I haen't quite understood the wrap-resistance property for onion routing protocols defined in [1], although I first noticed in section 4 of the Sphinx paper [2].
In short, they do not want attackers to be able to take valid onion packets, add a layer to the onion, and test it against a router. I can imagine this becomes necessary to prove security in the UC framework, well that's what the paper argues, although I'll need to go through it more careful to understand the argument. As a first point though, I'm not familiar with any actual attacks that exploit of failure of this property however, not without something else failing anyways. Is there something simple I'm missing here? Thanks, Jeff [1] http://cs.brown.edu/~anna/papers/cl05.pdf [2] http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/DBLP:conf/sp/DanezisG09.pdf
signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part
_______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list [email protected] https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
