-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 26/03/14 13:17, Tom Ritter wrote: > In an online-encrypted document sharing model, for the 98%, this > would look like a document being OpenPGP-encrypted in javascript > with a symmetric key you choose, and stored online by the service. > The recipient visits the fileshare, using javascript > OpenPGP-decrypts the document using the password they received > out-of-band, and downloads it. For the 2%, they PGP-encrypt the > document using gpg, and upload it, communicate the secret out of > band, and the recipient decrypts it using javascript. Or, they > receive a document encrypted with javascript and download it and > PGP-decrypt it using gpg. If you build the service correctly, the > service won't know ahead of time if the document is going to be > decrypted in javascript or gpg, and thus can't reliably attack the > user without a chance of detection.
A nitpick, but does OpenPGP support integrity protection for symmetric encryption? Last time I looked it just had some kind of hash-based checksum that the docs warned was not intended to be a real MAC. Cheers, Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJTMxDUAAoJEBEET9GfxSfMOdgH/1dnNGD4I7hE2hDFENWK/O4y zKHaazCuxOgaP6SAdBeoMDWUCsraSO33KTAEzJ1BsnTBc9hV2lCUyAIFS1XW716M 86fDdpX6H2cHMt1NhwlnRfSbdoqWj3EbXXWbU38AXfoMSfvvaYfyPWHPDbr5z/pD 2HaCYCbR43/50pBQHymKsvh9wEBLWFf6HyUFRWPOVqzXA6M6GPEOt4YjolqWuMC5 K40d19qqPXBdNvaKdYEjyf43UOq+C4IE+zj++l/pxwxzZ22I4G9CWmSFIecUC3YZ Y3XxRnUCYnYajJkou+EJxOdJ75EOdUXeVemjZeNUl4A3B8rnR/t2ogn59JleokM= =Oix9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list [email protected] https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
