On Sun, 2015-11-29 at 21:32 +0100, U.Mutlu wrote: > I wonder if it can be possible, at least theoretically, to have a > MITM-secure internet channel without the use of PKI and/or > persistent password (ie. w/o authentication, like in the telephone > network)? > Of course the communication must be encrypted against passive MITM, > and must also detect active MITM. > Does anybody know of such a protocol, info, papers etc.?
Also, are you willing to make the human participants do intellectual work to secure their conversation? You know about ZRTP use of voice authentication, right? We've discussed previously the voice morphing attacks that make this scheme insecure against very advanced adversaries : https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2015/001307.html In that conversation, we discussed using complex human intellectual games and conversational constructs. Just an example : Your session secret is run through scrypt with a human perceptible delay. The results are used locate a series of quotations from say the 12k on wikiquote that are displayed to both users. Users are instructed not to communicate the quotations directly, but instead communicate them indirectly using obscure jokes, linguistic tricks, etc. In particular, users are encouraged to obscurely "foreshadow" the quotes in their conversation and then go back to explain how the foreshadowing connects to the actual quotes. It'd take a serious AI investment to defeat this sort of authentication when done correctly, but.. First, almost no one would do it correctly. Second, human agents could still do direct impersonation attacks quite easily, provided they could know what the parties knew about one another. In other words, these schemes increase the risk of exposure for the adversary, but defeating them will never be anything like as hard a bruit forcing 128 bits or whatever. Jeff
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