboard of the wing root. They stopped
refueling immediately, of course, and called their wing command post at
Seymour Johnson, who also called the manufacturer, Boeing, for additional
advice.
The crew was directed to proceed to a point about 10 NM off shore east of
Wilmington to burn off fuel and await further instructions from Boeing.
After about 2 hours holding off Wilmington, the local wing commander
directed the crew to proceed back to Seymour Johnson and land.
On approach to Seymour Johnson from the east-northeast at about 10 thousand
feet and immediately after putting flaps down, the crew suddenly heard a
loud CRACK! and felt a shudder. The aircraft immediately went into an
uncontrollable roll to the right; the pilot was unable to regain control of
the aircraft, and the crew heard more loud CRACKS! as the right wing broke
off and the aircraft began to violently roll, spin and tumble. The aircraft
fuselage also broke in two across the middle of the bomb bay between the two
bombs.
Meanwhile, the pilot had given the order to bailout. The navigator ejected
downward immediately and survived; the co-pilot and electronic warfare
officer (EW) ejected upward and survived. EW landed in a pasture near a
cow, thought it was a bull and ran, breaking his ankle trying to jump over a
fence. The gunner pulled the first part of his ejection trigger mechanism
to blow the overhead hatch, but he never squeezed the second part of the
trigger mechanism to eject his seat; his body was found in the wreckage
strewn across Big Daddy's Rd. southwest of Faro. Meanwhile, the radar
navigator ejected downward, but his body was found the next morning hanging
from his parachute in a tree. Joel Dobson, author of "The Goldsboro Broken
Arrow," recently talked to one of the men who helped recover the gunner's
body. He told Dobson that they found part of a pine tree limb through the
gunner's head. The pilot ejected upward and survived. His chute hung up in
a tree suspending him a few feet above a swampy area. He released his chute
and fell into the very cold water. After several tries and failing to find
a way out of the swamp in the dark, he decided to wait until daylight and
spent the next several hours just trying to survive the very cold wind and
water. The staff electronic warfare officer in the instructor navigator's
seat on the lower deck failed to exit the aircraft. I strongly suspect that
the centrifugal forces inside the cabin, caused by the violent rolling,
spinning and tumbling, were such that he was unable to get to one of the
open hatches where the navigators' seats had been. His body was also found
in the wreckage.
The absolute miracle of the accident is the survival of the third pilot, Lt.
Adam Mattocks, riding the IP seat, a non-ejection seat, on the upper deck.
He's the luckiest man alive. If I were to play the lottery, I'd want HIM to
pick my numbers. Every B-52 crewman KNOWS that you can not survive bailing
out of a B-52 through an upward hatch without an ejection seat because of
the likely hood of hitting a wing or horizontal or vertical stabilizer.
Remember, though, that by this time, the right wing was gone and the
aircraft had broken in half, so the horizontal and vertical stabilizers were
also gone. Mattocks knew that, because of the violent centrifugal forces
created by the rolling, spinning and tumbling, that he'd never be able to
make it to the openings on the lower deck. In desperation, he flung himself
toward the co-pilot's open hatch, but he actually went out through the pilot's
hatch and landed near a house where three people were standing on their
porch watching the burning wreckage strewn across Big Daddy's Rd. They were
quite surprised to see him step up on the porch.
The breakup of the aircraft caused the bombs to separate from it much as if
they had been deliberately released, and I'll say more about that in a
couple of minutes. A retardation parachute lanyard attached between the
bombs and the aircraft opened the chute on one of the bombs. (Purpose of
the chute is to slow the bombs' fall to increase time for crew escape, give
time for the switches and devices in the arming, fusing and firing system
to work and to keep the bombs from destroying themselves on impact.)
Pullout rods that work very much like Wiley Coyote's dynamite plunger
generated an electric pulse that initiated the bombs' internal batteries and
started the arming, fusing and firing sequence.
Soon after the accident, SECDEF McNamara commented that all of the switches
in the arming, fusing and firing systems but one had failed, and only that
one switch had prevented a nuclear detonation.
Well, this is only partly right. Only one switch in one of the bombs did
prevent a nuclear detonation, but let's discuss for a minute whether or not
any switches or devices failed.
All of the switches, devices, etc., in the arming, fusing and firing systems
in the bombs are designed and built to work only under very specific
conditions of altitude and air speed in order to prevent a nuclear
detonation during ground handling, maintenance, storage and normal
transportation. The right combination of altitude and airspeed can be
attained only by an airplane in flight. You can not haul a bomb up a
mountain and push it off a cliff and make it work, and you can not haul one
on a truck fast enough to make it work.
If any switch or device in the arming, fusing and firing system does not
work exactly as designed and in the proper sequence, it becomes a roadblock
in the sequence - the systems fails SAFE and there would be no nuclear
detonation.
We must remember, though, that all of the switches and devices in the
arming, fusing and firing systems were also designed to ENSURE a nuclear
detonation when the bomb is released under the proper conditions of altitude
and airspeed.
Well, the aircraft broke up within the required range of altitude and
airspeed causing the bombs to separate from it as if they had been
deliberately released, except that the crew radar navigator/bombardier had
not performed the Weapons Preparation for Release checklist and never would
have performed it without a valid and properly authenticated GO CODE from
The President, and even then, only over enemy territory. One of the very
critical steps in the WPR checklist is to place the ARM/SAFE switches in the
bombs to the ARMED position; so, these switches in the bombs were still
SAFE - compared to a firearm, the safeties were ON.
The ARM/SAFE switch is a 28 volt DC, motor-driven, rotary switch inside the
bomb which must be placed in the ARMED position by the crew
radar-navigator/bombardier before release in order for the bomb to produce a
nuclear detonation. Of course, nobody has any control over anything inside
the bomb after release.
Let me review 3 very critical steps that the crew radar navigator must go
through during performance of the Weapons Preparation for Release
Checklist - all the steps are critical, but these 3 are most critical.
(Again, this checklist was never performed on this mission.) The radar
navigator (RN) would ask the electronic warfare officer (EW) on the upper
deck to "Pull and stow the special weapons manual lock handle." The EW
would bend over and reach down to a slightly raised pedestal on the floor by
his right foot, break a copper safety wire securing a D-handle on the end of
a cable, rotate the handle out of its detent and pull the cable to retract
mechanical locking pins in the bomb suspension and release mechanisms
(shackles) which, when in place prevent the release of a weapon from the
shackles. He would then stow the handle to prevent its accidental return to
the locked position. The RN would then ask the pilot to "Place the bomb
readiness switches to READY." The pilot would turn hard left in his seat to
access the switches by his left elbow. He would break copper safety wires
securing red plastic guards that prevent the toggle switches from being
accidentally placed to READY. After breaking the safety wires and raising
the plastic guards, the pilot would place the switches to READY. This sends
28 volts DC to the Weapons Control Panel on the RN's left side panel near
his left hand. The RN would then break a copper safety wire securing a
spring-loaded locking pin which, when in place, prevents the rotation of a
wafer/rotary switch to select the appropriate armed position - GRND or AIR.
After breaking the copper safety wire, the RN pulls/retracts and rotates the
locking pin with one hand and holds it while rotating the wafer switch to
the appropriate ARMED position with the other hand. This sends 28 volts DC
to the ARM/SAFE switch inside the bomb causing it to rotate to the
appropriate ARMED position.
Evidently, when the fuselage broke apart through the middle of the bomb bay,
that locking pin cable to the EW's station was accidentally pulled by the
breakup retracting the locking pins for both bombs. I can assure you, the
EW never pulled this cable - the locking handle was still in its proper
locked position in the wreckage, but both pins showed no evidence of any
shearing force, i. e., they were cleanly retracted before the bombs
separated from the aircraft.
Because the bombs separated from aircraft within the required range of
altitude and airspeed, all switches and devices, including ARM/SAFE switch,
worked exactly as designed - parachute deployed pulling the "Wiley Coyote"
switches, and internal batteries started arming, fusing, firing sequence.
In the true, usual sense of the word, then, the switches and devices did not
fail, but because they did not stop the arming, fusing and firing sequence
in this accidental situation, they are considered by some as having failed
in their roll as roadblocks to completion of the sequence.
For bomb # 1, then, all of the switches and devices but one, including chute
deployment, actuated; only the ARM/SAFE switch in SAFE position prevented a
nuclear detonation.
Bomb # 1 was found immediately the next morning standing on its nose with
little damage and with its chute up in a tree. It was quickly disarmed,
laid on a truck and hauled to Seymour Johnson.
The parachute lanyard for bomb # 2 was severed during the aircraft breakup,
so it fell very fast in freefall. The "Wiley Coyote" pullout rods activated
the bomb's internal batteries and started the arming, fusing and firing
sequence, but it hit the ground in about 12.5 sec. at 700 mph before the
sequence could be completed and destroyed itself upon impact.
Since soon after the accident, there's been much confusion and
sensationalism about the ARM/SAFE switch in bomb # 2. When found in the
impact crater with the bomb, it APPEARED to be ARMED, and the word went out
that it was ARMED and is still being reported by some that it was ARMED.
Soon after the accident, though, the bomb's manufacturer and the nation's
leading nuclear equipment testing organization, Sandia Corp., did extensive
analysis of the switch and found that damage to the case made it APPEAR to
be ARMED, but that the switch itself was, in fact, SAFE.
There was no nuclear detonation of bomb #2, then, for a combination of
reasons: the ARM/SAFE switch was in SAFE position, and because its parachute
lanyard was severed in the aircraft breakup, it fell in freefall without a
chute so fast that the arming fusing and firing sequence was not completed
before it destroyed itself on impact.
They soon found #2 in impact crater just off Big Daddy's Rd.
Air Force quickly got a digging and recovery contract with TA Loving Co.
Because the water table in the area of the crater was only a foot and a half
below the surface and its close proximity to Nahunta Swamp, they immediately
had a problem with water intrusion. In spite of using many pumps, they were
never really able to stay ahead of the water intrusion. In the first 2
weeks, though, they had dug a hole 200' in diameter and 40' feet deep.
By the end of 4 months, they had dug a much bigger and deeper hole and had
recovered all of the bomb but the secondary, a very compact and heavy
package containing uranium (half life 100 years - 170 kyrs), plutonium (half
life 100 years - 255 kyrs) and lithium 6-deuteride (half life of
milliseconds) and about the size of a large suitcase and weighing 200-300
lb. Because of so much water, mud and muck, though, they were never able to
find and recover it.
They gave up on the digging, filled in the hole, and the Air Force bought a
400' diameter easement, which is still in effect and allows only surface
farming and no digging more than a depth of 5 feet.
A group at UNC-CH several years ago estimated the depth of the secondary to
be about 180' .
The secondary package poses no threat of any type explosion.
Technicians from NCDENR take water samples annually; they've never found any
contamination, radiation, etc., as a result of the buried package.
Wilton
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