On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 9:44 AM, Michael Rogers <[email protected]> wrote: > >> What if Bob has ten thousand people he's ever corresponded with? > > Then ten thousand people will want to know about his new device, > regardless of which approach we take to key sync. > [...] >> My argument is that instead of updating everyone that might be >> remembering your identity info, it's easier to leave that info >> unchanged and just sign the new device's key, or synchronize the >> existing private key to the new device. > > That's fine if you don't want anyone to know about the new device. :-) > Otherwise you'll eventually want to tell people about it. > [...] > As I said before, I don't think the approach I described has any > obvious advantages over the master key approach. I just thought that > since we were enumerating possible approaches, I should mention an > approach that we're thinking of taking with Briar, because it's a bit > different from the other approaches that were described. I'm not > trying to persuade you it's the One True Approach - I'm just > describing it.
OK. Fair point that there's different ways to skin this cat, I had lost track whether we were arguing or not... I guess my point is that in a system like TextSecure, where each user has a single identity public key, and where Alice has to contact Bob's mailbox server to deliver a message, it's nice and easy for the mailbox to tell Alice if Bob has new devices. I think this is a good approach, and am happy that Bob doesn't have to proactively message each of his correspondents when he adds a device. But I can appreciate this isn't possible in all systems. Trevor _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list [email protected] https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
