Dear Ben, In respecting Trevor's concern that CT is off topic for this list, I decided to reply to this email of yours over on [randombit] here:
http://lists.randombit.net/pipermail/cryptography/2014-September/006800.html Feel free to send replies over there (or on [trans] if you'd like). On second thought, I probably should have sent it to [trans]... sorry, my mistake. Kind regards, Greg Slepak -- Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA. On Sep 27, 2014, at 4:38 AM, Ben Laurie <[email protected]> wrote: > On 27 September 2014 01:16, Tao Effect <[email protected]> wrote: >> On Sep 25, 2014, at 4:32 AM, Ben Laurie <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> 1. Gossip could be blocked. >> >> >> Blocking our proposed mechanism == blocking all TLS. So, it could be, >> but it would be kinda obvious... >> >> >> Where do you specify that blocking gossip = blocking TLS? >> >> And where do you specify the details of how gossip works? Still isn't in RFC >> 6962... > > It will never be in RFC 6962 (RFCs can't be substantially changed > after publication). > > Since you've read the article > (http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2668154), you already know I've > discussed gossip in it. > >> 2. If Gossip isn't blocked, and you're able to prove failure... so what? >> What then? The RFC is rather silent on this. >> >> Any support with this question? >> >> The blockchain, on the other hand, doesn't have problem #2. >> >> Even if MITM suddenly starts blocking all new blocks and only showing blocks >> it creates, the node has a giant store of accurate data that the MITM cannot >> modify. Not so with CT. >> >> >> Why not? >> >> >> Because the contents of the entries in the blockchain belong to their >> respective owners. >> >> If clients want to download the whole log, they can. >> >> >> Ben, according to your documentation, clients do not download whole logs, >> Monitors do. Monitors are not web browsers. > > a) "Monitor" is a role - anything can be in that role. > > b) If there's an advantage to downloading the whole log, a client is > free to do so. You claim that there's an advantage to having history > up to some point - I am just observing that CT allows the same thing, > at similar cost. > >> Now, you're welcome to come back at me and say that Google Chrome is going >> to start downloading "All The Logs!", but something tells me you're not >> going to do that. > > Yeah, and we're not going to download "all the blockchain" either. But > if we were prepared to do that, then we could also download the CT > log. > >> >> Kind regards, >> Greg >> >> -- >> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing >> with the NSA.
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