THE TACTICS
By Wilton Strickland
By 22 Dec '72, for four nights in a row, nearly 100 B-52's each night
flew in-trail (one behind the other) at 35,000 to 36,000 feet at 450 knots
true airspeed (TAS) (with a tailwind of about 100 knots) to an initial point
(IP) 90 nautical miles northwest of Hanoi where they accelerated to 470
knots and turned southeast and split off to go their respective targets in
and around Hanoi. The plan also required straight and level flight (no
evasive maneuvers) from IP to target, turn west, immediately decelerate to
450 knots after release and withdraw against a headwind of nearly 120 knots.
The aircraft were grouped into cells of three each with spacing of 15
seconds between each aircraft within the cell and 1 minute between cells.
This gave the enemy air defense system plenty of time to track and fire
on each aircraft as it came within range and get ready for the next one.
Long before we got into the target area, the enemy already knew our exact
altitude, speed, spacing and approach route - a large part of their
acquisition and tracking problem had already been solved for them by
American staff planners. During withdrawal, the combination of deceleration
to 450 knots, the turn into the 120-knot headwind and evasive maneuvers
(zigzagging) to evade the many SAMs fired at us, resulted in a straight line
ground speed of significantly less than 300 knots, drastically increasing
our exposure time. Several B-52's were being shot down every night, except
the second night. Three had been lost on the 18th, six on the 20th, and two
on the 21st.
North Vietnamese gunners later confirmed that it was relatively easy to
acquire their targets by just looking in the same area as the preceding one
and waiting. Because an open bomb bay full of iron bombs reflects more
radar energy than a closed bay, they also could get a better picture of us
when bomb bay doors were opened, usually at 60 seconds before release
(time-to-go - TG). Another more vulnerable time for the BUFF was in the
post-release turn, a procedure developed by Paul Tibbets during WW II to
enhance crew survival after a nuclear weapon release by placing the airplane
as far as possible from the detonation with the airplane straight and level
and tail to the burst at shockwave arrival and is completely irrelevant in
conventional bombing - there's no shockwave reaching our altitude. The turn
gave a special advantage to the enemy, though, by exposing a much larger
radar cross-section, and the aircraft's electronic counter measures beam
patterns were shifted up and away to the side in the turn, allowing the
defenders to better "paint" their targets - the defenders later said that
returns on their scopes tended to "blossom" when we opened the doors and
when we made the post-release turn.
We air crewmen were damned mad about the incompetent planning. I was
one of several crewmen who questioned and protested such tactics almost
immediately. I stood during the pre-mission briefing at U-Tapao on the
second night of the campaign and asked, "Who is planning such stupid tactics
as this, and why?"
The answer given was, "The planning is being done at Strategic Air
Command (SAC) Headquarters in Nebraska, and the common route and altitude
are used for 'ease of planning.'"
My reply to this was to suggest that the staff "weenies" come and fly
some of these missions to get some ideas about how to develop better
tactics. "The North Vietnamese are using our common route and altitude, our
in-trail formation, the long open-door time, the post-release turn and our
slow withdrawal for 'ease of tracking and shoot-down.'" (This was later
confirmed by North Vietnamese gunners.)
Our 17th Air Division Commander, B/G Glenn Sullivan, sitting two rows
directly in front of me on the front row turned and looked up at me during
my question and comments. He said nothing, but I could tell that he agreed
with me.
I adamantly maintained that we should fly as fast as possible from the
initial point (IP) through withdrawal, do evasive maneuvers as necessary
when fired upon if we could be back to straight and level at release,
approach the target from different directions and altitudes, open the doors
as late as possible, eliminate the post-release turn and withdraw to the
east over the Tonkin Gulf, taking advantage of the 100 to 120-knot tailwind
to "get the Hell out of there" ASAP.
Most of us who protested did so by questioning bad tactics and offering
alternatives. Protests by some of the crewmen became much more active,
however - one pilot refused to fly, was later court-martialed and
discharged.
After flying the original in-trail tactics dictated by the weenies in
Nebraska for the first several nights and losing bombers to enemy gunners
almost every night, B/G Sullivan, went around/over his superiors on Guam,
contacted the SAC Commander-in-Chief (CINCSAC) directly and persuaded him to
follow the advice of the air crewmen to develop more imaginative tactics.
It would take two more days to get the plans changed, transmitted across
the Pacific and put into action by the highly trained crewmen who were using
their knowledge, experience, professionalism and initiative to accomplish
the mission in spite of the faulty plans but at great cost. Immediately, we
started approaching many different targets with many aircraft at or near the
same time from several different directions at different altitudes. We
began to fly with full power on the bomb runs, descending rapidly 1000 feet
just before and again immediately after release and accelerating in the
descents to 520 knots TAS as we withdrew to the east, resulting in ground
speeds (up to ~640 knots or ~740 mph) double that using the original plans.
Enemy air defense crews later reported being frustrated and overwhelmed by
so many aircraft from so many directions at the same time.
Many crews had already taken it upon ourselves to keep the doors closed
until just a very few seconds before release and to do evasive maneuvers as
necessary to avoid SAMs. Opening the doors just seconds prior to release
and closing them immediately afterward did not give defenders on the ground
time to react to the stronger radar return given by a BUFF with doors open.
Because of the changes in tactics, bomber-loss rate improved
significantly. Though losses were reduced with the changes, they were not
completely eliminated, however - two were lost on the 26th, and two were
lost on the 27th.
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