On Nov 5, 2014, at 9:00 PM, Joseph Bonneau <[email protected]> wrote:
> Cloud backups can defeat this but we decided to consider this a separate > problem-any tool can be defeated if you backup the plaintext somewhere in the > cloud. If you think this is a bad feature encourage users to to disable it. OK, but since it is enabled by default (an opt-out rather than an opt-in, if my memory serves me correctly), shouldn't that checkbox be taken away from Apple, or at the very least, have some type of asterisk next to it? As-is, people will walk away with an incorrect understanding of the security of Apple's iMessages. I assume it is not EFF's intent to mislead people. > Apple's encryption is end-to-end. What definition of end-to-end are you using? Apple is capable of decrypting iMessages sent between users [1], so sorry, but I don't see how that is end-to-end. https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/001065.html Kind regards, Greg Slepak -- Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.
signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail
_______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list [email protected] https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
