David Leon Gil <[email protected]> writes: > See https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-October/035412.html
Fun times! I bet most of you know this but brute-forced vanity addresses are not the best way to generate human memorable names: Quick test, which one is the correct address for facebook? a) facebookcorewwwl.onion b) facebookcorewwwi.onion c) facebookcorewwwe.onion Also note that when the upcoming HS changes [0] get implemented, the length of onion addresses will increase to 52 characters. Say hello to: facebookcorewwwi0ta0tsw6uovyhwlezkcrmczeuzdvfauuemle.onion That said, I also don't know what's the best way to generate human memorable HS names. As part of upcoming funded work, Tor might implement an opt-in indexing service for HSes: a server where HSes can send their descriptors if they want to be public. That's for HSes that have the facebook/twitter threat model; not the "activist XMPP server" or the "personal SSH server" threat model. Such an indexing server might allow FIFO petname systems (ugh typosquatting!) or a GNS integration (ugh complicated system!) to happen [1]. Who knows, maybe that's better solution than plain vanity addresses. [0]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt [2]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007655.html _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list [email protected] https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
