On 06/17/2014 02:02 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote: > On Mon, Jun 16, 2014 at 11:18 AM, elijah <[email protected]> wrote:
>> Mix networks are not without their own problems [1], but there is much >> room for improvement, depending on the tolerance for delay. > > I think that paper is about problems with "threshold mixes" which fire > once they've received a certain # of messages; and doesn't affect > "timed" or "stop-and-go" mixes, which seem the more obvious approach. > But I'm no expert here. Yeah, the paper says limitations described don't apply to timed mixes. > The security of a mix doesn't depend on having so many parts it's hard > to observe them, it depends on the time delays and the number of users > your traffic is being "mixed" with. Sending traffic through a single > trusted mix, or a "cascade" of mixes run by a few different > organizations, could be very effective. On a related note, postfix already supports an option to spool messages for a particular transport for a configurable number of seconds (after which they are delivered in a burst). By setting this option on a per-domain basis, I think you could achieve some very rudimentary measures against timing analysis. The question is then, given the average number of messaged delivered to a particular domain every minute, what should the wait period be for that domain? This is not a mix at all, but could be super easy and still of significant benefit. -elijah _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list [email protected] https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
